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Introductory Summary  
 
Literature has begun to explore the relation of financial development and economic 
performance that indicates a positive role for capital markets and institutions (e.g., Levine and 
Zervos [1998], Rajan and Zingales [1998]). However, we still do not fully understand the 
mechanisms that are in place through which the capital markets, its participants, and the related 
institutions could have an impact on the economic performance of firms and hence, the real 
sector. As pointed out by Zingales [2003], this lack of understanding has made it difficult to 
draw policy conclusions from prior literature. It remains important to examine possible 
mechanisms and channels through which capital markets operate, and how they could influence 
economic performance.  
Generally, capital markets satisfy two important roles in an economy. Firstly, they can 
facilitate the allocation of capital. Secondly, they may help to promote governance and control 
by offering various mechanisms for information gathering and monitoring decision-makers 
inside the firms. In its allocation function, it ideally should help to channel resources to agents 
with the most profitable investment opportunities, and it should help to offer risk pooling and 
risk-sharing. Via its governance function, the financial system allows monitoring and 
information production services being offered that help to mitigate various agency problems, 
such as the lemons problem (Akerlof [1978]) which creates demand for information 
intermediaries (e.g., equity research analysts, institutional investors, media) who are 
incentivized to engage in information production to uncover managers’ information. 
Information intermediaries and other institutions may help to mitigate the consequences of 
imperfect information and moral hazard by facilitating and engaging in monitoring and 
information production.  
Prior literature has covered different players in the capital markets, such as banks (e.g., 
Fama [1985], Shan, Tang, and Winton [2019], and Marshall, McCann, and McColgan [2014]), 
equity research analysts as “gate keepers” (e.g., Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros [1989], and Yu 
[2008]), but also investors, such as activist investors (Brav, Jiang, and Kim [2015]) and short 
sellers (e.g., Efendi, Kinney, and Swanson [2005], Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman 
[2006], Drake, Rees, and Swanson [2011], Karpoff and Lou [2010], Massa, Zhang, and Zhang 
[2015], and Pownall and Simko [2005]) that may engage in the monitoring and information 




already shown that intermediaries can shape the information environment in capital markets 
(e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1995], and Piotroski and Roulstone [2004]). 
With the last-mentioned group, the short sellers, there has been an ongoing unsolved 
debate on their role as potential information intermediaries in the capital markets. On the one 
hand, prior literature describes short sellers as sophisticated, relatively more informed market 
participants compared to other investors (e.g., Drake et al. [2011], Reed [2013]). They are 
recognized to play an important role in correcting mispricing and identifying corporate 
malfeasance. Like equity research analysts, short sellers spend a substantial amount of their 
time and resources in analyzing companies and may well help to close the information gap, 
especially when other intermediaries such as equity research analysts are missing (Pownall and 
Simko [2005]). On the other hand, critics say that short sellers may engage in over-selling 
activities and that some short sellers may be exposed to limited cognitive processing abilities 
(e.g., Henry and Koski [2010], Sun and Xu [2018]). Also, regulators have acted against short 
sellers. The SEC named manipulators as a motivation for proposing short-position disclosure 
regulations, noting that short selling bear raids were thought by some to have caused the 1929 
market crash and the subsequent inability of the market to recover.1 
 Apart from short sellers, other market participants, such as institutions have been linked 
to the role of information and monitoring intermediaries. With regards to institutions in general 
and their role in monitoring in the capital markets, a great body of the prior literature has defined 
institutions primarily as institutional investors as described in Chen, Harford, and Li [2007] 
who offer the monitoring in the capital markets to other participants. In addition, literature has 
started to focus on governmental institutions and their relation to corporate governance issues 
and monitoring (e.g., Lederman, Loayza, and Soares [2005], Gilson [1996]), but mainly with a 
focus on national regulators. After the recent financial crisis, we saw an increase in the need for 
additional monitors to provide policymakers with regular assessments of the financial system’s 
vulnerabilities and by assisting in information gathering and monitoring. 
In the first and second essay, I focus on short sellers to understand, firstly how 
heterogeneous they are in their investing behavior and their usage of observable, potentially 
predictive information. The second essay focuses on a subgroup of short sellers who publish 
reports on target firms thereby disclosing their investment thesis. The essay studies how these 
 
1 “The Commission will vigorously investigate and prosecute those who manipulate markets with this witch's 
brew of damaging rumors and short sales,” said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. SEC Charges Wall Street 





activist short sellers may trigger firms’ reactions to their disclosed reports. The third essay shifts 
focus to a newly installed supranational monitor in the European Union, the so-called 
Monitoring Trustees (MT), where the focus is shifted away from market participants to 
monitors that are introduced by the European Commission, the supranational executive body 
of the European Union (EU), to supervise firms. All three essays are empirical in nature and 
aim at gaining insight into the mechanisms in place in the capital markets, that may or may not, 
facilitate the monitoring and information production services that help mitigate the various 
agency problems of the firms. All essays benefit from exploiting interesting settings with data 
sources of sufficient level of detail that also benefited from hand-collecting data and thereby 
adding granularity to the existing academic studies. As a result, settings range from single 
countries, like the United States (US) in the second essay, to a broader set of countries in the 
first and third essay. These essays aim not to answer whether a particular intermediary, investor, 
or governmental institution fulfills the monitoring position in a better way.  
In the first essay, I investigate observable characteristics and attributes of target firms 
that different types of short seller choose in a large, international sample. To my knowledge, 
this study is the first exploratory study that provides descriptive evidence in line with the idea 
that short sellers are not a homogenous group of investors but rather consist of heterogeneous 
subsets of investors with different preferences for targets and agendas, including the different 
use of predictive information. By classifying short sellers into different types, this study fills an 
open gap in the literature (Jiang, Habib, and Hasan [2020]) by putting a structure on this 
heterogeneous group of investors. I make use of the data made available through the EU 
Regulation on short selling that has detailed information about each single short selling 
transaction including the short sellers’ identity, location, and the target firms. With this data, it 
is possible to differentiate between heterogenous types of short sellers which I group mainly 
into three groups, namely hedge funds, investment managers, and banks. The data allows to 
structure short sellers who have mostly been described as a homogenous group of investors in 
prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Ge, and Schrand [2010]).  
Moreover, the decision process of short sellers, which is difficult to observe, has only 
been scantily addressed in a handful of studies (e.g., Dechow et al. [2001]) and, hence, I 
examine in this paper which observable firm characteristics of target firms are used by these 
different types of short sellers to identify overvalued firms. This may help to better understand 
the role of short sellers as information intermediaries because we may better understand the 
information set that is deployed by short sellers, especially when there seems to be evidence 




this study show: Hedge funds and investment managers on average share the preference for 
larger and younger with investment managers focusing also on lower return on assets and lower 
book-to-market ratios of target firms. The outcome of being targeted by banks, instead, is 
significantly only associated with lower restatements but higher leverage on average. Also, 
hedge funds and investment managers seem to prefer less risky firms abroad, which is in line 
with long investors who avoid more risky foreign firms due to information asymmetries (e.g., 
Coval and Moskovitz [1999]). 
The second essay studies a subset of short sellers, so-called activist short sellers that 
publish reports claiming the target firms are overvalued, and the types of responses firms make 
in response to these short seller reports. It is important to understand the target firm responses 
to activist short seller reports because these reports have become increasingly prominent in 
recent years and they significantly impact targeted firms (e.g., Ljungqvist and Qian [2016], 
Jiang et al. [2020]). Also, this study links back to point of better understanding whether and 
when short sellers can serve as information intermediaries for other investors and other 
participants in the capital markets, as those reports represent a negative information event for 
the target firm, like a sell recommendation of equity research analysts. What makes this setting 
particularly interesting is that we can see an observable investment thesis by the short seller. 
This disclosed report may help other market participants to adjust and/or confirm their own 
beliefs, and thereby short sellers may not only follow their profit-making agenda but also 
function as information and monitoring intermediaries in the capital markets. The recent 
collapse of Wirecard AG has shown even more how crucial activist short sellers may be. In 
2016, some activist short sellers had already posted a report that contained valuable information 
regarding the fraudulent activities of the firm but that was neglected, even downplayed, by 
regulators, equity research analysts, and other market participants. 
Using a hand-collected sample of reports that target US-listed firms and collecting the 
matching responses, this study offers new evidence about the association of those reports with 
significant firm outcomes. 31% of firms in the sample respond by denying the activists’ claims, 
threatening, or launching lawsuits against the activist, providing additional disclosures, and 
launching internal investigations. Firms are also more likely to respond when the activist report 
is accompanied by more negative abnormal returns and when the report contains new 
information that was not already available in public disclosures. Not only do the results 
highlight the impact of these short sellers on target firms, but additionally that launching an 




likely to be delisted, more likely to receive a fraud enforcement action, and less likely to be 
acquired.  
The third essay shifts focus away from short sellers in their role as information and 
monitoring intermediaries to a supranational monitoring mechanism, namely monitoring 
trustees (MT) that has been deployed to some banks that have obtained state aid during the last 
financial crisis. Using a hand-collected sample of 76 banks that have received state aid in the 
EU, I am the first one to study what duties they have and how those supranational monitors 
may change bank reporting behavior. Whereas some academics (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet 
[2017]) have been silent about the role of supranational regulators and monitors during the 
financial crises at state aid banks, my findings suggest that MT may change in loan loss 
reporting and restatements through their power to curtail management’s discretion and through 
imposing further supervision. My findings present the first comprehensive economic analysis 
to study the potential impact on banks through these new supranational monitors. Prior literature 
mainly investigated how national bank supervisors and regulators have shaped the financial 
reporting properties of banking systems (e.g., Bushman and Williams [2012], Costello, Granja, 
and Weber [2019]). By focusing on supranational supervisors, this paper shifts focus away from 
national supervisors and regulators and contributes to the literature by studying these new 
supranational monitors. 
Since the last financial crisis, external stakeholders have been seeking additional 
governance mechanisms to encourage bank managers to establish adequate reserves, thus 
leading to a more stable and healthier banking system. In this regard, the findings of this essay 
should be of interest to regulators, researchers, and, most importantly, the policymakers at the 
EC, as my findings contribute to the lively debate on the extent to which additional monitoring 
mechanisms should be implemented to foster financial stability or to which extend assigning 
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I investigate observable characteristics and attributes of firms that different short seller types 
pick when they select their target firms in a large, international sample. I provide new 
descriptive evidence using data made available through the EU Regulation on short selling that 
has detailed information about the short sellers’ identity, location, and the target firms. With 
this dataset, it is possible to differentiate between heterogeneous types of short sellers (e.g., 
hedge funds, banks) and to observe their revealed target preferences. I find that hedge funds 
and investment managers on average share preferences for larger and younger firms with 
investment managers being also associated with a lower return on assets and lower book-to-
market ratios. Target firms of banks, instead, are significantly associated with lower 
restatements but with higher leverage on average. Based on a subsample analysis, short sellers 
prefer firms with different observable characteristics at home versus abroad, with hedge funds 
and investment managers, seeming to favor less risky firms abroad. 
 
JEL Codes: G10, G14, G11 
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How do short sellers identify the companies they invest in? Most of the time, prior 
literature describes target firms as being overvalued in comparison to firms that are not shorted 
(e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan [2001], Nagel [2003]) or in comparison to the 
target firm’s estimated intrinsic firm value. Additionally, short selling activities are associated 
with weak target firm fundamentals, such as a low book-to-market ratio, (e.g., Dechow et al. 
[2001]) or low future returns (e.g., Seneca [1967], Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu [2006], 
Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman [2006]). However, the empirical evidence is still 
relatively meager on how short sellers identify their target firms – besides a few studies (e.g., 
Desai et al. [2006]) that ask whether accounting information plays a role as an input in short 
sellers’ analyses – and on which firm characteristics they prefer and whether different short 
sellers share similar preferences or not. Hence, this paper addresses this gap in the literature by 
exploring additional observable characteristics and attributes that short sellers reveal when they 
select potentially overvalued target firms by using a sample of short selling transactions across 
European countries from 2013 to 2015 with 413 target firms. Moreover, the paper provides new, 
topical descriptive evidence on the revealed preferences of different types of short sellers which 
directly addresses the recent call made by scholars for more research on “the heterogeneities of 
short sellers” (Jiang, Habib, and Hasan [2020], p.44).  
Generally, short sellers are often described as the relatively more informed market 
participants compared to other investors (e.g., Drake, Myers, Scholz, and Sharp [2015], 
Diamond and Verrecchia [1987], and Reed [2013]) and they are seen as important market 
participants that help to improve market efficiency (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang [2008], 
Diether, Lee, and Werner [2009], and Fang, Huang, and Karpoff [2016]). However, critics say 
that some short sellers also engage in over-selling activities and that some short sellers may 
make prices less efficient or may be exposed to limited cognitive processing abilities (e.g., 
Henry and Koski [2010], and Sun and Xu [2018]). Apart from knowing more about activist 
short sellers and their observed target preferences through recent studies (e.g., Chen [2016], 
and Ljungqvist and Qian [2016]), we still know little about how the bigger remaining subset of 
short sellers identifies target firms. Do all short sellers share similar revealed preferences 
regarding a target firm’s characteristics?  
Since the decision process of short sellers has only been scantily addressed in a handful 




characteristics are used by short sellers and to what extent these characteristics vary across 
different types of short sellers, such as banks or hedge funds. By using a more granular dataset 
which was obtained from each of the national competent authorities in the European Union, I 
can observe individual short selling transactions including the respective short seller as well as 
the target firm.1 The data structure has several advantages. First, the structure of the dataset 
used in this study allows me to allocate the short sellers to different groups, such as banks, 
investment managers, or hedge funds because I can identify the short sellers at the institutional 
level (like Bushee and Noe [2000]) (see Appendix for details). Hence, the data allows me to put 
more structure on short sellers who have mostly been described as a faceless, homogenous 
group of investors in prior literature (e.g., Boehmer and Wu [2013], Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 
[2010]). The location of each short seller is also observable which helps to categorize the short 
sellers into different groups based on the country of origin which is used in the subsample 
analyses. Second, due to the more granular data, I can now observe every single transaction 
made by a short seller at the institutional level (see figure 1) on a one-to-one level. This means 
that a specific short seller can be paired with its target firm and target firms are identified via 
the name and the provided International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) for each 
transaction. Hence, the one-on-one relation between a short seller and target firm allows me to 
investigate the revealed target preference in greater detail. This has not been possible with data 
in prior studies in the United States where short interest is disclosed but aggregated across 
different investors. Hence, prior evidence has provided rather inconclusive results about how 
short sellers seek out their targets due to highly aggregated data on short interest (e.g., Desai et 
al. [2006]) or daily data that has severe limitations due to a particular provider (e.g., Daske, 
Richardson, and Tuna [2005]).  
The main findings suggest after controlling for year- and firm-fixed effects in the 
ordinary least squares regression specification for the short panel (2013-2015) that the outcome 
of being targeted is positively associated with larger firms as well as younger firms that are 
often riskier compared to more mature firms. Considering the different subgroups of short 
sellers, hedge funds seem to prefer larger and younger firms like investment managers. The 
focus on size seems consistent with the preference for easy to short, more liquid firms (Reed 
[2013]). Investment managers also seem to account for a lower return on assets ratio and a 
 
1 Due to a regulatory change on the level of the European Union (EU) regarding the disclosure of short selling 
trades above a threshold of 0.5%, short sellers must disclose their transactions to the national regulator in the 
country in which they engage in short selling transactions. Information on the national competent authorities 
and their dataset have been obtained from the following link 




lower book-to-market ratio. In contrast, banks prefer leveraged firms and fewer restatements. 
Looking at differences between how short sellers invest at home versus abroad, I observe that 
short sellers at home (tested for the UK investors only2) reveal differences in target preferences 
of firms at home compared to target firms abroad: Hedge funds and investment managers prefer 
target firms abroad that appear to be less risky, which is in line with findings regarding long 
investors (e.g., Coval and Moskovitz [1999]) that are explained by higher information 
asymmetries abroad. 
This study contributes, firstly, to the literature on short sellers (e.g., Boehmer and Wu 
[2013], Christophe, Ferri, and Angel [2004], Desai et al. [2006], Drake, Rees, and Swanson 
[2011], Efendi, Kinney, and Swanson [2005], Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg [2012], Fang 
et al. [2016], Jones, Reed, and Waller [2016], Reed [2013], and Von Beschwitz, Chuprinin, and 
Massa [2017]) by adding new descriptive evidence regarding the determinants of the target 
selection of different short sellers across a large sample of firms in different countries. Secondly, 
it also contributes to our understanding of the short selling activities of different short seller 
types and their revealed preferences, thus providing a deeper understanding of this group of 
investors (e.g., Jiang et al. [2020], Bushee [2001], and Bushee [2004]), which addresses a 
recently voiced need to conduct more research on these heterogeneous investors (Jiang et al. 
[2020]). This way, it also connects to the literature (e.g., Bushee [2001], and Bushee [2004]) 
that has asked whether there are significant differences among investors in trading practices 
and what kinds of firms tend to attract each type of investors (e.g., Bushee [2001], and Bushee 
[2004]) but here, the primary focus is on short sellers. 
  
 
2 The subsample analyses are conducted only for the UK because it is the country in the sample with highest 




2. Background and Related Literature 
 
Short selling is a trading strategy that aims to benefit from a decline of a stock price or 
of another asset price and can be used to speculate or to hedge against downside risks of long 
positions. Given that short selling often involves leveraged positions, margin calls, and 
substantial downside risks for the short seller, short selling is distinct from other types of trades 
and hence, plays a unique and important role in financial markets.  
Given its importance, the last decades have produced widespread public and academic 
interest in short selling activities and interest in its potential consequences for market 
participants. So far, the existing literature has suggested that the underlying fundamentals of 
the different target firms seem to make up most of the motivation for short selling (e.g., Dechow 
et al. [2001]). Short sellers seem to prefer target firms that underperform (e.g., Asquith and 
Meulbrook [1995], Desai et al. [2002], and Dechow et al. [2001]) which suggests that short 
sellers use valuation-related signals to identify overpriced firms. Richardson [2003] further 
investigates whether short selling transactions are linked to the target firms’ magnitude of 
accruals (based on Sloan [1996]) and finds no significant relation between short interest and 
accruals. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how short sellers distinguish between target firms and 
non-target firms: Prior literature has been rather silent on providing a better understanding of 
the underlying determinants that short sellers select and which observable firm characteristics 
short sellers reveal as preferred firm characteristics.  
Much of the prior literature has concentrated on the presence of short sellers around 
specific corporate events (e.g., Christophe et al. [2004], and Boehme et al. [2006]) that finds 
that short selling transactions concentrate prior to disappointing earnings announcements, 
equity analyst forecast revisions, and equity analysts’ downgrades. Other studies (e.g., Desai et 
al. [2006], and Efendi et al. [2005]) show that short interest increases in the months just prior 
to an earnings restatement or disclosures that correct prior disclosures, suggesting that short 
sellers select firms that are more likely to be related to doubtful financial reporting practices. 
However, the ambiguity about short sellers’ information set remains and the ambiguity about 
the preferred targets’ characteristics, too. For example, Engelberg et al. [2012] find no evidence 
that short sellers engage in abnormal trading activities prior to bad news events. Interestingly, 
Drake et al. [2015] find that short sellers prefer to target rather smaller companies with 
potentially weaker information environments, which goes against the intuition that target firms 




transaction. Their results also suggest that short sellers respond to, but do not anticipate, 
restatement announcements of target firms (Drake et al. [2015]).  
Recent work on short selling has focused on a special subset of investors, namely activist 
short sellers (Chen [2016], and Ljungqvist and Qian [2016]) who publicly reveal their 
information, usually in the form of publicly available reports, to induce a sale of the targets’ 
shares. Chen [2016] finds that this special subset of short sellers focuses on firms with financial 
reporting red flags but with “good” operating performances and stock valuations. The word 
“good” implies an operating performance that is deemed to be too good to be true by the reports 
of short sellers. However, given the specific business model of those short sellers, their own 
legal risk, i.e., being sued by the companies they target, these short sellers could be incentivized 
to focus on a special subset of companies.3 Also, these short sellers seem to make up only a 
small portion of the overall population of short sellers who do not disclose their investment, 
making the generalization of these results difficult. 
Given that researchers have provided persuasive evidence that institutional investors are 
not a homogeneous group – they differ greatly in terms of investment styles (value stocks vs. 
growth stocks), trading frequency, competitive pressures, and legal restrictions (e.g., Bushee 
[2004]), it may follow that different groups of short sellers also differ in their target firm 
selection. Using the currently available more granular data set on different short seller types, I 
can help to better differentiate determinants in the target selection of this heterogeneous group 
of short sellers and contribute to the literature (e.g., Jiang et al. [2020], Bushee [2001], and 
Bushee [2004]) in the main part of this paper that tries to examine whether there are significant 
differences among short sellers in trading practices.  
In addition, in a subsample analysis, I examine whether short sellers select their targets 
differently abroad than at home to see whether the “home bias” behavior is also observable 
among short sellers. Here, I also investigate whether I see differences for the main subgroups 
of short sellers. As indicated in prior literature (e.g., Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock [2004]), 
 
3 In line with Lamont (2012), who provides evidence of firms use lawsuits to block short selling activities, 
Carson Block, the founder of Muddy Waters Research, mentions: “Every time I publish a report, I assume two 
things. One is that the company is going to sue me, and I am going to face a hostile regulator. I have only been 
sued twice. I have never had to file a response. But I assume that I will be sued. And I have never faced a 
regulator that is hostile. But when I say hostile there are political forces behind the scenes pushing them to 
come down on us. So, every word that I write in the report must be written to that standard of, “Can I support 
this in court?”, “Can I support this in front of a regulator?” We always know more than we publish.” This 
article discusses what short sellers look for in stocks their short. Link via 
https://moneyweek.com/495473/what-a-short-seller-looks-for-in-a-stock-and-what-to-short-now/ (access date: 




outside long investors face higher informational barriers and, hence, higher information costs 
concerning foreign firms. When compared to their investments abroad, we know that long 
investors show a strong preference for more risky firms at home (Coval and Maskowitz [1999]). 
For short sellers we do not know whether the same holds, yet. 
 Overall, the paper aims to relate to prior studies that analyze short sellers (e.g., Von 
Beschwitz et al. [2017], Boehmer et al. [2013], Christophe et al. [2004], Desai et al. [2006], 
Drake et al. [2011], Efendi et al. [2005], Engelberg et al. [2012], Fang et al. [2016], Jones et al. 
[2016], and Reed [2013]) in general and their observable target selection procedure (e.g., 
Dechow et al. [2001], and Drake et al. [2015]) in particular with a focus on the heterogeneity 





3.  Data and Research Design  
 
To provide further insights into the process of how short sellers select their targets, I 
analyze relatively newly available data on short selling transactions, covering a period from 
November 2012 to July 2016, on short selling activities with regards to target companies across 
the European Union. The main analysis will only focus on full-year periods, from the beginning 
of January 2013 to the end of December 2015. The core data sets have been obtained from the 
respective national regulators where available.4 Where no short selling was taking place, no 
data sets were available from the regulator. Due to the new EU regulations, short sellers are 
asked to disclose their single short selling positions to regulators in the respective country of 
their target firm. Investors must disclose positions to respective regulators from 0.2% of the net 
short position, and all positions from 0.5% must be made public since November 2012.  
In prior empirical academic literature (e.g., Karpoff and Lou [2010]), the most widely 
used source of short selling data has included the aggregated short interest of firms in the United 
States, which consists of a monthly or bimonthly snapshot of open short positions at brokerages. 
More recent empirical academic papers (e.g., Drake et al. [2015]) have used intra-day data 
points on short-sale transactions conducted on stock exchanges in the United States. A nice 
feature of the data that I use is that I can observe each single transaction made by an investor, 
including the investor’s identity, the investor’s location, the transaction date, and the 
publication date as well as the target’s identity (see figure 1). Using these disclosed data points, 
I can classify the short sellers into different groups and determine what kinds of firms are more 
likely to attract each of the different types of short sellers. Across 16 European Union countries 
with the available disclosures (see table D), 806 target firms were identified, as well as 383 
short sellers (see table 1) and a total of underlying 47,019 transactions. 413 unique target firms 
remain for the regression specifications in table 5. 
I begin the sample selection by obtaining the lists of transactions from the respective 
national regulators that include all transactions starting with the period November 2012. The 
main sample will only include the full years 2013-2015 due to data availability at the time data 
was collected and to circumvent later macroeconomic risks related to the announced Brexit in 
June 2016. I use the names of each firm and its ISIN to be able to link it to company-specific 
CapitalIQ financial data and the respective CapitalIQ universe of listed firms in each of the 
countries. Table 1 describes my sample selection procedure in greater detail. Company-specific 
 
4 Information on the national competent authorities have been obtained from the following link: 




data used in the analyses have been retrieved from CapitalIQ and SDC Platinum for the M&A 
activity data and the variable definitions are described in greater detail in Appendix A.  
To classify the short sellers, I have used investor types disclosed with third-party data 
from CapitalIQ and Bloomberg (see Appendix B, figure B). The classification considers 
investor types on the institutional level, including hedge funds, banks, investment managers, 
family offices, pension funds, and others. I choose to use the legal type to classify the short 
sellers as it is deemed a common approach (Bushee [2004]). The general idea behind this 
approach is that I assume that, for instance, banks may invest differently than pension funds. 
The investment practices of both may also differ significantly from those of investment 
management firms and hedge funds. This approach also entails that each of these types is 
governed by different fiduciary responsibility laws: banks and pension funds usually must 
follow stricter fiduciary standards than investment managers and hedge funds, which are less 
regulated, can follow more complex trading and risk management techniques, and tend to move 
their portfolios toward safer stocks (Del Guercio [1996]). Also, the competitive pressures faced 
by each type may differ which may also be reflected in a different target selection approach. 
Investment managers often tend to have much more “churn”, meaning sources flow in and out 
more often in their funds, than, for instance, pensions and endowments, which results in trading 
that is more sensitive to the performance of portfolio companies (e.g., Lang and McNichols 
[1997]). The advantage of my chosen classification approach is that legal type is readily 
available in most financial databases, too. One of the major disadvantages is that there may 
exist tremendous variation within these groups in terms of investment horizons and sensitivity 
to short-term news (Bushee [2005]). However, I deem the parent’s legal entity to be important 
in setting strategies for the overall unit which may not be the case. Also, disclosed investor 
types may change over time which I cannot capture with my data, and the data may be based 
on self-disclosed information by investors which may be erroneous. This is probably the biggest 
limitation of this study because the key dependent variable is constructed based upon the 
constructed short seller types. Any systematic error in the grouping may harm the results in the 
main analysis. 
Determining the geographical classification of investor types has turned out to be less 
difficult as the location of investors at the city level can be easily obtained from the disclosures 
provided (figure 1). In the data set, a short seller’s parent’s company location is important to 
identify the distribution of short sellers across countries. For example, a British subsidiary of 




States. For example, J.P. Morgan’s UK subsidy is summarized under the parent’s country of 
origin, here the United States.  
 The primary model will be fitted by an ordinary least squares’ regression specification 
including year- and firm-fixed effects with standard errors clustered by firm. The dependent 
variable at firm-year level is equal to either one in the case of being selected as a target by a 
specific investor group in a given year indicating a positive outcome or zero otherwise. 
I estimate the following model at the firm-year level for my ordinary least squares’ 
regression specification with year and firm fixed effects5: 
 
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
 +𝛽5𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽10𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽12𝑀&𝐴 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
  ∑𝛽𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +   ∑𝛽𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (1) 
 
All explanatory variables are included in the model as lagged, winsorized values (at the 
top and bottom 10%) and measured at the data-year ends (details in Appendix A). First, as an 
exploratory analysis, I account for basic firm-level characteristics and short sale constraints by 
including firm size, measured by the log of total assets (size) and leverage (leverage), measured 
by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, expecting that targeted firms have higher leverage 
as reported in prior literature (e.g., Jank and Smajlbegovic [2017], Massoud, Nandy, Saunders, 
and Song [2011]). With regards to the size variable, the existing evidence points to two different 
directions: Jank, Roling, and Smajlbegovic [2021] find that targeted firms are of larger size, 
which is in line with the short sale constraint argument which states that short sellers prefer 
larger and more liquid target firms, whereas Drake et al. [2015] find in their sample that short 
sellers target smaller companies which are said to prefer to operate in weaker information 
environments. Furthermore, I account for age in the regression specification because I want to 
explore whether short sellers in a larger sample prefer firms at a certain stage of their life cycles. 
Recent prior research on activist short sellers finds that this subgroup of short sellers seems to 
target firms that recently IPOed (e.g., Brendel and Ryans [2021]), i.e., often younger firms. For 
simplicity reasons, I only consider two firm-age groups: firms that are less than five years old 
and firms that are five years old or older. I end up with two groups - young and mature firms - 
by accounting with a binary indicator variable age that equals one when a firm is mature and 
zero otherwise.6 Additionally, I account for loss-making firms (via a binary loss indicator 
variable), as it is reasonable to assume that firms that are not doing economically well attract 
 
5 ß0 is not estimated when fixed effects are being used. 




more short sellers than firms that are not loss-making because short sellers are generally betting 
that the stock of the firm they short sell will drop in price. As for the overvaluation features, I 
account for the lagged value of the book-to-market ratio (book-to-market), the asset growth 
(growth) (Cooper Cooper, Gulen, and Schill [2008]) which is defined as Assetst/Assetst-1, and 
profitability as proxied by the return on assets (RoA). With regards to prior expectations, I 
presume to find targets with a lower book-to-market ratio compared to non-target firms because 
a lower book-to-market indicates overvaluation. Also, target firms may be likely to be less 
profitable than non-target firms and may exhibit a lower asset growth relative to non-target 
firms (e.g., Cooper et al. [2008], Dechow et al. [2001], Jank et al. [2017]). Moreover, I add 
capital intensity as a potential explanatory variable (capital intensity) because, following Kedia 
and Philippon [2006], there seems to exist a higher likelihood of overvaluation for firms that 
have a recent history of increased hiring and capital investments. Like Zhao [2018], I account 
for uncertainty features via the following variables: the existence of Big4 auditors (Big4) which 
is defined as a binary indicator variable counting one for Big4 auditors and zero otherwise, 
restatements (restatements) which indicate whether a firm had recent substantial restatements 
of their financials or zero otherwise, and the litigation risk (litigation risk) as defined by Kim 
and Skinner [2012]. With regards to the Big4 auditors, I expect target firms to be less 
transparent than the non-target firms (e.g., Drake et al. [2015]), though considering the risks 
involved in short selling transactions, one could also argue that short sellers prefer more 
transparent targets to minimize potential noise trader risk. Lastly, like Beneish and Nicholas 
[2009], who try to identify overvalued equity, I am adding a variable that tries to capture 
whether a firm engages in M&As (M&A activity). The reasoning behind this variable is that for 
firms with a recent history of acquisitions, investors may face value destruction via overvalued 
target firms and a higher uncertainty via a more difficult-to-value firm (e.g., Jensen and Ruback 
[1983], Travlos [1987], Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller [2002], and Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz [2004]). Some anecdotal evidence supports this variable through a recent example 
that occurred in February 2021 where a short seller started questioning Kerry Group’s 
acquisition track record and claimed it had overpaid for low-yielding acquisitions.7 A more 
detailed description of the variables used in the main specification can be found in Appendix 
A. I run the main regression analysis in table 5 for all major groups of different short sellers, 
namely hedge funds, investment managers, and banks. Due to fewer observations, the following 
 
7 Kerry Group’s acquisition track record was question by a short seller in 2021. Link: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/agribusiness-and- food/kerry-shares-slide-as-short-seller-questions-m-a-




groups are not analyzed further: pension funds, family offices, and individual investors. The 
main analysis hence focuses only on the three topmost frequent short seller types. 
In an additional analysis, I explore in a subsample analysis whether short sellers, once 
categorized by their countries of origin, behave differently abroad than at home because one 
may assume that their information set may vary across countries, and hence, so may their 
preferences for target firms. Prior literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz [1999]) suggests that 
long investors exhibit a strong preference for locally established firms to take advantage of 
asymmetric information between local and non-local investors. It also shows that they prefer 
smaller and more leveraged firms at home, which would be riskier in a setting with lower 
information asymmetries. For the sub-analysis, I make use of the fact that I, first, have a 
substantial number of short sellers from the United Kingdom (see table B that describes the UK 
as the biggest market for hedge funds) in my sample. Second, I have many target firms located 
in the United Kingdom and abroad that are targeted by short sellers from the United Kingdom 
(see table C panel B, table D, table 1 panel B). Hence, I use this larger subsample to explore 
whether short sellers at home in the United Kingdom prefer different target firm characteristics 
than abroad, expecting to see more target firms with riskier characteristics at home than abroad 
to be in line with prior literature (Coval and Moskowitz [1999]). The specification follows the 
same ordinary least squares regressions as in table 5, column (3) where year- and firm-fixed 
effects are accounted for, and standard errors are clustered by firms only. I also conduct the 
same analyses for the two largest subgroups, hedge funds, and investment managers, to 





4. Empirical Results 
 
The sample selection procedure results in 806 target firms and 383 different short sellers 
with 47,019 transactions (see table 1 for details) in the EU after keeping only transactions of 
EU firms in the years 2013 to 2015. The main analysis in table 3 to table 6 is based upon 413 
target firms that remain after deleting target firms with missing financials and after outlier 
treatments (e.g., winsorizing at the top and bottom 10%) to minimize the influence of outliers. 
Out of those 413 firms, the majority of firms are located in the United Kingdom (approximately 
33.7%), Germany (approximately 14.8%), France (approximately 9.9%), and Sweden 
(approximately 9.7%). 
According to 47,019 transactions grouped by short seller types in table 2, hedge funds 
account for the most active group of investors, with a total number of 24,620 transactions 
(approximately 52% of all transactions), followed by investment managers with 18,087 
transactions (approximately 39% of all transactions). Banks make up roughly 8% of all 
transactions with 3,908 transactions. “Others” is the least active group with a total number of 
404 transactions in the period from 2013 to 2015. This group consists of all remaining 
subgroups such as pension funds, individual investors, etc.; due to the limited number of 
transactions, these groups are ignored in further analyses. Overall findings are in line with Jank 
et al. [2021] who find that hedge funds are the largest group, accounting for 66% of their sample 
and banks only accounting for 2% of the observations. Jank et al. [2021] explain the small 
visible share of banks with the fact that banks may use an exemption rule for market makers to 
avoid disclosing their positions because they may face higher reputational costs.8 Also, my 
higher percentage share could be explained by a different classification. Unfortunately, I do not 
observe the classification process of Jank et al. [2021], but I, for example, classified J.P. Morgan 
Asset Management as a bank and not as an investment manager because it is part of the bank 
JPMorgan Chase & Co and not a stand-alone investment manager. Additionally, out of the top 
ten list of short sellers with the most frequent disclosures in table A of the Appendix, only hedge 
funds, investment managers, and banks are represented which supports my later approach to 
later focus only on these three core groups in the main analyses. With regards to the origin of 
the investors in table C in the Appendix, most transactions come from investors located in the 
United States with 57.8% of the total transactions, followed by short sellers from the United 
 
8 ESMA publishes a list of market makers (link: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/list_of_market_makers_and_primary_dealers.pdf, access 




Kingdom (UK), with 31.7% of all transactions. Among the remaining European Union 
countries, only France ranks fourth with 1.4% of the 47,019 transactions. Not surprisingly, most 
transactions from the United States come from hedge funds with 14,607 transactions, followed 
by investment managers with 10,871 transactions. The United Kingdom is the country with the 
highest amount of hedge funds and investment managers in Europe as shown in table C panel 
B. The focus on the United Kingdom in my subsample analyses is also supported by table 1 
panel b where the United Kingdom has the most target firms with 139 companies 
(approximately 33.7% out of the total sample). 
Table 3 compares univariate yearly firm-level differences in observable characteristics 
between target and non-target firms in the universe of listed companies in the respective 
European Union countries. The data is based on yearly observations of the 413 target firms and 
2,041 non-target firms. Generally, target firms are significantly larger (at the 1% significance 
level) with a log value of Euros 7.81 billion of assets than the average of non-targeted firms 
with a log value of Euros 6.10 billion assets; comparing medians, target firms are still 
significantly larger than non-targeted firms (moods test untabulated). This result is in line with 
target firms being larger, more liquid, and hence easier to short for investors (e.g., Massoud et 
al. [2011]) than non-targeted firms. In line with prior research (e.g., Jank et al. [2017], and 
Massoud et al. [2011]), target firms are also significantly more leveraged (at the 1% significance 
level), implying a riskier firm profile. The book-to-market ratio is also, as expected, lower than 
the ratio of non-target firms indicating potential overvaluation of the target firms, but the 
difference remains insignificant. Target firms have on average a significantly higher return on 
assets and but are not more mature on average, with the age difference being not statistically 
significant. The finding on the return on assets can be seen as consistent with the finding by 
Chen [2016] who finds that some short sellers focus on firms that report good operating 
performances but have red flags related to their financial reports, which he calls as to be “too 
good to be true” (Chen [2016], p. 1453) firms. Growth and loss indicators are not significantly 
different between the groups in the univariate comparison. Target firms have significantly more 
Big4 auditors and a significantly higher capital intensity (both at 1% significance level) than 
the non-target firms. The higher capital intensity may indicate (Kedia and Philippon [2006]) a 
higher likelihood of overvaluation for these firms. Another overvaluation feature approximated 
by M&A activity does not differ from non-target firms on a univariate basis. The only other 
metric that differs significantly (at the 5% significance level) is the litigation risk where target 




B, all subgroups prefer larger target firms with higher leverage, higher capital intensity, and a 
higher share of Big4 auditors on average in a univariate comparison with non-target firms. 
Banks seem to additionally prefer older firms, more loss-making firms as well as firms with 
fewer restatements. Investment managers additionally avoid firms with higher litigation risk 
but prefer firms with a lower book-to-market ratio. They also prefer firms with a higher return 
on assets which is similar to hedge funds. Regarding the different industries of target firms, the 
most frequently targeted industries are the manufacturing and financial services sector (table 3 
panel C), which reflects the structure of the overall industry composition of the whole sample 
of target and non-target firms.  
Table 4 provides both the Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients for all 
variables included in the regression models as well as the target indicators. The Spearman 
correlation coefficients that account for non-linearities indicate significantly positive 
correlations (all at the 1% level) between being an overall target and the variables like size, age, 
return on assets, leverage, capital intensity, the Big4 auditor indicator variable, and the M&A 
activity, but the correlation coefficients remain mostly below 0.10 which indicates a rather weak 
or small association – only size, age, and the Big4 indicator are above 0.10 in the Spearmen 
specification in column (1). Size, age, return on assets, capital intensity, and the Big4 indicator 
are significantly positively correlated with being targeted by banks but correlations are still 
rather weak in terms of the size of the coefficient. Leverage significantly positively correlates 
for firms that are being targeted by hedge funds and investment managers but again with a 
rather small correlation coefficient. The book-to-market ratio seems to be only positively 
correlated with target firms of investment managers but again with a weak association. The 
M&A activity is only significantly positively correlated with investment managers but again 
with a weak association regarding the correlation coefficients. 
In table 5, the main analyses, I examine the associations between key observable firm 
characteristics and the outcome of being targeted by different short sellers. Table 5 reports the 
ordinary least squares specification results from a multivariate regression which accounts for 
year- and firm-fixed effects as well as clustered robust standard errors. Results in table 5 panel 
A column (1) suggest that being targeted by all short sellers is positively associated with size, 
the loss-making indicator, and Big4 indicator but negatively with the book-to-market ratio. 
After accounting for year- and firm-fixed effects as in column (3), the only two characteristics 
that remain significant are size and age. Size remains significantly positively associated but age 




and younger firms are more likely to be associated with being a target, which makes sense, as 
short sellers may prefer more liquid, larger firms to avoid costly short selling constraints (Drake 
et al. [2011], and Reed [2013]) and to reduce the risk losing their own capital. This finding is 
also aligning with the suggestion that short sellers are motivated by well-accepted patterns, 
including size (Reed [2013]). The preference for younger firms is supported by recent findings 
of activist short sellers that show a preference for recently IPOed firms, hence often younger, 
firms (Brendel and Ryans [2021]), which is consistent with a preference for riskier firms. 
Panel B explores the association between the observable target firms’ characteristics 
and the outcome of being targeted by hedge funds. One can observe that the outcome is 
positively associated with size and negatively with age in column (3) as in panel A. Similarly, 
the association between being targeted by an investment manager in panel C and firm size is 
also positively associated and negatively with age in column (3). Additionally, the outcome is 
also negatively associated with the return on assets and the book-to-market ratio, indicating that 
investment managers may prefer firms with lower profitability and signs of overvaluation. In 
contrast, the outcome of being targeted by a bank, as can be seen in panel D column (3), seems 
to be primarily positively associated with leverage but negatively with restatements after 
controlling for year and firm fixed effects. This may indicate that banks use additional 
predictive information to identify the risk profile of firms; this may also hint at a different 
information set, given their access to information as capital providers.  
In the subsample analyses of the short sellers from the United Kingdom (UK) in table 6 
panel A, the biggest non-US group of short sellers in my sample, I explore whether the 
associations regarding the target firm selection differ at home versus abroad (all other countries 
combined). In table 6 column (1), one can observe that the association between the outcome of 
being targeted by UK investors at home is only significantly negatively associated with capital 
intensity, the overvaluation feature according to Kedia and Philippon [2006]. In column (2), 
when I account for the UK investors’ target selection abroad, only the easy-to-observe loss-
making attribute is associated positively with the outcome of being targeted. Litigation risk, 
however, is negatively associated with the outcome which is in line with the finding by Coval 
and Moskowitz [1999] where only the investors at home had a strong preference for the riskier 
local firms. Not only long investors exhibit a preference for less risky foreign firms due to 
information asymmetries, but short sellers seem to do the same. Results in table 6 panel b 
support the results from panel a because being targeted by UK hedge funds or UK investment 




they have a lower litigation risk. Apart from the litigation risk, UK investment managers also 
seem to target larger, loss-making firms which is consistent with a less risky short selling 
strategy. Restatements of firms seem only to matter for UK investment managers at home where 
they might be more capable to manage existing information asymmetries. 
Overall, the results suggest that different short seller types seem to show different 
revealed preferences that may help them to analyze the fundamental state of a firm and to 
identify target firms that are expected to realize negative returns in the future.9 But results also 
indicate that short sellers cannot be treated by researchers as well as regulators as a homogenous 
group of investors. Moreover, apart from Dechow et al.’s [2001] findings that short sellers use 
fundamental-to-valuation ratio, further company indicator variables, such as age, capital 
intensity or restatements, or litigation risk seem to matter when identifying target firms.  
 
9 It must be clear that we can only observe revealed preferences and not the actual information used/processed by 






In this study in general, I am the first to investigate whether different groups of short 
sellers reveal different preferences for target firms with different observable firm characteristics 
to better understand this heterogeneous group of investors and their usage of information. 
When comparing different types of short sellers, I find significant differences in 
displayed target firm characteristics that vary across these different short seller types, with 
hedge funds and investment managers showing revealed preferences for younger but also larger 
firms. Additionally, investment managers seem to focus on a negative return on assets ratio and 
lower book-to-market ratios, as fundamental-to-value ratios. Apart from the mentioned 
attributes, only banks seem to be associated with target firms that have higher leverage and 
fewer restatements. Across the UK subsample analyses, UK investors seem to exhibit different 
preferences for foreign and local firms. Especially, hedge funds and investment managers seem 
to avoid firms abroad that have a higher risk profile which is in line with the behavior of long 
investors (Coval and Moskowitz [1999]) that avoid riskier foreign firms due to potentially 
higher information asymmetries. 
This study is subject to several important caveats. This study is purely exploratory in 
nature, and it needs to be clear that this analysis does not claim to document any causal effects. 
The results are based on the data that may be potentially limited by the reporting errors or biases 
that may be present in individual short sellers’ reports. The regulators’ diligence in analyzing 
the obtained positions, however, provides some assurance as to its integrity. Also, I observe the 
institutional level of investors only and not the single fund level. Assuming that house policies 
of these institutions are in place, this might be less of a concern, but this is a strong assumption. 
One needs to see this study as a complementary exploratory study aiming to fill the current gaps 
in the existing literature with regards to the activities conducted by short sellers and potential 
observable determinants of their choice process. Also, due to the threshold upon which the 
trades are made public, in this case of 0.5%, it is not possible to observe the whole universe of 
shorted firms. Nevertheless, even with only having obtained the truncated sample, the analysis 
remains in line with prior research (Dechow et al. [2001]) where firms with over 0.5% of 
outstanding shares were classified as “high short” positions to emphasize on large short 
positions because they seem more likely to represent a consensus among short sellers that a 
stock is overpriced. Also, given the findings by Jank et al. [2017], as mentioned briefly above, 




non-existent, and hence the subset of firms observed above the threshold of 0.5% can be deemed 
to be representative for the overall population of targeted firms. Lastly, the categorization of 
investors is based on the investors’ own disclosures and a comparison with the investors’ 
descriptions delivered at CapitalIQ. The characterization of types may not be stable over time 
and the self-declaration may not always be true, which may lead to a wrong classification of 
short seller types. The chosen approach leaves room for future research to find more elaborate 
ways to categorize short sellers with data of large amounts of transactions into different groups. 
Altogether, this paper contributes to the existing literature in the following way: This 
paper contributes to the literature on short selling (e.g., Boehmer et al. [2013], Christophe et al. 
[2004], Desai et al. [2006], Drake et al. [2011], Efendi et al. [2005], Engelberg et al. [2012], 
Fang et al. [2016], Jones et al. [2016], Reed [2013], and Von Beschwitz et al. [2017]) by 
expanding our understanding of different short sellers types and their revealed preferences with 
regards to their observable target selection and target selection procedure. Research on short 
sellers’ use of information, in general, has been limited (Drake et al. [2011]), apart from 
Dechow et al. [2001]. Hence, this paper studies the connection of the observable short sellers’ 
preferences, the short sellers’ use of information, and the target firm characteristics to these 
different heterogeneous subgroups of short sellers (Jiang et al. [2020]). This study is the first 
study, to my knowledge, that provides topical evidence in line with the idea that short sellers 
are not a homogenous group but rather consist of heterogeneous subsets of investors with 
different preferences for targets, different information sets, and agendas. It is the first paper that 
classifies these heterogenous short sellers in a large, international sample into different groups 
to study them in greater detail, and thereby, it directly answers the latest call by Jiang et al. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition and Source 
Dependent Variables  
Target Indicator variable, equal to one when the target firm is targeted by a 
particular short seller type in a given year, e.g., hedge funds and zero 
otherwise; when a target firm is only shorted by banks and hedge 
funds in a given year, both short seller groups are assigned a one for 
the indicator variable and zero otherwise. For example, if for a 
specific target firm, hedge funds account for 350 transactions after 
the adjustment, investment managers for 200 transactions, and 
banks for 0 transactions, the first two short seller groups are 
assigned a one and the last group is assigned a zero. Data source: 
National regulators. 
Targeted by Hedge Funds Indicator variable, equal to one when the target firm is targeted by a 
hedge fund in a given year, e.g., hedge funds and zero otherwise. 
Data source: National regulators; CapitalIQ, Bloomberg and 
Company Information 
Targeted by Investment 
Managers 
Indicator variable, equal to one when the target firm is targeted by 
an investment manager in a given year, e.g., hedge funds and zero 
otherwise. Data source: National regulators; CapitalIQ, Bloomberg 
and Company Information 
Targeted by Banks Indicator variable, equal to one when the target firm is targeted by a 
bank in a given year, e.g., hedge funds and zero otherwise. Data 
source: National regulators; CapitalIQ, Bloomberg and Company 
Information 
Explanatory Variables 
Size The lagged value of the log of total assets at the fiscal end of the 
data year; for this position, the following CapitalIQ ticker was used: 
IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS (e.g., Zhao [2018]); the variable was 
winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the distribution to reduce 
the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Age The lagged value is the number of years since foundation; for this 
position, the following CapitalIQ ticker was used: 
IQ_YEAR_FOUNDED and the difference calculated between the 
year founded and the observation years (2013-2015). Then a binary 
indicator was assigned as a 1 for firms five years old or older and 
zero otherwise; the variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 
10% of the distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: 
CapitalIQ 
Loss The lagged value is an indicator variable of 1 if the net profit of the 
previous year was negative and zero otherwise. The net profit was 




top and bottom 10% of the distribution to reduce the effect of 
outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Book-to-Market The lagged value of the book value per share was obtained via 
IQ_BV_SHARE; generally high book-to-market stocks earn 
significant positive excess returns while low book-to-market stocks 
earn significant negative excess returns (implying overvaluation); 
the variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the 
distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
RoA The lagged value is based on the following CapitalIQ ticker: 
IQ_RETURN_ASSETS; the variable was winsorized at the top and 
bottom 10% of the distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data 
source: CapitalIQ 
Leverage The lagged value of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the 
fiscal end of the data year (total liabilities / total assets); for the 
positions the following CapitalIQ tickers were used: 
IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS and IQ_TOTAL_DEBT (e.g., Brav, Jiang, 
Partnoy, and Thomas [2008]; Massa, Zhang and Zhang [2015]; Zhao 
[2018]); the variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of 
the distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: 
CapitalIQ 
Growth The lagged value of the yearly asset growth is defined as 
Assetst/Assetst-1 (in %) (e.g., Zhao [2018]). The logged value has 
been used and the CapitalIQ variable: IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS; the 
variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the 
distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Capital intensity 
 
The lagged value of PPE / total assets ratio based on the following 
CapitalIQ variables, IQ_NPPE, and IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS; the 
variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the 
distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Big4 
 
The lagged value of the indicator variable, equal to one when the 
auditor in the data year is among the Big-4 auditors and zero 
otherwise (Zhao [2018]); IQ_AUDIOR_NAME in CapitalIQ was 
used to identify the auditor for each respective firm; the variable was 
winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the distribution to reduce 
the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Restatements 
 
The lagged value of the indicator variable, equal to one when the 
company had restatements that were fundamentally different (RS 
output under CapitalIQ) from original, i.e., Net Income, Retained 
Earnings or Cash from Operations is different and zero otherwise, 
CapitalIQ provided the data via IQ_RESTATEMENT_IS, 
IQ_RESTATEMENT_IS and IQ_RESTATEMENT_CF; the 
variable was winsorized at the top and bottom 10% of the 
distribution to reduce the effect of outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
Litigation risk The lagged value of the indicator, equal to 1 when primary SIC-
codes is in the set (2833:2836, 3570:3577, 3600:3647, 5200:5961, 




obtained via CapitalIQ: IQ_SIC; the variable was winsorized at the 
top and bottom 10% of the distribution to reduce the effect of 
outliers. Data source: CapitalIQ 
M&A activity The lagged value of the indicator variable, equal to one when the 
number of all M&A transaction conducted by a firm in each year 
exceed the yearly median value and zero otherwise (e.g., Hoitash, 
Hoitash, and Bedard [2009]; Ogneva Subramanyam, and 





Appendix B: Additional Background Information 
Table A: Short Seller Composition – Top 10 Short Sellers with the Highest Number of 
Disclosures  
 
This table shows the top 10 short sellers based on the 47,019 transactions in the European Union, including the 
country of origin, investor type, and average net short position across the sample period of 2013-2015. An 
example of how the investor type was identified can be found in Appendix figure B. 
 
Overview of Position Holders in the European Union 










1 Blackrock Inc. 
Investment 
Manager 
US 6,038 12.8% 0.82 
2 Marshall Wace LLP 
Hedge 
Fund 
UK 4,464 9.5% 0.84 
3 AKO Capital LLP 
Hedge 
Fund 
UK 2,192 4.7% 1.20 
4 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Bank US 1,618 3.4% 0.85 
5 Pennant Capital Management LLC 
Hedge 
Fund 
US 1,480 3.1% 0.96 
6 Perceptive Advisors LLC 
Hedge 
Fund 
US 1,257 2.7% 2.78 
7 Citadel Advisors LLC 
Hedge 
Fund 
US 1,147 2.4% 1.08 






US 1,040 2.2% 0.74 
10 Worldquant LLC 
Hedge 
Fund 







Appendix C: Tables 
Table B: Hedge Fund Industry by Location 
 
This table shows the breakdown of hedge fund manager assets under management by location and aims to 
highlight the importance of the UK for the subsample analysis in table 6. According to the 2015 Preqin Global 
Hedge Fund Report (link:https://docs.preqin.com/samples/2015-Preqin-Global-Hedge-Fund-Report-Sample-
Pages.pdf, access data 22.04.2021), hedge fund managers managed over $2tn in assets in 2015 in the United 
States (US) and the US accounts for 71% of all industry assets held worldwide. The United Kingdom (UK) ranked 
second with assets at $413bn and it accounted for 14% of total industry assets worldwide. Hong Kong, Australia, 
and Singapore are the three largest locations in the Asia-Pacific region to feature in the top 10 largest countries 
by assets under management (AUM). According to the Preqin Special Report (Hedge Funds in Europe published 
in 2017): Europe is the second-largest region in terms of hedge fund activity across the globe and $657bn accounts 
for 20% of AUM held by the industry.  
 
       
# 





















2 United Kingdom 413 Switzerland 123 Switzerland 29% 
3 Jersey 62 Sweden 41 France 8% 
4 Hong Kong 61 France 66 Italy 4% 
5 Brazil 51 Netherlands 27 Sweden 3% 
6 Sweden 39 Germany 36 Luxembourg 2% 
7 Australia 36 Italy 15 Jersey 2% 
8 Canada 31 Luxembourg 35 Netherlands 2% 
9 Singapore 29 Spain 16 Other 3% 
10 France 25 Norway 10   






Table C: Comparison of Short Sellers – Country Composition 
 
These tables show the origin of the short selling transactions in Panel A and the origin of the different short seller 
types by country in Panel B. Others in Panel A includes countries Cayman Islands, Sweden, Germany, Isle of 
Man, Luxembourg, Finland, Australia, Denmark, Japan, Russia, Norway, Brazil, Canada, and Jersey. Others in 
Panel B includes all other investor types, such as private equity and venture capital firms, family offices, pension 
funds, arbitrageur, and private investors. The table is based upon the sample that contains 47,019 transactions in 
total from the observed full years 2013-2015 for the whole European sample.  
 
Panel A: Short Sellers in the European Union by Country of Origin  
 
# Country # of Transactions Average NSP % of Total 
1 United States 27,185 1.00 57.8% 
2 United Kingdom 14,892 0.85 31.7% 
3 Switzerland 1,784 0.83 3.8% 
4 France 1,384 1.02 2.9% 
5 Hong Kong 665 0.72 1.4% 
6 Bermuda 208 1.48 0.4% 
7 Italy 193 0.53 0.4% 
8 Spain 111 0.65 0.2% 
9 The Netherlands 104 0.91 0.2% 
10 Ireland 102 0.56 0.2% 
11 Others 391 0.85 0.8% 
  Total 47,019     
 
Panel B: Short Sellers in the European Union by Country and Investor Group 




1 United States 14,607 10,871 1,661 46 
2 United Kingdom 9,695 5,083 50 64 
3 Switzerland 17 919 837 11 
4 France 5 96 1,228 55 
5 Hong Kong 189 19 0 0 
6 Bermuda 0 661 0 4 
7 Italy 0 136 52 5 
8 Spain 0 0 0 111 
9 The Netherlands 28 26 0 50 
10 Ireland 0 102 0 0 






Table D: Distribution of Publicly Disclosed Net Short Selling Positions (2013-2015) in 
the European Union Across Member States 
 
This table displays the distribution of the number of observable transactions across countries that have the NSP 
disclosures available. The sample contains 47,019 transactions in total from the observed full years 2013-2015 
for the whole European sample. 
 
Distribution across Countries   
Country 
% of all 
Transactions 
% of all Firms 
Belgium 53.3% 3.3% 
United Kingdom 12.2% 34.9% 
Italy 8.9% 11.5% 
Sweden 5.9% 11.1% 
Germany 5.0% 13.1% 
France 4.9% 9.4% 
Spain 4.8% 5.2% 
Finland 1.9% 3.1% 
Denmark 1.5% 3.0% 
Austria 0.7% 1.9% 
The Netherlands 0.4% 0.6% 
Hungary 0.3% 0.5% 
Ireland 0.2% 1.6% 
Luxembourg 0.1% 0.5% 
Ireland 0.0% 0.1% 
Greece 0.0% 0.2% 
 

















Appendix D: Figures 
Figure A: Stock Market Capitalization (as % of GDP) in 2013 in each EU28 Country 
 
This table presents the stock market capitalization as % of GDP in 2013 across all 28 countries of the 
European Union and is directly taken from a report “Capital Markets in the EU” by the European 







Figure B: Examples of the Investor Identification 
 
These snapshots were taken from CapitalIQ during the data collection period in 2016 to show how short seller 
types were identified. Apart from CapitalIQ, information from Bloomberg or Company Information was also 
used. 
 












Figure C: Distribution of Publicly Disclosed Net Short Selling Positions (2013-2015) in 
the European Union 
 
This figure displays the distribution of the number of open short positions across reporting intervals and the 
relative frequency for each interval with truncation at 0.5%. Reporting intervals are in 0.5 steps, starting from 
0.5%. Positions above 0.2% but below 0.5% are reported to the regulator but are not disclosed to the public and 
hence not visible in this figure. The sample contains 47,019 transactions in total from the observed full years 












Figure 1: Example of a Publicly Available Short Selling Disclosure 
 
This figure shows an example of the publicly available disclosures provided by the regulators. It was taken 
from the German bundesanzeiger.de (access date: 28.09.2017); the data set obtained from the regulator in 
Germany consists of a similar data structure. All other links to identify the short selling notifications from other 
European countries were taken from here: 










Table 1: Sample Details 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
This table describes the sample selection procedure. Only short selling transactions from 2013 to 2015 are kept 
in the sample and firms with missing data points in 2012-2015 are also excluded. For identifying the transactions, 
all countries that have recorded short selling transactions in the respective years are included. The main analyses 
are based on 413 target firms which are in the European Union. All independent variables are trimmed with the 
top 10% and bottom 10% of observations being removed in the final sample; additionally, the 2% of firms with 
abnormally high book-to-market ratios are deleted to arrive at the 413 target firms of the final sample. 
 
 
Panel B: Country origin of the target firms 
This table shows the country of origin of the 413 target firms. 
Country  
# of Target 
Firms 
% of Total 
United Kingdom 139 33.7% 
Germany 61 14.8% 
France 41 9.9% 
Sweden 40 9.7% 
Italy 35 8.5% 
Spain 26 6.3% 
Belgium 18 4.4% 
Denmark 17 4.1% 
Finland 14 3.4% 
Austria 10 2.4% 
Ireland 4 1.0% 
The Netherlands 4 1.0% 
Hungary 2 0.5% 
Luxembourg 2 0.5% 
Total 413  
  
Sample Composition – European Union  
    
Sample Selection Criteria – Target Firms  
# of 
 Firms 




Total of Number of Targets 1,224 551 9,075 
Less: firms not targeted between 2013-2015  418 168 43,056 
Firms in the Targeted Sample 806 383 47,019 
Less: firms with not enough firm data available and 
firms that are deleted due to outlier treatments 
393 - - 




Table 2: Short Seller Composition in the European Union 
 
This table shows the distribution of the 47,019 transactions across different short seller types and years 2013-
2015 for the whole European sample. Others include pension funds, family offices, and individual investors. 
 
 
    
Transactions per Investor Type – European Union 
 N 2013 2014 2015 
Hedge Funds 24,620 7,587 8,957 8,076 
% of Total 52.4% 56.4% 66.6% 60.0% 
Average NSP   1.22 1.05 0.93 
      
Investment 
Managers 
18,087 5,017 5,238 7,832 
% of Total 38.5% 37.3% 38.9% 58.2% 
Average NSP   0.84 0.90 0.79 
      
Banks 3,908 643 1,264 2,001 
% of Total 8.3% 4.8% 9.4% 14.9% 
Average NSP   0.77 0.88 0.88 
      
Others 404 203 79 122 
% of Total 0.9% 1.5% 0.6% 0.9% 
Average NSP   1.05 0.72 0.95 
Total Transactions  47,019 13,450 15,538 18,031 

















Table 3: Observable Firm Characteristics of Target Firms (2013-2015) 
 
Panel A: Target firms’ comparison with non-target firms   
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the firm characteristics for the target firms and non-target firms in the 
overall sample of 413 target firms and 2,041 non-target firms in the sample over the years 2013-2015. It divides 
the sample into firms that are being targeted at least once by any short seller and all other non-targeted firms that 
have never been targeted in the EU for the period from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015, respectively. The 
sample contains all firms that have data available to calculate the firm characteristics over 2012-2015 as the firm 
characteristics are based on lagged values. CapitalIQ was used as the source for all financial data points. The 
table reports time-series averages of cross-sectional means, median, and standard deviation for the targeted and 
non-targeted firms. For more detailed information regarding the calculations of the firm characteristics and 
variables used, see Appendix A. All variables are trimmed with the top 10% and bottom 10% of observations 
being removed. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Firms in selected countries in the European Union  
 Summary Statistics          




Firm Characteristics Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Avg. Diff. in 
Means 
Size 7.813 7.784 1.694  6.084 5.822 2.518 1.730*** 
Age 0.991 1.000 0.095  0.985 1.000 0.121 0.006 
Loss 0.221 0.000 0.415  0.232 0.000 0.422 -0.010 
Book-to-Market 0.094 0.044 0.130  0.096 0.039 0.146 -0.002 
RoA 0.037 0.036 0.056  0.026 0.032 0.078 0.010*** 
Leverage 0.256 0.246 0.159  0.239 0.212 0.172 0.018*** 
Growth 0.041 0.036 0.182  0.040 0.047 0.602 0.001 
Capital intensity 0.196 0.101 0.226  0.164 0.056 0.230 0.032*** 
Big4 0.931 1.000 0.253  0.716 1.000 0.451 0.216*** 
Restatements 0.155 0.000 0.362  0.158 0.000 0.365 -0.003 
Litigation risk 0.018 0.000 0.133  0.028 0.000 0.166 -0.010* 







Panel B: Comparison of means across different short seller groups with non-target firms 
This table reports the univariate differences in means of all firms targeted by each short seller group compared 
with the non-targeted firms in the sample; all variables are based on lagged values, for more detailed 
information regarding the calculations of the firm characteristics and variables used, see Appendix A. All 
variables are trimmed with the top 10% and bottom 10% of observations being removed. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Distribution of target firms according to industries by SIC codes 
This table reports the distribution of target firms across different industries in the EU based on the primary sic 
code focusing on the industry groups for the overall sample of 413 target firms and 2,041 non-target firms in 
the sample over the years 2013-2015. The industry classification is based on the major two-digit SIC codes. 
 
 
        








Means   
Differences in 
Means   
Differences in 
Means   
Size 2.255*** 1.535*** 1.491*** 
Age 0.001 0.005 0.010* 
Loss 0.020 0.001 0.085** 
Book-to-Market 0.017** -0.014** 0.003 
RoA 0.007** 0.010*** 0.001 
Leverage 0.030*** 0.015** 0.042*** 
Growth -0.005 -0.003 0.006 
Capital intensity 0.028** 0.035*** 0.067*** 
Big4 0.245*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 
Restatements -0.025 0.014 -0.049** 
Litigation risk -0.011 -0.011* -0.007 
M&A activity -0.362 -0.946 -0.803 
Industries by SIC code     
Division 
Target 
Firms in % 
Non-
Target 
Firms in % 
Manufacturing 46.5% 39.1% 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 13.7% 23.1% 
Services 11.8% 16.0% 
Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade 10.9% 6.9% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Service 9.6% 7.7% 
Mining and Construction 7.4% 6.5% 
Other 0.0% 0.7% 




Table 4: Correlation Table of Target Firms Attributes and Characteristics 
 
 
This table shows the Spearman (lower part) and Pearson (upper part) correlations for the firm attributes based on the sample of N= 6,414 firm-years; numbers in old are 
indicated statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Correlation table                                 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16 
(1) Target     0.225 0.080 -0.008 -0.005 0.044 0.034 0.000 0.045 0.160 -0.003 -0.020 -0.005 
(2) 
Target of Hedge 
Funds 
    0.090 0.052 0.036 0.004 -0.002 0.041 0.002 0.048 0.077 -0.024 -0.007 -0.003 
(3) 
Target of Investment 
Managers 
    0.198 0.038 0.012 0.029 0.017 0.039 -0.002 0.026 0.121 -0.017 -0.015 -0.001 
(4) Target of Banks     0.159 0.057 0.002 -0.029 0.036 0.022 -0.002 0.041 0.127 0.012 -0.018 -0.006 
(5) Size 0.260 0.112 0.217 0.191  0.334 -0.237 0.346 0.219 0.171 0.023 0.157 0.441 0.092 -0.090 0.040 
(6) Age 0.106 0.074 0.070 0.080 0.409  -0.121 0.212 0.102 -0.019 -0.014 0.031 0.191 0.030 -0.072 0.010 
(7) Loss -0.008 0.036 0.012 0.002 -0.242 -0.185  -0.132 -0.534 0.057 -0.072 -0.023 -0.100 0.000 0.007 -0.015 
(8) BTM 0.039 0.020 0.077 -0.006 0.517 0.339 -0.247  0.054 0.024 0.006 0.127 0.142 0.044 -0.032 0.038 
(9) RoA 0.041 -0.012 -0.003 0.043 0.135 0.140 -0.593 0.108  -0.012 0.079 0.058 0.096 -0.032 -0.028 0.022 
(10) Leverage 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.036 0.201 0.039 0.046 0.013 -0.072  -0.003 0.302 0.050 0.054 -0.066 -0.009 
(11) Growth -0.031 -0.019 -0.036 -0.023 -0.026 -0.125 -0.264 -0.010 0.291 -0.039  0.003 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.003 
(12) Capital intensity 0.090 0.065 0.059 0.076 0.240 0.156 -0.037 0.182 0.088 0.242 -0.078  0.119 0.026 -0.067 -0.015 
(13) Big4 0.160 0.077 0.121 0.127 0.466 0.256 -0.100 0.237 0.103 0.055 -0.053 0.189  -0.009 -0.034 0.015 
(14) Restatements -0.003 -0.024 -0.017 0.012 0.086 0.019 0.000 0.058 -0.062 0.054 -0.044 0.012 -0.009  -0.035 -0.008 
(15) Litigation risk -0.020 -0.007 -0.015 -0.018 -0.093 -0.096 0.007 -0.041 0.000 -0.068 0.029 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035  -0.004 




Table 5: Targeted Firms by Different Short Sellers Across all Countries 
   
Panel A: Regression analysis of targeting – All short sellers 
This table presents the ordinary least squares specifications with year and firm fixed effect. 
The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective firm in the sample is 
targeted by any of the short sellers in a given year (2013-2015) and zero otherwise. The 
results for pension funds, family offices, and others are not tabulated since observations are 
too few. The definitions of all explanatory variables are given in Appendix A. The models 
accounted for clustered robust standard errors, clustered by year in column (2) and firms in 
column (3). ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level (two-






Regression Analysis of Targeting – All Short Sellers 
European Union sample     
  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 
Targeted by Targeted by Targeted by 
Firm Characteristics All Investors All Investors All Investors 
Size 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.048* 
Age 0.062* 0.058 -0.049** 
Loss 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.017 
Book-to-Market -0.209*** -0.210*** -0.178 
RoA 0.100 0.110 0.002 
Leverage -0.026 -0.027 0.020 
Growth -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 
Capital intensity 0.025 0.025 -0.145 
Big4 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.007 
Restatements -0.017 -0.010 0.003 
Litigation risk -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
M&A activity 0.016 0.015 0.004 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 6,414 6,414 6,414 
R2 0.067 0.069 0.713 




Panel B: Regression analysis of targeting – Hedge funds 
This table presents the ordinary least squares specifications with year and firm fixed effect. 
The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective firm in the sample is 
targeted by hedge funds in a given year (2013-2015) and zero otherwise. The definitions of all 
explanatory variables are given in Appendix A. The models accounted for clustered robust 
standard errors, clustered by year in column (2) and firms in column (3). ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate 








Regression Analysis of Targeting – Hedge Funds 
European Union sample       
  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 
Targeted by Targeted by Targeted by 
Firm Characteristics Hedge Funds Hedge Funds Hedge Funds 
Size 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.031** 
Age 0.011 0.009 -0.026*** 
Loss 0.034*** 0.034* 0.016 
Book-to-Market -0.064*** -0.065** -0.147 
RoA -0.001 0.005 0.084 
Leverage 0.003 0.003 0.042 
Growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
Capital intensity -0.004 -0.004 -0.047 
Big4 0.020*** 0.020* -0.014 
Restatements -0.021*** -0.018 -0.009 
Litigation risk 0.002 0.002 -0.002 
M&A activity 0.010 0.010 0.013 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 6,414 6,414 6,414 
R2 0.047 0.049 0.700 




Panel C: Regression analysis of targeting – Investment managers 
This table presents the ordinary least squares specifications with year and firm fixed effect. 
The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective firm in the sample is 
targeted by investment managers in a given year (2013-2015) and zero otherwise. The results 
for pension funds, family offices, and others are not tabulated since observations are too few. 
The definitions of all explanatory variables are given in Appendix A. The models accounted 
for clustered robust standard errors, clustered by year in column (2) and firms in column (3). 








Regression Analysis of Targeting – Investment Manager 
European Union sample       
  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 








Size 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.034** 
Age 0.039 0.036* -0.052** 
Loss 0.032*** 0.033** 0.014 
Book-to-Market -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.167* 
RoA 0.102* 0.108 -0.118* 
Leverage -0.027 -0.027 0.019 
Growth -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 
Capital intensity 0.028* 0.028 -0.106 
Big4 0.043*** 0.042** 0.005 
Restatements 0.002 0.005 0.014 
Litigation risk -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 
M&A activity 0.004 0.004 -0.003 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 6,414 6,414 6,414 
R2 0.040 0.042 0.650 




Panel D: Regression analysis of targeting – Banks 
This table presents the ordinary least squares specifications with year and firm fixed effect. 
The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective firm in the sample is 
targeted by banks in a given year (2013-2015) and zero otherwise. The results for pension 
funds, family offices, and others are not tabulated since observations are too few. The 
definitions of all explanatory variables are given in Appendix A. The models accounted for 
clustered robust standard errors, clustered by year in column (2) and firms in column (3), ∗, ∗∗ 








Regression Analysis of Targeting – Bank 
European Union sample       
  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 
Targeted by Targeted by Targeted by 
Firm Characteristics Bank Bank Bank 
Size 0.006*** 0.006 0.010 
Age 0.025 0.022* 0.011 
Loss 0.025*** 0.026* 0.009 
Book-to-Market -0.034** -0.034 -0.044 
RoA 0.015 0.024 -0.083 
Leverage 0.014 0.013 0.097** 
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Capital intensity 0.023** 0.023 -0.072 
Big4 0.016*** 0.016* 0.005 
Restatements -0.015** -0.009 -0.017** 
Litigation risk 0.003 0.002 0.005 
M&A activity 0.003 0.002 -0.008 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Observations 6,414 6,414 6,414 
R2 0.017 0.023 0.516 




Table 6: UK Investors at Home and Abroad 
 
 
Panel A: All UK investors 
This table presents the binary choice model fitted with an ordinary least squares 
specification. The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective 
firm in the sample is targeted by UK investors at home (1) and abroad (2) in a given 
year and zero otherwise. The definitions of all explanatory variables are given in 
Appendix A. The models accounted for clustered robust standard errors, clustered 
by firms. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
(two-tailed), respectively. I chose to present the results only for the UK as here the 
number of observations for investing at home and abroad is big enough. See table C 




Regression Analysis of Targeting – UK Investors  
    
  OLS 
 (1) (2) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 
Targeted by Targeted by 
Firm Characteristics 




Size -0.003 0.019 
Age 0.004 -0.076 
Loss 0.011 0.025** 
Book-to-Market -0.030 -0.055 
RoA 0.046 -0.024 
Leverage -0.009 -0.054 
Growth -0.010 -0.001 
Capital intensity -0.315** 0.027 
Big4 0.047 0.000 
Restatements 0.024 0.003 
Litigation risk -0.016 -0.033** 
M&A activity 0.002 0.011 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,816 4,598 
R2 0.497 0.566 




Panel B: UK investors by short seller types  
This table presents the binary choice model fitted with an ordinary least squares specification as in panel A with 
year- and firm-fixed effects. The binary dependent variable is defined as one when the respective firm in the 
sample is targeted by either a UK located hedge fund or investment manager at home (1), (3) or abroad (2), (4) 
in a given year, and zero otherwise. UK banks are neglected due to their small number in the sample. The 
definitions of all explanatory variables are given in Appendix A. The models accounted for clustered robust 
standard errors, clustered by firms. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
(two-tailed), respectively. I chose to pick only the UK as here the number of target firms is large, and the UK 
has a large pool of different short seller types. See table 1 panel B or table C in the Appendix for more details. 
 
  
Regression Analysis of Targeting – UK Investors 
Short Seller Subgroups         
  OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV = Target by Investor 
Type 















Size -0.004 0.011 -0.006 0.020* 
Age 0.000 -0.072 0.002 -0.043 
Loss 0.006 0.015 0.014 0.028*** 
Book-to-Market -0.012 -0.042 -0.030 -0.019 
RoA -0.016 -0.005 0.058 -0.017 
Leverage 0.023 0.001 -0.014 -0.018 
Growth 0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 
Capital intensity -0.069 0.063 -0.313** 0.009 
Big4 -0.020 -0.003 0.046 -0.001 
Restatements 0.001 0.005 0.024* 0.008 
Litigation risk -0.001 -0.022** -0.016 -0.017* 
M&A activity 0.012* 0.014* -0.005 0.001 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,816 4,598 1,816 4,598 
R2 0.410 0.580 0.494 0.453 
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We present descriptive evidence of target firms' responses to activist short seller reports. 
Activist short sellers are hedge funds or individuals who take short positions in a company’s 
stock prior to publishing research reports that claim the target firm is overvalued. Their reports 
frequently allege accounting issues and fraud, and the reports are accompanied by significant 
negative abnormal stock returns on average and higher rates of outcomes such as stock 
exchange delistings and SEC enforcement actions. It is important to understanding target firm 
responses to activist short seller reports because these reports have become increasingly 
prominent in recent years and they significantly impact targeted firms (e.g., Ljungqvist and 
Qian [2016], Jiang, Habib, and Hasan [2020]). Despite the growing importance of activist short 
sellers, little is known about how firms respond to these reports. We provide new evidence 
about the types of responses firms make when targeted by activist short sellers and associations 
among these responses and firm outcomes. 
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we collect an extensive sample of activist 
short seller reports and manually classify their allegations, including the presence of business 
and accounting issues, if the activist provides new evidence not already available in public 
filings, and if the activist alleges securities fraud. Our sample includes 351 activist short seller 
reports released between 1996 and 2018. We find that the number of short seller reports has 
grown substantially in recent years, from an average of 2.5 reports per year during the period 
from 1996 to 2009, to 35 reports per year from 2010 to 2018.  
Second, we collect and classify all observed firm responses to these reports. The most 
frequent type of response is a public denial of the activists’ claims through a press release or 
conference call, which we observe in response to 28% of activist reports. Firms can make more 
than one type of response, and we also observe that firms provide additional information to 
investors (following 12% of reports), file or threaten to file lawsuits against the short seller (6% 
of reports), and launch internal investigations conducted by outside counsel (4% of reports). 
Overall, the firms in our sample respond to 31% of the activist reports using one or more of 
these approaches. 
Our third area of analysis is to provide evidence on factors associated with the decision 
to respond. We find a strong relationship between the tendency of firms to respond and returns 




returns on average at the report release, but a response becomes more likely when abnormal 
returns are more negative: only 24% of firms respond when their abnormal returns surrounding 
report release is in the highest three quartiles, increasing to 52% of firms responding for lowest 
quartile returns. Firms are also more likely to respond when the reports contain new 
information not already available in securities filings, a characteristic that Ljungqvist and Qian 
[2016] use to proxy for report credibility. Management may be better positioned to use the 
activist’s report data to verify or refute the allegations more easily when the activist presents 
new evidence, compared to when the report is based on opinions based on the company’s filings. 
Consistently, we find that firms are significantly less likely to respond when the activist’s report 
only discusses overvaluation based on business issues and does not provide new evidence. 
Our fourth and final area of analysis is whether firms’ responses are associated with 
adverse outcomes, specifically, we consider stock exchange delisting, SEC Auditing and 
Accounting Enforcement Releases (AAERs), financial statement restatements, auditor changes, 
and being the target of an acquisition. Firms that launch internal investigations in response to 
the short seller report release are significantly more likely to be delisted, to receive an AAER, 
and are less likely to be acquired compared to other target firms which respond in other ways. 
Taken together, our study finds that firms’ responses to activist short seller reports vary 
systematically with characteristics of the report and are associated with firm outcomes. The 
majority of firms do not respond to activist short sellers, and not responding is associated with 
a less negative stock price response to the report release and fewer adverse outcomes. Thus, 
the initial market response to the report appears to be an effective indicator of a report’s merit. 
Our results are relevant to several streams of academic research. We contribute to the 
limited literature on activist short sellers and firm responses to their reports. Lamont [2012] 
uses media reports of target companies engaging in lawsuits and related actions against short 
sellers between 1977 and 2002 and finds significantly negative abnormal returns following 
these media reports. However, Lamont [2012] is limited to firms that responded and were 
covered in the press, it does not examine factors associated with the decision to respond or 
outcomes for firms that do not respond. Ljungqvist and Qian [2016] examine a sample of all 
research reports from a set of activist short sellers, released between 2006 and 2011. They 
demonstrate that activist short seller reports presenting new information are associated with 
target company price declines, but they do not consider firm responses. We provide new 
evidence on target firms’ response decisions and the relation with firm outcomes, including 




widely available to investors and the media through social media and other report distribution 
websites.  
We also contribute to the literature on the duties of managers and directors to investigate 
allegations of wrongdoing. The legal literature describes the Delaware Doctrine standard for 
board members’ fiduciary duties (Pan [2010]). Managers and directors must investigate 
credible red flags for fraud or other criminal activity, usually by means of an internal 
investigation conducted by outside counsel (e.g., Duggin [2003], Pearson and Mark [2007], 
Mark and Pearson [2007]). Firms use this structure to maintain the confidentiality of the 
internal investigation’s findings by virtue of attorney-client privilege, giving the firm an option 
to waive privilege and reveal the information to the public or cooperate with authorities. To 
our knowledge, there are no extant studies providing empirical evidence on the determinants 
of internal investigations into fraud allegations or their association with firm outcomes. Our 
study provides evidence that firms responding to short seller reports by launching internal 
investigations are associated with higher subsequent rates of AAERs, delisting, are less likely 
to be acquired. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature on accounting fraud, restatements, and related 
adverse outcomes. Miller [2006] examines AAER firms and finds that the press often reports 
accounting fraud prior to the firm or SEC revealing the information. Dyck, Morse and Zingales 
[2010] examine various sources of fraud information, using short interest to infer the 
involvement of short sellers. We also consider other adverse events that are associated with 
negative returns upon their announcement, such as restatements (e.g., Palmrose, Richardson, 
and Scholz [2004]). We extend this literature by giving new evidence about the role of activist 





2. Background and Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1. Target firm responses to activist short sellers 
 
The term activist short seller refers to hedge funds or individuals who disclose having 
a short position in a target company’s stock. Activists establish a short position in target 
companies’ shares prior to publishing their research reports describing the target firms’ 
overvaluation. Ljungqvist and Qian [2016] provide evidence that these activists, despite having 
limited capital, are able to precipitate stock price declines with the publication of their research 
reports, indicating that the reports are on average effective. The activists intend to cover their 
short positions at a profit after the reports are released and the targets’ stock price falls. Theory 
suggests that activist short sellers will make generally truthful reports, since a track record for 
accuracy is expected to increase the market response to subsequent reports, increasing the 
profitability of trading in advance of these reports in a repeated game. Benabou and Laroque 
[1992] show that the reporters’ optimal strategy involves issuing false reports with non-zero 
probability. Mitts [2020] provides empirical evidence that anonymous short-oriented posting 
on chat boards contain such distorted reports, which aim to profit from the resulting temporary 
price declines.  
Making false statements in a written research report is risky for short sellers, as it gives 
rise to potential securities fraud liability under SEC rule 10b-5.1 Short sellers can also be sued 
for defamation by target firms (e.g., Lamont [2012], Mitts [2020]). Successful defamation 
claims require the target firm to prove four elements: that the short seller made a false statement 
purporting to be fact, communicated that false statement to a third party, that the false statement 
was negligent or malicious, and that the target firm suffered damages as a result.2 Firms can 
sue short sellers for defamation even when the report is accurate, as a bluffing strategy to try 
and force the short seller to withdraw the report rather than incur the legal costs of defending 
the action. Short sellers have successfully defended themselves against defamation lawsuits by 
 
1 “The Commission will vigorously investigate and prosecute those who manipulate markets with this witch's 
brew of damaging rumors and short sales,” said SEC Chairman Christopher Cox. SEC Charges Wall Street 
Short seller with Spreading False Rumors (April 24, 2008), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-64.htm 
2 Overstock.com v. Gradient Analytics, 151 Cal.App.4th 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) is an example of a successful 




demonstrating that their analysis was either accurate or an expression of opinion rather than 
fact.3  
Overall, the foregoing discussion suggests that activist short sellers are incentivized to 
provide generally accurate reports, but that some reports will be intentionally distorted. 
Therefore, firms may be able to influence investors and regulators by undertaking a response 
that credibly communicates that a report’s allegations lack merit. Despite the increase in 
activist short seller reports in recent years, and evidence that activists have a significant impact 
on target firms’ share price, there is little evidence about when firms respond and whether those 
responses are informative.  
Our study is most closely related to Lamont [2012] which examines returns for a set of 
firms identified from media articles to have engaged in anti-shorting actions against short 
sellers, such as lawsuits. However, Lamont [2012] only looks at cases where the target firm’s 
response was reported in the media, and so does not examine the response choice itself. Also, 
Lamont’s [2012] sample is taken from media reports between 1977 and 2002, a period with 
little overlap with the modern concept of activist short selling, given the significant expansion 
of internet publishing and social media distribution since 2002. Modern activists are now able 
to rapidly reach a wide audience and have a significant impact on target firms. Furthermore, 
Lamont [2012] considers stock returns following the media report, while we look at a range of 
adverse outcomes including AAERs, delisting, restatements, and being acquired, which 
represent significant events for targeted firms and its managers (e.g., Dechow et al. [2001], 
Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz [2004], Walsh [1989], Clark and Ofek [1994]). We also 
examine auditor changes as prior literature finds that auditors associated with fraud firms have 
higher litigation risk (Bonner, Palmrose, and Young [1998]). 
The majority of prior research into short sellers has generally been based on indirect 
evidence of short seller activity, such as aggregate short interest. Heavily shorted firms 
experience negative abnormal returns indicating that short sellers are effective in identifying 
overvaluation (e.g., Dechow et al. [2001], Desai et al. [2002], Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 
[2005], and Karpoff and Lou [2010]). Some direct evidence on large individual short positions 
has become available in the European setting, where public disclosure of these positions has 
 
3 GTX Global Corp. v. Left, 2007 WL 1300065 (Cal. Ct. App. May 4, 2007) is an example of a successful defence mounted 





been required since 2012. Jones, Reed, and Waller [2016] show that the initial disclosure of 
these short positions is followed by negative abnormal returns. However, research based on 
short interest as well as European evidence on individual short positions does not examine 
either the short sellers’ rationale for shorting the target firms or the firms’ responses. 
 
2.2. Internal investigations conducted by outside counsel 
 
Firms are not obligated to respond to activist short seller reports. When credible 
allegations of fraud and misconduct are presented, the firm’s directors have a fiduciary duty to 
investigate to protect the firm and its shareholders by maintaining oversight of the firms’ 
compliance with laws and regulations. Pan [2010] describes the Delaware Doctrine standard 
for directors’ fiduciary obligations. This standard directly applies to the 58% of listed firms 
that are incorporated in Delaware, and Bebchuk and Cohen [2003] show that Delaware 
corporation law strongly influences legislation and case law in other jurisdictions. Under the 
Delaware Doctrine, directors are only required to investigate potential wrongdoing when clear 
red flags regarding fraudulent or criminal activity are present. Investigations of business risk 
issues are not required, except in extreme cases (Pan [2010]).  
Directors primarily exercise their fiduciary duty to investigate allegations of fraud and 
malfeasance by launching an internal investigation conducted by outside counsel. Duggin 
[2003] notes that the purpose of internal investigations is both to evaluate risk exposure and 
mitigate legal liability and potential penalties through cooperation with authorities. A key 
benefit of utilizing outside counsel is to protect the investigation’s findings with attorney-client 
privilege, allowing the firm to avoid having to disclose any resulting findings either to 
shareholders or to authorities unless the firm elects to waive this privilege. Mark and Pearson 
[2007] and Pearson and Mark [2007] discuss the framework whereby prosecutors and 
government agencies encourage companies to cooperate with authorities and reveal the results 
of internal investigations with sentencing guidelines that favor cooperation. However, Leone, 
Li, and Liu [2020] provide empirical evidence from SEC enforcement actions that target firm 
cooperation is associated with higher penalties. This conflicting empirical result could reflect 
that firms cooperate when they have engaged in more severe misbehavior, or it may reflect that 
cooperation is not rewarded in practice. The literature does not currently provide empirical 
evidence about the decision to conduct internal investigations or the relation of investigations 





2.3. Conceptual framework 
 
The timeline of the moves made by the activist and the target firm is illustrated in figure 
1. At time 1, the activist observes a noisy private signal about the target firm’s value and issues 
a report indicating the firm has a low value. There exists an equilibrium that maximizes 
expected profits for the activist where a fraction of reports is strategically distorted, indicating 
low value when in fact the activist’s private signal indicated high value (Benabou and Laroque 
[1992]).  
At time 2, the market responds to the activist’s report with a negative abnormal return 
if the report presents credible new information. At time 3, the target firm observes the market 
reaction to the activist’s report and its own private signal of firm value. Since there is an 
expectation that not all reports are accurate, there is scope for the firm to respond to try and 
persuade investors to discount the activist’s report. The motivation to respond arises from the 
firm’s interest in reversing a stock price decline that followed the release of the report. 
Responding managers may also want to forestall an enforcement investigation that might arise 
from the report’s allegations. The SEC performs a cost-benefit analysis before deciding to open 
an investigation, including factors such as the potential monetary penalties and the cost to 
mount an investigation in the decision to proceed (Dechow et al. [2011], Blackburne et al. 
[2020]). A response that signals the firm is innocent or will be costly to pursue may therefore 
deter an investigation.4 
In cases when the firm’s share price does not decline significantly, the firm has little 
incentive to respond. In some instances, the firm may not even notice that the report was 
released. If the firm is aware of the report, there is relatively little benefit to responding, as 
there is no share price decline to try to reverse. Responding carries both direct costs to create 
and disseminate a public statement and gives rise to liability if the statement is ultimately found 
to contain errors. Finally, acknowledging the report can be counterproductive if it signals that 
the firm believes the activist is sufficiently important to warrant a response, thereby increasing 
the activist’s credibility.  
 
4  General Electric Company (GE) presents an illustrative anecdote: in August 2019, analyst Harry Markopolos 
published a report alleging accounting fraud at GE, and the shares fell 11% on the day the report was released. 
GE responded with a rebuttal of the activists claims and the stock price subsequently recovered. However, the 
SEC was not dissuaded from investigating, and subsequently found that GE engaged in securities violations 
related to issues raised in the Markopolos report. In December 2020, GE agreed to pay a $200 million penalty 
to settle the resulting action (AAER 4194, available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2020/33-




If the firm’s share price declines following the report’s release, it is more likely that the 
firm’s managers will become aware of the report, and this naturally gives rise to a higher 
probability of responding in some way. When the activist provides data and logical conclusions, 
and the firm has the ability to verify and dispute the data, a clear denial of the activists’ claims 
is feasible, both to try and repair the share price decline and to forestall regulatory action. When 
managers are more certain their information is accurate, they should face a lower risk of making 
a false statement, and thereby be more likely to respond. Another important response seen in 
Lamont [2012] is to threaten or initiate a lawsuit against the short seller, which benefits the 
firm by winning damages if it prevails in the lawsuit. Lawsuits are costly, however, involving 
a significant investment of time and resources, and require the firm to reveal potentially 
sensitive information to the activist in the discovery process and to the public if the case 
proceeds to trial. Litigation in this scenario, when the firm believes the activist’s report is false, 
presents a costly and, therefore potentially credible signal that the activist’s report is false.  
There are nevertheless incentives not to respond. First, the activist may simply report 
opinions of overvaluation based on an interpretation of the firm’s public filings. The firm 
cannot dispute the source or accuracy of the information, and again acknowledging the activist 
by engaging in lends the activist credibility. Second, managers may not have high confidence 
in their position, and avoid responding if the risk of making a false statement is material, which 
could open them up to liability. A negative stock price reaction may inform managers and 
directors that the report contains important information, reducing their certainty about the true 
state of their firm (e.g., Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang [2015], Zuo [2016]).  
When the market declines following the publication of the short seller’s report, and the 
firm’s private signal indicates that the allegations are accurate, the decision not to respond is 
more attractive than revealing the truth because investors only place a partial weight on the 
activist’s allegations (Benabou and Laroque [1992]). Empirically, we do not observe any 
disclosures in our sample that simply acknowledge the veracity of the short seller’s 
allegations.5 The firm’s managers could choose to issue their own false report, a material 
possibility when management is involved in a fraud, as the additional liability for an additional 
false statement may be small relative to the existing liability. The firm may respond by suing 
 
5 We are aware of one such example outside of our sample. Let’s Gowex SA CEO made just such an admission 
immediately after publication of a report from Gotham City Research. “I made a voluntary confession … I 
will face the consequences,” from the Financial Times, “WiFi provider Gowex goes bankrupt and admits 
falsifying accounts,” Buck, T. July 7, 2014. While Gotham City Research is an activist short seller in our 




the short seller for defamation as a bluffing strategy, and if the activist has insufficient financial 
resources to mount a legal defense, they may be forced to settle by agreeing to retract the report. 
A litigious target firm also signals to regulators and other short sellers that the firm is an 
expensive target to pursue, reducing the odds that authorities launch an investigation into the 
firm’s activities (Dechow et al. [2011], Blackburne et al. [2020]). 
The approach most consistent with the fiduciary duties of independent directors is to 
launch an internal investigation in cases when the allegations present sufficient red flags to 
management and/or the board of directors to trigger a duty to investigate (Pan [2010]). It is 
unlikely that firms conduct such investigations as a routine matter to respond to frivolous 
allegations, because internal investigations are costly, both in terms of management attention 
and in terms of out-of-pocket costs for outside law firms to conduct extensive interviews with 
staff and conduct forensic audits of the firm’s books and records. These costs become 
warranted when the firm expects to benefit materially from either using the findings to secure 
reduced penalties through cooperation or to mount a vigorous defense (Duggin [2003], Mark 
and Pearson [2007]).  
Internal investigations are unlikely to be a credible commitment to disclose the 
investigation’s findings because the structure includes outside counsel specifically to avoid 
having to disclose the results, under the protection of attorney-client privilege. The internal 
investigation then affords the firm an option to either maintain confidentiality or to waive 
privilege and provide the results to interested parties such as shareholders or the authorities 
(Mark and Pearson [2007]).6 Therefore, we predict that firms launch internal investigations 
when the firm’s directors either have significant uncertainty about whether or not fraud has 
taken place or suspect that fraud has occurred, and the purpose of the investigation is to limit 
liability and penalties. 
At time 4, the accuracy of the activist’s report is revealed. We use various firm 
outcomes to proxy for the report’s accuracy. Exchange delisting is evidence of lack of 
compliance with listing standards, and materially increases the firms’ cost of capital (e.g., 
Schumway [1997]). Allegations of fraud can be validated by subsequent AAERs (e.g., Dechow, 
 
6 In addition to confirming this prediction in discussions with a partner at a leading activist defense law firm and 
general counsel at a publicly traded company, industry publications highlight that “…internal investigation 
protected by the attorney-client privilege can benefit the company in a number of ways” including “insulating 
management and/or the board…”. (“Corporate Internal Investigations: Best Practices, Pitfalls to Avoid” Jones 
Day, 2013.) Available at https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2013/01/corporate-internal-investigations-




Sloan, and Sweeney [1996], Dyck, Morse, and Zingales [2010]). Target firms may resort to 
seeking strategic alternatives, i.e., being acquired, which we do not consider to be a good or 
bad outcome per se.. On one hand, being acquired is material to the firm, represents a potential 
distress outcome, and often results in managers’ employment being terminated (Walsh [1989], 
Clark and Ofek [1994]). On the other hand, an acquisition implies that an acquirer believes the 
target firm has sufficiently valuable assets and limited liabilities to be an attractive purchase. 
In either case, however, it is a significant event for the firm because its existence as an 
independent entity ends. 
Overall, this discussion indicates that several response types are supportable both when 
the firm believes the activist’s report is correct or not. Denials and lawsuits can be an 
appropriate course of action in either case. The foregoing discussion does provide two clear 
empirical predictions: First, making any type of response is more likely when there is a 
significant negative abnormal return around the publication of the activist’s report since the 
firm is more likely to be aware of these reports and has the incentive to try and reverse the price 
decline and forestall enforcement inquiries. Second, the launching of an internal investigation 
is more likely when the short seller allegations credibly relate to fraud or other criminal activity 
and present the target’s board of directors with sufficiently compelling red flags to trigger a 






3. Data and Overview 
 
3.1. Sample construction 
 
We start with the sample of activist short seller reports used in Ljungqvist and Qian 
[2016] which includes 126 reports from 17 short sellers from 1994 through 2011. This sample 
was created by selecting all reports published by all known professional short sellers that 
satisfied three criteria: the report makes public claims of overvaluation, discloses that the short 
seller has a short position in the targeted firm, and is made available to the public either on the 
activist’s own website or through a publicly accessible web site such as Seeking Alpha. The 
short seller must have released more than one report to be included in the sample. We extend 
this sample using the same methodology to include additional short sellers who issue multiple 
reports through 2018. 
Our extended sample consists of 421 initial short selling reports by 25 repeat short 
sellers from 1996 to 2018. We limit our search to US-listed targets to provide for a consistent 
legal, regulatory, and market framework so that our outcome measures, including delisting and 
enforcement activities, are consistently applied. Excluding 33 unlisted firms and another 37 
that lack the financial data needed to compute our control variables, we obtain a final sample 
of 351 initial reports on unique activist-company events. We manually verify that we have 
captured all reports issued by these short sellers using the short sellers’ websites, the Internet 
Archive, and the platforms on which the short sellers’ reports are distributed, including 
SeekingAlpha. Of the 351 reports in our sample, 56 are published by anonymous authors, and 
in untabulated tests, we do not find evidence that anonymity is associated with differences in 
response rates or outcomes. 
After collecting all initial reports, two research analysts coded the allegations made in 
the reports according to our coding manual which is illustrated with an example report in the 
Online Appendix A. One or both of the authors reviewed the coding of every report. We 
observe and record the following major categories of allegations: accounting issues (i.e., issues 
with revenues, expenses, income, cash flows, assets, liabilities, non-GAAP presentations, 
auditor issues), disclosure issues (incomplete disclosures, serious errors in disclosures), 
product and business issues (product quality, Ponzi schemes, inherently unprofitable products, 
related party transactions, fabricated customers, poor acquisitions or divestitures), management 




short sellers’ specific allegation that the firm is committing securities fraud, (e.g., “… 
management of Textura is committing FRAUD [sic] on the investing public”). Finally, we code 
the activist reports with an indicator variable for reports that include new information, as 
opposed to basing the analysis only on the company’s SEC filings. Such new information 
typically arises when the short seller provides material gathered using private investigators or 
from local or foreign regulatory filings that are not readily available online. We combine the 
report characteristics data with returns data from CRSP, financial statement data from 
Compustat, and media counts from FactSet. 
We collect the target firms’ responses to the short seller reports by searching for press 
releases and news articles from Factiva, conference call transcripts from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon, litigation from Audit Analytics, and 8-Ks from EDGAR. After observing the complete 
set of responses from these sources, we categorized the responses according to the criteria 
described in the Online Appendix B. The responses that we observe belong to one or more of 
five categories. First, firms issue denials of the accuracy of allegations made by the short seller. 
Second, the firm may disclose additional information, to respond to or rebut the activist’s 
allegations. Third, the target firm may threaten or file a lawsuit against the short seller. Fourth, 
the firm may announce an internal investigation into the short seller’s allegations, conducted 
by outside counsel. We record an indicator variable for each type of publicly disclosed response 
made by the firm if it occurs within two weeks of the short seller report date and addresses the 
report or any allegations made in the report. We record a fifth category, no response, if the firm 
does not take any of these actions. 
Data on firm outcomes were collected from several sources: AAER data is from the 
USC Leventhal School of Accounting and is described in Dechow et al. [2011]. Delisting and 
acquisition outcomes are from CRSP, and restatements and auditor changes are from Audit 
Analytics. 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the activist short sellers and report 
characteristics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for each of the activists in our sample. 
The mean CAR from one day prior to the report’s issuance through 60 days following the report 
issuance is -17%, broadly consistent with the returns observed by Ljungqvist and Qian [2016]. 




and the significant price decline at the time the report is released which consistent with prior 
research into the effect of activist short seller reports on target firm returns (Ljungqvist and 
Qian [2016], Appel and Fos [2020]). We find significant positive cumulative abnormal returns 
over the 90 days preceding the report’s disclosure, consistent with short sellers screening for 
stocks that might be overvalued based on recent price increases and stock promotions 
(Aggarwal and Wu [2006]).  
We find that firms respond in at least one way to 31% of short seller reports. We also 
observe variation in report characteristics, depending on the activist, with some alleging fraud 
in 100% of reports, others in as few as 27% of reports. The presentation of new evidence varies 
by activist from 0% to 100%. Target firm response rates vary from 0% to 86%. Overall, the 
activists appear to be a heterogeneous group of investors that make varied allegations and 
engender different response rates. 
Panel B of table 1 presents the frequency of the various allegations and issues we 
observe in the activist reports. On average there are 5.71 different issues raised per report, 
including 1.82 accounting issues and 1.38 business issues. At least one business issue occurs 
87% percent of reports, and accounting issues occur in 65% of reports. Overall, fraud is alleged 
in 54% of reports and new evidence is presented in 55% of reports.  
Panel C of table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the most commonly bundled sets of 
allegations present in short seller reports, which helps to understand the scope and style of 
typical reports. The most common bundle of allegations, comprising 84 of the 351 activist 
reports in the sample, includes all categories of allegations and provides new evidence. This 
report style could reflect that the short seller identified serious and fundamental flaws in all 
aspects of the business, presenting a particularly compelling case of overvaluation including 
allegations of fraud. The strategy might also be designed to lessen the risk of a defamation 
claim by making a large number of claims, only some of which need to be true for a reasonable 
defense. The second most common bundle contains only allegations of overvaluation based on 
business issues, without giving any new information.  
Panel D of table 1 provides descriptive evidence of the evolution of the activist report 
sample over time. We provide evidence that the number of reports issued increased 
dramatically in recent years, in particular since 2009. While we do not attempt to identify 
underlying causes for this rise in activism, we note that the distribution of activist reports using 




likely increases the reach and publicity of existing activist short sellers, encouraging more 
analysts to release short-oriented reports. Prior to social media distribution, activists primarily 
relied on their own websites and in some cases the financial press to rebroadcast their analyses. 
The target firm response rate has varied from 13% to 46% of reports each year, with an overall 
average response rate of 31%. We find that the prevalence of new information has become a 
significant feature of activist short seller reports only since 2007. A general movement by 
governments and private enterprise to make more data available online in recent years likely 
provided greater access to new evidence for short sellers. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about the target firm’s responses and outcomes. 
Panel A shows that the response rate also varies among firms associated with different 
outcomes. Only 6% of AAER firms respond to the reports, while 47% of firms that do not have 
a significant outcome respond, giving initial indications that responses may be associated with 
less severe outcomes.  
To provide descriptive evidence of when firms respond to the activist reports, in figure 
3, we plot a histogram of the firm responses relative to the report release day. Most responses 
happen during the first week following the activist report, with relatively few responses 
observed more than two weeks following the report release.  
Panel A of table 2 shows that 25% of target firms are delisted following the activist 
report release, and in figure 4 we plot the histogram of delisting events relative to the report 
release day. This figure illustrates that some firms are suspended from trading and delisted as 
soon as the same day the activist report is released. 7 The rate of delisting proceeds at a rate of 
0.28 to 0.85% of target firms per day over the two weeks following the report release. Although 
the overall percentage of firms affected on a daily basis is small, the cumulative delisting of 
25% of target firms provides evidence that targeted firms frequently violate listing standards. 
Panel A of table 2 also illustrates the fraction of firms electing to use each of the various 
response categories, with univariate outcome rates tabulated for each response option. 31% of 
firms respond with at least one of the categories we observe. The most common response is a 
denial of the activist claims, an action taken following 28% of activist reports. 12% of firms 
 
7 When we manually inspect the reasons for rapid delistings following the short seller report, we find that they 
are initiated by the NYSE or NASDAQ exchanges on a discretionary basis “for the protection of investors” 
(e.g., NASDAQ Listing Rule 5101, and Section 1009(d) of the NYSE Company Guide), and the determination 
is supplemented by other listing rules such as for failure to provide adequate responses to exchange inquiries, 




provide additional disclosures, 6% threaten or file lawsuits against the short seller, and 4% 
launch internal investigations.  
Of firms that launch internal investigations, 29% have subsequent AAER enforcement 
actions, more than four times the overall of 6% for the sample. Interestingly, these firms that 
receive fraud actions make denials in response to only 3% of activist reports, compared to a 
28% denial rate for the full sample. These firms provide additional information in only 2% of 
activist reports, compared to a 12% rate for all reports. Collectively this indicates that firms 
with subsequent fraud findings are much more likely to launch internal investigations and much 
less likely to make statements that could create additional liability for the firm. Firms launching 
internal investigations are acquired at a rate of 7%, less than half the 18% rate for the overall 
sample, and are twice as likely to be delisted, at a rate of 50%, compared to the sample average 
of 25%, indicating that these firms are harder to value or may bring significant liabilities to an 
acquirer. We confirm the statistical significance of several of these univariate results in 
multivariate tests below.  
Panel B of table 2 tabulates the univariate association between response options and 
abnormal returns. Consistent with our predictions, the market response to the short seller’s 
report publication is associated with response choices. The mean announcement return over the 
three days surrounding the report release (CAR [-1,1]) for all reports is -4%, the mean return 
associated with response firms is -14%, and the mean return for no-response firms is 0%, 
suggesting that firms targeted with unfounded reports optimally choose not to respond. Firms 
that launch internal investigations have announcement returns of -24%, indicating that the set 
of reports associated with internal investigation firms provided material new information. The 
application of the Delaware Doctrine implies that these reports raised sufficient evidence of 
red flags for fraud or other wrongdoing amongst the target firms’ management and/or directors 
to trigger a duty to investigate.  
Figure 5 plots average abnormal media attention, with media mentions spike more than 
261% on the day of the report’s disclosure, suggesting that the activists in our sample are able 
to reach a wide audience on average, and these reports are likely to gain the attention of 
investors and managers. 
Panel C of table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics for 
responding and non-responding firms. The univariate difference in firm characteristics is 




profitable (RoA of -0.01) compared to non-responding firms (RoA of -0.12), indicating that 
responses are likely related to the characteristics of the report, rather than observable 





4. The Activist Short Seller’s Targeting Decision 
 
In table 3, we provide a descriptive analysis of the types of firms targeted by activist 
short sellers. We provide new evidence about the characteristics of target firms, using a probit 
regression including all listed firms in CRSP and Compustat with the necessary data 
availability to calculate all the covariates, from 1996 to 2018. The dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one for firm-years with an activist report in our sample, and zero otherwise.8  
Panel A of table 3 provides descriptive statistics for targeted firms and the Compustat 
universe. Firms targeted by short sellers are smaller than the Compustat average in the mean 
($2,241 million for targeted firms versus $3,847 million for the full sample) but are somewhat 
larger using the median, at $531 million for targeted firms compared to $283 million for all 
firms. Targeted firms are different on other dimensions, consistent with prior literature on 
overvaluation, short sellers, and fraud: they have lower book-to-market ratios, lower leverage, 
are more likely to be foreign-headquartered, have higher short interest, higher Tobin’s Q, and 
are more likely to be earnings manipulators (e.g., Beneish [1999], Lee, Li, and Zhang [2015], 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996], Dechow et al. [2001]).  
Panel B of table 3 presents a probit regression with a dummy variable for being targeted 
as the dependent variable, and the inferences are generally consistent with panel A, although 
size is not a statistically significant targeting factor in the multivariate regression. panel B 
confirms that targeted firms have higher Tobin’s Q and lower profitability than the Compustat 
average. These coefficients have the opposite sign compared to the targeting decision for long 
activists studied by Brav et al. [2008], who aim to identify undervalued firms. Overall, short 
sellers appear to target firms with traditional indications of overvaluation, as target firms are 
significantly more likely to be labeled as manipulators using the M-score, to have recently 
undergone an IPO, and to be foreign. These factors are associated with the potential for fraud 
and distorted earnings (Beneish [1999], Lee, Li, and Zhang [2015]). Targeted firms have higher 
short interest, which is associated with greater limits to arbitrage, and therefore, the publication 
of a report is a more attractive way to resolve the overvaluation of these firms in a short period 
of time (Ljungqvist and Qian [2016]). 
 
8 In a contemporaneous working paper, Appel and Fos [2020] conduct a test of activist short seller targeting, 
using predictor variables based on Brav et al. [2008], and find that short interest, Tobin’s Q, and size are 
associated with activist reports. Because we expect long and short activists look at different factors, we 





Figure 6 plots the average short interest for targeted firms in the days surrounding report 
release, and it illustrates that targeted firms have 9% of shares outstanding sold short 90 days 
prior to the activist report releases, increasing to 12% at the release date. This can be compared 
to the Compustat population average short interest of 2%. Short interest remains high over the 
following 90 days, consistent with Appel and Fos [2020].  
Figure 7 presents longer-term plots of several outcome measures, with comparison plots 
between targeted firms on the left and matched peers on the right. Peer firms are matched using 
the nearest neighbors from the probit specification in table 3 and are limited to a caliper of 0.1 
standard deviations for the independent variables used in the model.  
Panel A of figure 7 shows the average rate of delisting from 36 months prior to 36 
months following the report release. We observe 3% of targeted firms delisting in the month 
immediately of the release, with generally 1% to 3% per month being delisted over the 
following 36 months. The matched firms have a delisting rate between 1% and 2% per month, 
so for targeted firms, delistings appear significantly more pronounced in the months 
immediately following the report release compared to peer firms. 
Panel B of figure 6 illustrates how targeted firms are significantly more likely than peer 
firms to face enforcement actions with a histogram of AAER violation periods and 
announcement dates. The plot on the left shows AAER dates for targeted firms, with light-
colored bars used to identify the end of the fraud period cited in the AAER. Dark-colored bars 
represent the histogram of AAER release dates, which all occur after the activist report release. 
AAER release dates more than 36 months following the event are included in the 36-month 
bar. AAERs for peer firms are negligible over the same period. The picture that emerges is that 
short seller reports are issued generally following or during periods of fraud but before SEC 
enforcement actions are disclosed. This is not necessarily causal evidence that the SEC 
identifies fraudulent activity from the short seller reports, the pattern could also be consistent 
with short sellers and the SEC observing the same warning signs that prompt investigation of 
the firm, but with the SEC taking longer to complete their investigation and issue an order. We 
manually examine all the AAERs that follow the activist report and find that 64 percent 
specifically address issues raised in the short seller reports, indicating that the enforcement 
actions have a strong relation to the short sellers’ allegations, even though we cannot comment 




Panel C of figure 3 shows that restatements rates are consistent over the event period, 
but they are somewhat more frequent in the six months following the short seller event for 
targeted firms, indicating the activist report may prompt auditors to reevaluate previously 
issued financial reports (e.g., Bockus and Gigler [1998], Krishnan and Krishnan [1997]). Panel 
D illustrates a 52% increase in auditor resignations from the pre-release period to the post-
release period for targeted firms, with lower rates of auditor resignations in both periods for 
matched firms. In summary, the monthly time series patterns indicate a significant association 





5. Target Firm Responses and Outcomes 
 
5.1. Report characteristics and target firm responses 
 
We next examine factors associated with the decision to respond and the type of 
response in a multivariate setting. Panel A of table 4 presents a summary of probit and OLS 
regressions of firm response types on indicator variables for the major categories of report 
allegations and an indicator variable if the abnormal return in the three days surrounding report 
issuance is in the lowest quartile. We include the full set of control variables used in Table 3 
panel B in all regressions. Column 1 presents a probit regression specification, and columns 2 
through 4 present OLS specifications with no fixed effects, year fixed effects only, and year 
and activist fixed effects, respectively.  
Panel A provides evidence that bottom quartile abnormal returns are significantly 
associated with making any response, with the previous discussion. Firms in the bottom quartile 
of returns are between 18 and 29 percentage points more likely to respond, compared to the 
overall average, consistent with the univariate results. Reports containing new evidence are 
also a predictor of responding, with a 11 to 17 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
responding, significant in all specifications other than the no-fixed-effects OLS specification. 
It is plausible that when the activist presents data and conclusions using new evidence, 
management may be better positioned to use the data to verify or refute the allegations more 
easily than reports based on the opinion of existing data. 
Considering specific report characteristics, we find that firms are less likely to respond 
with lawsuits when reports allege business issues, consistent with these issues presenting 
opinions that are less actionable in a defamation suit. Internal investigations are strongly 
associated with first quartile announcement returns, providing evidence that negative returns 
are associated with reports that present target firms with credible red flags for fraud or other 
serious wrongdoing.  
In Panel B of table 4, we present a similar analysis using the most common report 
bundles as independent variables. We run separate regressions with an indicator for each 
bundle included in a stepwise fashion and the full set of control variables from table 3 panel B. 
The reported coefficients on each bundle, therefore, represent the marginal effect of that bundle 
compared to all other reports. The results of this analysis show that bundles containing all 




business issues are associated with a lower likelihood of making any response, as well as lower 
chances of denials, lawsuit, and additional disclosure responses. 
 
5.2. Target firm responses and significant outcomes 
 
In our final analyses, we examine the association between responses and firm outcomes. 
Table 5 presents a summary of the probit and OLS regression coefficients of significant firm 
outcomes regressed on indicators for the firm response types and the full set of control variables.  
Table 5 provides no statistically significant evidence that non-response is associated 
with any of the outcomes we consider. This is consistent with our prediction that there are 
plausible reasons not to respond both when the firm agrees and disagrees with the activist 
allegations. Non-responses appear to provide little information to investors about the accuracy 
of the activists' claims, insofar as they are realized through these outcome measures.9 Lawsuit 
responses are positively associated with delisting in most specifications, which is not an 
association we predicted but is consistent with these firms suffering significant damages that 
they may attempt to recover through litigation. 
Internal investigations are associated with a 16 to 22 percentage point greater likelihood 
of delisting, a 7 to 20 percentage point greater rate of receiving an AAER, and a 9 to 24 
percentage point lower rate of being acquired, and these results are statistically significant in 
all specifications, providing evidence that the internal investigation response is associated with 
firms that have more adverse outcomes following the report release. We examine each firm 
that launches an internal investigation (untabulated) and find that of the 14 internal 
investigations in the sample, only 3 result in a public disclosure that the investigation cleared 
the firm of wrongdoing, 6 cases disclosed findings that wrongdoing did occur, and in the 
remaining 5 cases, the firm did not release the investigation results and is also delisted, 
indicating a finding of wrongdoing likely occurred. Considered together, these results are 
consistent with firms announcing internal investigations when the activist presented a 
sufficiently credible case to trigger directors’ duty to investigate.  
 
9 In untabulated tests, we examine if these responses are associated with post-report returns but cannot reject the 






How firms respond to activist short seller reports is an important question because short 
activism is an increasingly frequent phenomenon that significantly impacts target firms. Our 
study provides new evidence about the types of responses firms make in response to short seller 
reports, and the association of those reports with significant firm outcomes. While the majority 
of firms choose not to respond publicly to the activist, 31% of firms respond by denying the 
activists’ claims, threatening or launching lawsuits against the activist, providing additional 
disclosures, and launching internal investigations. Firm response choices are associated with 
report characteristics and its market impact, as firms are significantly more likely to respond 
when the activist report is accompanied by more negative abnormal returns and when the report 
contains new information not already available in public disclosures. Conversely, not 
responding is associated with more muted stock price response to the report release and fewer 
adverse outcomes. Launching an internal investigation is an important action, as firms electing 
this option are more likely to be delisted, more likely to receive a fraud enforcement action, 
and less likely to be acquired. We extend the literature on internal investigations by providing 
empirical evidence on the decision to conduct internal investigations and the relation of 
investigations to short seller activity and firm outcomes. Our study highlights the impact that 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 





Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company overstates its revenues, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Expense 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company understates its expenses, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Income 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company overstates its income 
(e.g., operating income, net income), and 0 otherwise.  
Cash flow 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company overstates or 
misclassifies its cash flow, and 0 otherwise.  
Assets 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company overestimates its assets, 
and 0 otherwise; or if it conducted improper asset recognition, failure to 
write down the asset or overestimated goodwill.  
Liabilities 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company underestimates its 
liabilities (e.g., off-balance sheet liabilities), and 0 otherwise.  
Non-GAAP 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company inadequately 
uses/discloses Non-GAAP measures (e.g., EBITDA, EBIT, adj. EBITDA, 
adj. EBIT), and 0 otherwise.  
Audit and internal 
controls 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target has a weak auditor, frequent 




Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company makes vague or 
inadequate disclosures, and 0 otherwise.  
Errors in disclosure 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company makes disclosures that 
are inconsistent with the law, e.g., fraudulent disclosures, missing 




Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company has bad/fake products, 
and 0 otherwise.   
Business 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company has a flawed business 
model, e.g., inherent unprofitability due to a competitive market, related 
party transactions, missing clients and contracts, production facilities 
non-existing, and 0 otherwise.  
Acquisitions and 
divestitures 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company has made poor or 






Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company has issues with the 
management, incl. past fraud participation, frequent changes of top 
management (CEO, CFO), and 0 otherwise. 
  
Securities fraud 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the short seller alleges material lie or 
omission in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, insider 
trading. Filings that included false reports (annual report, quarterly 
reports), and 0 otherwise. Do they use the word “fraud”?  
New evidence 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the short seller provides new information, 
not in existing securities filings or produces a sufficiently novel analysis 
of filings to present strong evidence of the alleged improper activity (e.g., 





Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company issues a press release, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Form 8-K 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company issues 8-K filing, and 0 
otherwise. 
Conference call 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company issues a conference 
call, and 0 otherwise. 
Denial 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company makes a hostile 
response, incl. insulting the short seller, and 0 otherwise. 
Lawsuit 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company makes or threatens to 
file a lawsuit, and 0 otherwise. 
Internal investigation 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company announces to conduct 
internal investigations, e.g., setting up a special committee, and 0 
otherwise 
Additional disclosure 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company discloses additional 




Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company has an increase of 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) after the 
EVENT_DATE, and 0 otherwise. AAER dataset from the USC Leventhal 
School of Accounting at the Marshall School of Business (Dechow et al. 
[2011]). 
Delisting 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company is delisted after the 
EVENT_DATE, and 0 otherwise. CRSP. 
Acquired 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company is acquired after the 
EVENT_DATE, and 0 otherwise. CRSP. 
CAR[-1,+1] 
Is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window (-1/+1) 
surrounding the activist short seller report disclosure.  
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the market model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[𝑎, 𝑏]𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑)
𝑏




abnormal return for firm i for day a through day b. 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑 is calculated as 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑 = 𝑟𝑖𝑑 − [α?̂? + β1̂𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑑 + β2̂𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 + β3̂𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + β4̂𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑑] , 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑑is the abnormal return for firm i on day d, 𝑟𝑖𝑑 is the excess 
return of the stock i for day d over the one month Treasury Bill rate, 
RMRFd is the excess market return for day d using the value-weighted 
CRSP index of all firms traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Amex 
exchanges, SMBd, HMLd, and UMDd are the portfolio returns on the size, 
book-to-market, and momentum portfolios on day d, and α?̂? and the β̂s are 
estimated from the equation: 𝑟𝑖𝑑 = α𝑖 + β1𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹𝑑 + β2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑑 +
β3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑑 + β4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑑 + ε𝑖𝑑, using a pre-event period from event day -252 
trading days to event day -20 trading days. Observations with less than 70 
days of returns data in the estimation period are dropped. CRSP. 
CAR[+2,+60] 
Is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window (+2/+60). 
Firms that are delisted during the post-event window CAR calculate up 
through the delisting date. CRSP. 
CAR[+2,+252] 
Is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window (+2/+252). 
Firms that are delisted during the post-event window CAR calculate up 
through the delisting date. CRSP 
Severe outcome Is an indicator if AAER, delisting, or acquired equals 1. 
Restatements 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company had a restatement filed 
over the subsequent 12 months after the EVENT_DATE, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Analytics.  
Auditor change 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company had a change of the 
auditor filed over the subsequent 12 months after the EVENT_DATE, and 
0 otherwise. Audit Analytics. 
Abnormal media count 
Use count of media mentions and calculate abnormal media pct in days -
65 to -20. Factset, all news sources. 
Daily short interest 




Log market cap 
Is the log of the market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year 
in which the short seller report is published (Compustat, csho*prcc_f). 
BTM 
Is the ratio of the target company’s book value of equity to its market 
value of equity as of the beginning of the fiscal year in which the short 
seller’s report was published. Compustat, Book/MktCap, where Book is 
defined as seq-pstk and MktCap as csho*prcc_f.  
Leverage 
Is the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of debt and market value of 
equity. Compustat, calculated via as (long term debt (dltt)+debt in 
current liabilities(dlc))/total assets(at).  
Analysts 
Is the log number of equity analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the 
fiscal quarter in which the short seller’s report is published. Compustat 
and calculated as log(numan + 1).  
Institutional ownership 
Is the percentage of the target company’s stock held by institutional 
investors as of the beginning of the quarter in which the short seller’s 





Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company is foreign 
headquartered. Compustat loc is not “USA”. 
Litigation risk 
Kim and Skinner [2011]. Indicator equal to 1 if primary SIC-codes is in 
the set (2833:2836, 3570:3577, 3600:3647, 5200:5961, 7370:7374, 
8731:8734). Compustat 
Short interest 
Is the percentage of shares outstanding that are shorted prior to the 
short seller’s report publication date. Compustat 
short_pre/csho/1,000,000. 
Q 
Tobin’s Q. Compustat ((Long term debt (dltt)+ debt in current liabilities 
(dlc) + price times shares outstanding (prc*shrout))/(Long term debt 
(dltt) + debt in current liabilities (dlc)+ (shareholders’ equity (seq) – 
preferred stock (pstk)). 
Dividend yield The dividend yield. Compustat (dvp+dvc)/(MktCap+pstk.  
RoA Return on Assets. Compustat ibadj/shift(at,1,NA,"lag")? 
Manipulator 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the M-score is greater than -1.78, and 
where the M-score is calculated as -4.84 + .920 * dsri + .528 * gmi + 
.404 * aqi + .892 * sgi + .115 * depi - .172 * sgai + 4.679 * tata - .327 * 
lvgi (see Beneish [1999] for the calculation of the underlying ratios.) 
Compustat. 
IPO 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the report is filed during the first year the 
company is listed in Compustat. 
Earnings 
announcement 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company’s response is within 
five days of a quarterly earnings announcement date, and 0 otherwise.  
Avg pre-returns 
Cumulative abnormal returns in the (-5/-1) relative to the event date. 
CRSP. 
Pre-AAER 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company had a change of the 
auditor filed over the prior 12 months after the EVENT_DATE, and 0 
otherwise. AAER dataset from the USC Leventhal School of Accounting 
at the Marshall School of Business (Dechow et al. [2011]) and SEC. 
Pre-Restatement 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company had a restatement 
filed over the subsequent 12 months prior the EVENT_DATE, and 0 
otherwise. Audit Analytics.  
Pre-Auditor change 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company had a change of the 
auditor filed over the subsequent 12 months prior the EVENT_DATE, 
and 0 otherwise. Audit Analytics. 
1st quartile of 
 CAR[-1,+1] 
Indicator variable of value 1 if the target company is in the lowest CAR[-













































































Figure 7: Monthly Descriptive Statistics Surrounding Report Dates 
 
Panel A: Delistings 
 
Panel B: AAERs  
 
Panel C: Restatements 
 










Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Activist Short Sellers and Report Allegations 
 
The sample contains details of the 351 reports from 25 activist short sellers on US-listed target firms from 1996 
to 2018, with available data to calculate required control variables. Fraud allegations, new evidence, and any 
response are the proportion of reports that allege securities fraud, that present new evidence, and to which 
companies respond to the short seller’s allegations via press releases, conference calls, or Form 8-K filings, 
respectively. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Panel A: Activist short seller characteristics 
 












1 Spruce Point 42 0.64 0.93 0.21 -0.14 
2 Richard Pearson 41 0.59 0.56 0.15 -0.19 
3 GeoInvesting 34 0.47 0.35 0.32 -0.26 
4 Citron Research 29 0.41 0.59 0.34 -0.23 
5 Asensio & Co. 24 0.46 0.00 0.50 -0.33 
6 Kerrisdale Capital 23 0.30 0.35 0.26 -0.25 
7 Bleecker Street Research 17 0.59 0.59 0.12 -0.24 
8 Pump Stopper 17 0.82 0.88 0.18 -0.25 
9 Muddy Waters 16 0.75 0.88 0.75 -0.19 
10 Bronte Capital 15 0.47 0.00 0.13 -0.09 
11 Prescience Investment 14 0.64 0.93 0.50 -0.09 
12 Xuhua 11 0.27 0.27 0.09 -0.12 
13 Aurelius Value 9 0.78 0.78 0.67 -0.23 
14 Shareholder Watchdog 9 0.33 0.11 0.00 -0.25 
15 Glaucus Research 7 0.29 0.57 0.86 -0.21 
16 Gotham City Research 7 0.57 1.00 0.71 -0.27 
17 Alfred Little 6 0.83 0.83 0.50 -0.18 
18 Chimin Sang 5 0.40 0.40 0.20 -0.16 
19 Street Sweeper 5 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.45 
20 Absaroka Capital Management 4 0.75 1.00 0.75 -0.18 
21 Anonymous Analytics 4 0.50 0.50 0.75 -0.01 
22 Chinese Company Analyst 4 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 
23 The Emperor Has No Clothes 3 0.33 0.67 0.00 2.49 
24 Viceroy Research 3 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.05 
25 ForensicFactor 2 0.50 1.00 0.50 -0.31 







Panel B: Report allegation characteristics 
Appendix A provides detail regarding the frequency at which the short seller makes allegations addressing 
various topics among our sample of 351 short seller reports. Mean reports the average number of times a topic 
occurs per report across the sample, for example, there are an average of 1.82 accounting issues per report. For 
topic areas with various subtopics that we code, we also report the incidence or rate of occurrence, reported in 
parentheses, for at least one of the subtopics, for example, 65% of reports contain at least one accounting issue. 
 
Allegation Topic Mean (Incidence) 
Accounting issues 1.82 (0.65) 








Disclosure Issues 0.84 (0.65) 
Serious errors in disclosure 0.46 
Incomplete disclosures 0.38 
Business Issues 1.38 (0.87) 
Business 0.74 
Product 0.36 
Acquisitions and divestures 0.28 
Management Issues 0.58 
Securities Fraud 0.54 






Panel C: Descriptive statistics of report allegation bundles 
This table presents the number of analyst reports that correspond to the indicated set of characteristics, which comprise the topics discussed in the report, allegations of 
securities fraud, and the presence of new evidence. 
   Bundle characteristics 
  














All issues  84  X X X X X X 
Business issues only 34    X    
All issues except securities fraud 23  X X X X  X 
Accounting and business issues only 16  X  X    
All issues except new evidence 14  X X X X X  
Business issues and new evidence only 13    X   X 
Others, >= 5 obs. 10   X X X X  
 10  X X X   X 
 9   X X    
 8  X  X X X X 
 8  X X X X   
 8  X X X    
 8   X X  X  
 7  X X X  X X 
 6  X X  X X X 
 6   X X X X X 
 5    X X X X 
  5    X X   
Others, < 5 obs. 77        





Panel D: Report characteristics by year 
 
This table provides annual descriptive statistics of report characteristics and topic incidence for the 351 reports in the sample. 
 
         








1996 2 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 
1997 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1998 6 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.33 0.83 0.83 0.50 
1999 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 
2000 - - - - - - - - 
2001 4 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 
2002 - - - - - - - - 
2003 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
2004 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2005 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
2006 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2007 4 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 
2008 4 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.75 
2009 7 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.57 0.43 0.86 0.29 
2010 24 0.13 0.38 0.46 0.67 0.63 0.83 0.42 
2011 48 0.46 0.60 0.60 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.69 
2012 20 0.40 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.60 0.95 0.65 
2013 42 0.31 0.45 0.38 0.64 0.55 0.86 0.55 
2014 46 0.17 0.72 0.65 0.59 0.59 0.87 0.63 
2015 40 0.28 0.48 0.53 0.63 0.65 0.95 0.63 
2016 29 0.38 0.59 0.52 0.66 0.55 0.93 0.62 
2017 36 0.36 0.67 0.58 0.69 0.78 0.94 0.58 
2018 32 0.25 0.75 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.97 0.53 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Responses 
 
Panel A: Cross tabulation of target firm response and outcomes 
 
This table relates the fraction of events by each combination of target firm response and target firm outcome 
for our sample of 351 short seller reports to firm outcomes. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 
Disclosure type Target firm outcome 
Target firm response 
All 
Outcomes 







                
Denial 0.28 0.03 0.26 0.22 0.49 0.06 0.10 
Lawsuit 0.06 0.00 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.05 0.05 
Internal investigation 0.04 0.29 0.50 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.29 
Additional disclosure 0.12 0.02 0.30 0.23 0.44 0.05 0.12 
Any response 0.31 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.47 0.06 0.12 
No response 0.69 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.55 0.07 0.17 
All Reports 1.00 0.06 0.25 0.18 0.51 0.07 0.15 
 
       
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns by response type 
 
This table presents average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the three days surrounding report release 
days [-1,+1], the subsequent three-month [+2,+60], and year [+2,+252] periods, and the entire period, [-
1/+252]. Statistical significance on the abnormal returns is based on a t-test of the mean difference from zero. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
  Mean CAR 
  [-1,+1] [+2,+60] [+2,+252] [-1,+252] 
 
    
Denial -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.30*** -0.37*** 
Lawsuit -0.16** -0.17** -0.39*** -0.46*** 
Internal investigation -0.24*** -0.18 -0.27 -0.35** 
Additional disclosure -0.13* -0.11* -0.23** -0.32** 
Any response -0.14*** -0.15** -0.29*** -0.36*** 
No response 0.00 -0.13*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
All Reports -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.30*** -0.34*** 






Panel C: Characteristics of responding and non-responding firms 
 
This table provides the mean values for characteristics of responding (N=109) and non-responding events 
(N=242). Statistical significance is based on a t-test of the mean difference from zero. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Comparison of response and no response firms   
Variables Response firms 
No response 
firms 
Difference in Mean 
Market cap 2,309.46 2,209.43 100.03 
BTM 0.44 0.45 -0.01 
Q 3.74 4.00 -0.26 
RoA -0.01 -0.12 0.11*** 
Leverage 0.17 0.14 0.02 
Dividend yield 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Analysts 1.42 1.45 -0.03 
Institutional ownership 0.34 0.36 -0.02 
Litigation risk 0.30 0.37 -0.07 
Manipulator 0.36 0.24 0.11 
IPO 0.17 0.15 0.01 
Foreign 0.46 0.36 0.10 
Short interest 0.07 0.07 0.00 
Pre-AAER 0.01 0.03 -0.02 
Pre-Restatement 0.43 0.00 0.43 







Table 3: Activist Short Seller Target Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Characteristics of target companies 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of short seller target firm characteristics with comparison to the full Compustat universe (N=16,283). The difference in median p-
value is calculated using Mood’s median test. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
 





















Market cap 2,240.50 6,398.61 189.88 531.31 1,358.14 3,846.52 0.00 283.19 0.00  
BTM 0.45 0.66 0.15 0.31 0.54 0.64 0.00 0.51 0.00  
Leverage 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.17 0.00  
Analysts (log) 1.44 1.00 0.69 1.61 2.20 1.23 0.00 1.10 0.01  
Institutional ownership 0.35 0.35 0.01 0.23 0.65 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.06  
Foreign 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Litigation risk 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Short interest 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Q 3.92 4.01 1.55 2.48 4.61 2.47 0.00 1.53 0.00  
Dividend yield 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09  
RoA -0.08 0.39 -0.13 0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00  
Manipulator 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Pre-AAER 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.28 0.00 0.46  
Pre-Restatements 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Pre-Auditor Change 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Earnings announcement 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 - - - -  
Avg pre-returns 0.01 0.34 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 - - - -  
CAR[-1,+1] -0.04 0.61 -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 - - - -  
CAR[+2,+60] -0.14 0.31 -0.32 -0.14 0.03 - - - -  




Panel B: Probit analysis of targeting 
 
This table reports a probit regression of the probability of being targeted by an activist short seller in our sample. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if an activist short seller targets the firm-year 
observation. based on the prior year-end realization of the financial variables. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. The marginal probability column indicates the change in probability of targeting induced by a one-
standard deviation change in the values of the covariate from their respective sample averages. *. **. and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%. 5%. and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Dummy (of Being Targeted) 
 Coefficient z-value  Marg. Prob. % 
Log market cap 0.01 0.78 0.00% 
BTM -0.09* -2.12 -0.06% 
Q 0.02** 3.22 0.01% 
RoA -0.16* -2.42 -0.10% 
Leverage -0.45*** -4.42 -0.28% 
Dividend yield -2.81** -2.75 -1.77% 
Analysts 0.02 0.81 0.01% 
Institutional ownership 0.08 0.91 0.05% 
Manipulator 0.18*** 4.06 0.13% 
IPO 0.28*** 4.84 0.24% 
Litigation risk 0.02 0.04 0.01% 
Foreign 0.54*** 11.32 0.54% 
Short interest 3.40*** 14.12 2.14% 
Restatement 0.11 0.07 0.08% 
AAER -0.17 0.19 -0.09% 
Pre-Auditor change 0.29*** 4.38 0.26% 
N 148,776   
Pseudo-R2   0.10   





Table 4: Report Characteristics and Firm Responses 
 
Panel A: Report characteristics and firm responses 
 
This table provides the probit and ordinary least square regression coefficients of interest for specification 
including year and short seller fixed effects with clustered standard errors based on short sellers. All regressions 
include the control variables included in panel B of table 3. See Appendix A for variable definitions. N=351. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
 
 Probit  OLS 





 Coef. Marg. 
Prob. % 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
       
Dependent variable: Any Response 
Accounting issues 0.21 6.57  0.06 0.07 0.10* 
Disclosure issues 0.26 8.39  0.06 -0.00 0.02 
Business issues -0.29 -9.95  -0.08 -0.15* -0.21** 
Management issues -0.09 -2.94  -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
Securities fraud 0.03 1.03  0.01 0.01 0.01 
New evidence 0.35** 11.34  0.10 0.17** 0.15** 
1st quartile CAR[-1,+1] 0.82*** 29.20  0.28*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 
Dependent variable: Denial 
Accounting issues 0.17 4.90  0.04 0.06 0.08 
Disclosure issues 0.28 8.21  0.06 0.00 0.03 
Business issues -0.12 -4.90  -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 
Management issues -0.21 -6.28  -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
Securities fraud 0.01 0.33  0.01 0.01 0.01 
New evidence 0.41** 12.06  0.11 0.17*** 0.14** 
1st quartile CAR[-1,+1] 0.70*** 23.56  0.23*** 0.18*** 0.13** 
Dependent variable: Lawsuit 
Accounting issues 0.00 0.00  -0.01 0.00 0.02 
Disclosure issues 0.09 0.24  0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
Business issues -0.86*** -5.60  -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.09** 
Management issues -0.64* -2.35  -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
Securities fraud 0.54 1.64  0.05 0.03 0.02 
New evidence 0.43 1.27  0.03 0.06** 0.07*** 
1st quartile CAR[-1,+1] 0.54* 2.34  0.07 0.04 0.01 
Dependent variable: Internal investigation 
Accounting issues 1.43** 0.25  0.04 0.04 0.06** 
Disclosure issues 0.42 0.06  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Business issues -0.46 -0.14  -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
Management issues -0.47 -0.09  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Securities fraud -0.43 -0.08  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
New evidence 0.06 0.01  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 





 Probit  OLS 





 Coef. Marg. 
Prob. % 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Additional disclosure 
Accounting issues 0.20 2.98  0.03 0.03 0.04 
Disclosure issues 0.28 4.19  0.03 0.01 0.03 
Business issues -0.34 -6.19  -0.07 -0.09* -0.12** 
Management issues 0.17 2.06  0.04 0.03 0.06 
Securities fraud -0.12 -1.87  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
New evidence -0.02 -0.36  -0.00 0.03 0.03 











Panel B: Report allegation bundles and firm responses 
 
This table provides the probit and ordinary least square regression specification including year and short seller 
fixed effects with clustered standard errors based on short sellers. The regressions are conducted in a stepwise 
manner, with an independent dummy variable included for a single bundle with each regression. The complete 
list of bundle definitions is provided in panel C of table 1. All regressions include the control variables included 
in panel B of table 3. See Appendix A for variable definitions. N=351. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
 Probit 
 OLS 








 Coef. Marg. 
Prob % 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Any response 
All issues  0.44*** 15.63  0.16** 0.14* 0.09 
Business issues only -5.38*** -30.82  -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.30*** 
All issues except securities fraud 0.04 1.21  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Accounting and business issues only -0.81 -20.10  -0.17** -0.15** -0.13** 
All issues except new evidence -0.02 -0.72  -0.01 -0.04 0.08 
Business issues and new evidence 
only 
0.45 0.16  0.14 0.14 -0.02 
Dependent variable: Denial       
All issues  0.37** 12.00*  0.12* 0.11 0.06 
Business issues only -5.28*** -27.22  -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.25*** 
All issues except securities fraud 0.12 4.02  0.04 0.02 0.03 
Accounting and business issues only -0.75 -17.38  -0.16** -0.13* -0.13* 
All issues except new evidence -0.18 -5.25  -0.05 -0.09 0.00 
Business issues and new evidence 
only 
0.55 19.73  0.17 0.20* 0.05 
Dependent variable: Lawsuit       
All issues  0.04 0.20  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Business issues only -4.42 -2.36  -0.05** -0.04* -0.06** 
All issues except securities fraud -0.14 -0.63  -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Accounting and business issues only -4.08 -2.21  -0.05** -0.05** -0.04** 
All issues except new evidence -0.13 -0.59  -0.01 -0.05 0.01 
Business issues and new evidence 
only 
0.23 1.46  0.02 0.03 0.03 
Dependent variable: Internal investigation 
All issues  0.16 0.43  0.01 0.01 0.00 
Business issues only -5.04 -0.82  -0.03 -0.03 -0.06* 
All issues except securities fraud 0.69 2.73  0.03 0.05 0.06 
Accounting and business issues only -3.86 -0.91  -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
All issues except new evidence -4.41 -0.90  -0.06** -0.08*** -0.04 
Business issues and new evidence 
only 
-3.81 -0.89  -0.02* -0.03* -0.07*** 
Dependent variable: Additional disclosures 
All issues  0.20 3.44  0.04 0.04 0.03 
Business issues only -4.56 
-
10.32*** 
 -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
All issues except securities fraud 0.09 1.55  0.00 -0.02 0.00 
Accounting and business issues only -0.24 -3.39  -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 
All issues except new evidence 0.66* 15.34  0.17 0.18 0.23 
Business issues and new evidence 
only 




Table 5: Target Firm Responses and Outcomes 
  
This table provides the probit and ordinary least square specification including year and short seller fixed effects 
with clustered standard errors based on short sellers. All regressions include the control variables included in panel 
B of table 3. See Appendix A for variable definitions. N=351. *. **. and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%. 5%. and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 
 Probit  OLS 







 Coef. Marg. 
Prob % 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)        
Dependent variable: Delisted 
No response 0.60 12.72  0.14 0.09 0.08 
Denial 0.05 -1.23  0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Lawsuit 0.79** 36.78  0.23** 0.12* 0.06 
Internal investigation 0.74* 22.18  0.19*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 
Additional 
disclosures 
0.52 13.00  0.12* 0.09 0.09 
Dependent variable: AAER 
No response -0.33 -0.35  -0.12 -0.10 -0.14 
Denial -1.07 -0.67  -0.16 -0.11 -0.13 
Lawsuit -5.52 -0.72  -0.07 -0.09 -0.14* 
Internal investigation 1.34** 6.69  0.20** 0.20** 0.18** 
Additional 
disclosures 
-0.32 -0.20  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Dependent variable: Acquired 
No response -0.28 -5.36  -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 
Denial 0.28 5.31  0.08 0.02 0.02 
Lawsuit -0.65 -7.76  -0.15* -0.05 -0.04 
Internal investigation -0.97* -9.38  -0.21** -0.22*** -0.24*** 
Additional 
disclosures 
-0.10 -1.63  -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
Dependent variable: Restatements 
No response -0.14 -2.84  -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Denial -0.46 -7.96  -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 
Lawsuit -0.81 -9.95  -0.11 -0.15* -0.28** 
Internal investigation 0.52 13.03  0.10 0.11 0.08 
Additional 
disclosures 
0.05 0.89  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
Dependent variable: Auditor Change 
No response -0.38 -0.40  -0.01 0.02 0.02 
Denial -0.40 -0.28  -0.02 0.04 0.06 
Lawsuit -1.12 -0.33  -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 
Internal investigation 0.76 1.80  0.11 0.08 0.06 
Additional 
disclosures 







Banks and their Supranational Monitors –  










The last financial crisis saw large amounts of taxpayers’ money used to save banks. Given the 
incentives of banks to offer an obfuscated view of their financial health, I investigate in this 
paper whether banks that receive state aid become more transparent when a supranational 
monitoring trustee (MT) is assigned to the bank, compared to banks without these monitors. 
Using a hand-collected sample of European banks that obtained state aid at different times in 
different countries, the staggered introduction of the MTs allows for a difference in differences 
analysis of the impact of the MT on financial reporting transparency. The MT’s presence is 
associated with higher levels of loan loss allowances. Banks with MTs are more likely to restate 
their financial statements when it comes to restatements regarding the income statement and 
cash flow statement. Both findings seem to be driven by the banks that also disclose having 
MTs. In a subsample analysis of listed banks, however, banks that disclose the presence of an 
MT in their annual reports tend to have significantly lower credit risk disclosure scores than the 
banks that do not disclose their presence in a univariate comparison. 
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In both the United States of America (USA) (Gorton and Metrick [2012]) and Europe, 
a flood of capital assistance to banks occurred following the start of the financial crises in 2007.1 
Countries in the European Union (EU) provided more than €600 billion in capital and loans as 
well as more than €1,200 billion in guarantees to banks as of 2015.2 Many European banks were 
rescued through a range of state aid measures that included equity capital injections and 
government guarantees but also asset relief programs. Some of these banks have received 
further additional supervision through an external supranational monitor, a so-called 
Monitoring Trustees (MT) after obtaining state aid, whereas other banks have remained only 
under the oversight of their national regulators.3 Being the “eyes and ears” (Brueckner and 
Hoehn [2010], p.75) of the EC, the MT usually oversees the implementation of the 
commitments and agreements made in these state aid cases. The MT can be one or more natural 
or legal person(s) and in most observable cases in my sample, the MT is usually a private 
consulting or auditing firm (Brownsword, Van Gestel, and Micklitz [2017]), such as KPMG or 
Grant Thornton, because these firms have the skill set required by the EC.4 
This study is the first study to investigate what duties have been assigned to these MTs 
that were sent to banks, as well as whether and how these supranational MTs may change the 
financial reporting transparency and financial reporting behavior of banks. Transparency is here 
defined as the availability of bank-specific, value-relevant information available to external 
stakeholders (similar to Guo, Jin, Kanagaretnam, and Lobo [2020]). While this supranational 
monitoring mechanism has been employed relatively often in merger control cases in the EU5, 
 
1 In the USA, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Division A of Public Law 110-343) 
established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to allow the US Treasury department to purchase and 
guarantee of “troubled assets.” $700 billion were initially authorized in the TARP. Source: 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56300 (access date: 14.08.2020) 
2 Details are obtained from the papers by the Competition Directorate–General of the European Commission; 
link: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/csb/csb2015_001_en.pdf (access date: 15.01.2019) 
3 As described in this news article by Reuters link: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-banks/greek-
banks-face-extra-monitoring-in-return-for-aid-idUSBRE8AF11E20121116 (access date: 21.12.2019), Greek 
banks received MTs as part of the state aid commitment.  
4 Though the majority of MTs seems to include private consulting or auditing firms, I could also observe a case 
in 2017 where a natural person, Claudia C. Oddi, was appointed as an MT, related to the case SA 43390 
2016/N. But these “one man shows” seem to be no longer common according to one of my interview partners. 
5 The legal basis for EU Merger Control is Council Regulation No 139/2004, the EU Merger Regulation. 
Mergers and acquisitions, which would significantly reduce competition in the European Single Market, are 
prohibited. For instance, if a merger would result in dominant companies that are likely to raise prices for 
consumers, the transaction would only be allowed if certain conditions and obligations are met. The European 
Commission (EC) views a MT as a natural and legal person that is appointed by the merging parties and 
approved by the EC to monitor compliance with these conditions and obligations. Non-compliance would 




it was the first time during the financial crisis that MTs were assigned to banks during the state 
aid cases by the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), which is part of the 
European Commission (EC)6. The DG COMP is responsible for establishing and implementing 
the competition policy for the European Union and which has a dual enforcement role 
containing an investigative role and a decision-making role. 7  Though some prior studies 
investigate state aid in Europe and suggest that state aid to banks has been able to restore trust 
in the financial markets (Barucci, Colozza, and Milani [2019], p. 2), it is not clear at all what 
role the new supranational MTs have played.  
Given their strong enforcement power and monitoring rights (see Appendix D for an 
overview of their far-reaching competencies), the MT may influence a bank’s financial 
reporting transparency through two main channels. Firstly, MTs can influence the information 
generating of bank managers by demanding more and/or better information regarding certain 
issues, such as loan impairments or allowances. Following the proposition made by Verrecchia 
[1990], the market will exert more pressure on the manager to disclose information when the 
quality of the information possessed by the manager increases, especially when market 
participants are aware of the MT’s presence. Nevertheless, it is still possible that shareholders 
and other stakeholders free ride on the MT’s presence – and engage in so-called delegated 
monitoring (e.g., Diamond [1996]) without increasing banks' transparency. Secondly, the EC 
asked for more foreseeable losses to be disclosed (e.g., “Impaired Assets Communication”, 
2009/C 72/01 of 25.02.2009, see Appendix C)8 and it may be using the assignment of the MTs 
to increase market discipline. Prior literature, however, hints to potential forbearance strategies 
(e.g., Huizinga and Laeven [2012], Gallemore [2020], Cole [2017]) with a focus on the national 
level. These strategies may also take place on the supranational level and banks might be 
allowed to “go dark”, i.e., to become opaquer, to recover under state aid (e.g., Agarwal, Lucca, 
Seru, and Trebbi [2014]). Hence, one would not expect banks to disclose more or better 
 
in Europe and the complexity of the banking industry, it was decided to also use this new monitoring tool for 
the many state aid cases in the banking industry. 
6 According to my interview with to Dr. Andreas Bergmann, the sheer number of state aid cases during and after 
the last global financial crisis (GFC) and the complexity of the banking industry, made the DG COMP to 
receive support from the MTs in the monitoring of state aid commitments. 
7 DG Competition is one of the most sophisticated antitrust enforcers in the world, alongside US agencies 
Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Its policy areas include 
antirust, mergers, liberalization, state aid as well as international cooperation; link 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/consumer/background-what-is-the-ec-s-competition-directorate-1.3143166 (access date: 
29.01.2020) 
8 Apart from institutions like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank, the European Commission (EC) also gave guidance in its Communications (e.g., 
“Impaired Assets Communication”, 2009/C 72/01 of 25.02.2009, see Appendix C) to actively encourage more 




information. Prior findings, nevertheless, suggest that the regulator’s reputation can be 
potentially harmed by forbearance strategies (e.g., Morrison and White [2013]) and that it may 
be suboptimal for regulators with a strong reputation. Engaging in secret forbearance strategies 
can never be fully ruled out (Gallemore [2020]) because they are difficult to observe but the 
setting in the EU seems to provide strong incentives to adhere to the EU rules on State Aid9 
reducing the incentives to engage in forbearance strategies that serve national interests. Given 
the EC’s wide powers to investigate and penalize breaches this monitoring mechanism may 
circumvent political interference (e.g., Tiebout [1956]) from the national regulators, national 
regulatory laxity as well as potential regulatory arbitrage (e.g., White [2011]). 
The European setting in this study is helpful for several reasons. First, in contrast to the 
state aid measures taken in the USA, European banks have received state aid measures at 
different points in time and of different magnitudes. I rely on a setting where banks face similar 
external incentives to provide transparent reporting because they are subject to similar 
economic shocks and have similar business models. Second, it is helpful that some banks have 
received state aid with MTs and some banks have received state aid without MTs and that, 
according to the DG Comp, there is no standard procedure with regards to the process of the 
selection of the MT. Third, focusing on banks in the EU allows me to focus on a supranational 
monitoring mechanism that has a strong legal assertiveness towards the participating banks that 
may circumvent the problems usually linked to national regulators and national enforcement 
such as regulatory capture (e.g., Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi [2014], Boyer and Ponce 
[2012]) and potential “turf fights” among regulators. Also, differences in regional supervisory 
characteristics (Agarwal et al. [2014], Granja and Leuz [2018]) may matter less in this setting 
given the supranational contractual binding legal commitments between the European 
Commission and the involved banks. 
The analyses of this study proceeds in the following steps. First, the MT, its 
characteristics, its duties, and the EU setting are studied and explained (see Appendix D) in 
detail. Secondly, using a hand-collected sample of European banks that have received state aid 
during the period between 2005-2019, I check whether banks that have received state aid and 
MTs have been structurally different in the pre-crises years than their peers that have not been 
supervised by MTs. Moreover, I analyze which observable country and bank characteristics can 
help to explain the assignment of an MT because it is difficult to observe and obtain information 
 
9 These incentives include retroactive action against illegal state aid, repayment of the state aid including 




about this assignment process from the EC. Then, to operationalize changes in financial 
reporting transparency, I investigate whether those banks with MTs have changed their loan 
loss reporting behavior and whether banks with MTs are associated with more financial 
restatements. I check whether results only hold for banks that disclose the presence of the MT. 
Lastly, I also operationalize reporting transparency by constructing a disclosure score. For a 
small subsample of listed banks, I investigate whether banks with MTs that disclose having 
MTs have increased their credit risk disclosures over time by composing a hand-collected 
disclosure index like Nier [2005] and Bischof, Rudolf, and Elfers [2020a].10 
After comparing the bank with MTs and those banks without MTs, banks are more 
likely to be assigned MTs when the regulatory quality index is lower and when the bank faces 
a more complex state aid structure, including for example asset relief measures, longer duration, 
or recapitalizations. On a univariate comparison, banks with MTs seem to have more disclosed 
loan loss allowances but fewer disclosed non-performing loans. Employing a yearly panel of 
bank-level data in a staggered difference-in-differences design from 2003-2018, I find that 
banks’ loan loss reporting behavior changes only significantly for the loan loss allowance ratio 
after controlling for changes in the underlying credit portfolio and using original filings. I 
interpret this evidence as consistent with the notion that banks’ reporting choices are influenced 
by the MT beyond simple compliance with accounting standards. Considering restatements, 
evidence indicates that banks with MTs are more likely to engage in restatements that relate to 
the income statement and cash flow statement. These findings only hold for the group of banks 
that also disclose having an MT. Using a subsample of listed banks for the period 2006-2016, I 
find a minor statistically significant difference in the credit risk disclosure score: banks with 
MTs that disclose the presence of the MT in the annual report have a lower disclosure score 
compared to banks with MTs who do not disclose it. 
This paper contributes to the lack of empirical evidence on the economic consequences 
of these newly implemented supranational supervisors. Apart from studies in the law literature 
(e.g., Brueckner and Hoehn [2010], Tyagi [2019]), studies on the economic consequences of 
MTs and their relation to bank transparency have not been conducted yet to the best of my 
knowledge. This is the first paper that studies the role of MTs and how they relate to the 
financial reporting transparency of banks. Determinants of bank financial reporting 
transparency (Guo et al. [2020], Bushman [2014]) have been an important subject of prior 
literature because the lack of transparency of banks played a major role in the global financial 
 




crisis (GFC) by impairing bank regulators’ and market participants’ understanding of banks’ 
risks (e.g., Acharya and Richardson [2009]). Secondly, this study contributes to the literature 
that examines the role of public regulatory enforcement of the banking system with a focus 
shifting from national to supranational supervisors. Prior literature primarily has used cross-
country settings to examine how national bank supervisors and regulators shape the financial 
reporting properties of banking systems (e.g., Bushman and Williams [2012], Costello, Granja, 
and Weber [2019]). Only some recent papers (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017]) have started 
to speak of undefined “supervisory pressure” (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017]) in the 
European setting without further investigating the additional monitoring mechanism of MTs 
during the last financial crises. I add to this literature by exploring this novel mechanism with 
hand-collected data to study the interplay of supranational regulatory oversight and bank 
transparency. Lastly, my findings can also inform regulators globally (e.g., Rixin [2015]) via 






2. Background and Related Literature 
 
2.1. European Union and state aid 
 
Many European banks were rescued through a range of state aid measures (e.g., equity 
capital injections, government guarantees, asset relief programs, etc.) during the last financial 
crisis. Various economists believe that this assistance to banks has changed the public 
perception of the government safety net (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein [2008]) and may have 
impacted the future behavior of banks. The economic significance of the past state aid decisions 
in Europe has been enormous: €665 bn (~5% of the EU’s GDP in 2008) were deployed via 
capital-like aid instruments and €1,296 bn in liquidity aid instruments have been used since 
2008. Between 2007 and 2014 over 400 state aid decisions (note that one bank may have more 
than one state aid decision) have been conducted in the financial sector with over 100 banks 
involved (incl. private banks). To get an idea of the economic significance of state aid granted 
in the financial sector, one may consider the ratio of the financial support to the total public 
debt: as of 2015, the state support to the financial sector represented in many affected countries 
more than 10% of total public debt, for example in Greece (14.5%), Ireland (28.5%), Cyprus 
(19.3%) or Germany (10.4%) (European Commission [2017]).  
Apart from the economic significance of this setting, this paper tries to make use of 
some peculiarities of the European setting and regulatory particularities to learn more about the 
new supranational supervisors, the MT, that has been assigned to banks. First, focusing on 
banks in the EU allows me to observe banks, unlike banks in the US, that have obtained state 
aid at different points in time and different magnitudes with different state aid types. Many of 
these European banks have received significant financial support from their governments, often 
– but not only – in the form of equity capital injections during the latest financial crisis.11 
Second, the setting provides a transnational competition policy with strict rules on state aid in 
contrast to the US whose competition law has no written rules on state aid. Given the broader 
literature on the merits and pitfalls of relying on national public enforcement to ensure 
compliance with financial regulation (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2016]), one crucial 
differentiating factor in the European setting is that it unites all the different cases of financial 
support under the umbrella of the European Union and its rules: The European Union provides 
 
11 Bank government ownership in the European banking industry has increased. According to Iannotta et al. 
[2013], the average share of the equity capital of banks owned by banks increased from 5.4% in 2007 to 7.3% 




a competition policy with strict rules on any form of state aid concerning all operating firms in 
the EU. These rules include strict procedures, sanctions in case of misconduct, and additional 
monitoring, including the role of MTs that will be explained below in greater detail. These 
procedures aim at making sure that firms obey the competition law of the EU.  
These rules on state aid in the EU are important and deserve a short description: These 
rules have been implemented to safeguard the Treaty of Rome [1957] (here the Treaty or TFEU) 
which has laid the foundations of European Community competition policy. Its core aim is to 
ensure that competition in the internal European market is not obstructed by the anticompetitive 
behavior of firms or national authorities. The Treaty contains provisions on anti-competitive 
agreements (Article 85 TFEU) and on the abuse of dominant position (Article 86 TFEU) as 
well as on state aid (Article 90 TFEU). Article 107 TFEU prohibits state aid that distorts 
competition in the internal market. Member States must notify the EC of planned state aid 
measures unless they fall under a general exemption, such as the “de minimis rule”12. The EC 
has the sole competence to decide on the legality of state aid.13 The EC was also given authority 
to enforce the competition rules. The EC has strong investigative (incl. on-site monitoring)14 
and decision-making powers (e.g., recover incompatible state aid). Member states must follow 
notification procedures and aid measures need approval by the EC. To give guidance to member 
states of the European Union during the GFC, the EC published so-called Communications 
(details for the Communications concerning the state aids for banks can be viewed in Appendix 
C).  
Concerning the potential sanctions, the DG COMP office, which processes and monitors 
all the state aid decisions for the EC, has powerful sanction mechanisms which can result – in 
the worst case – in a full payback of the state aid plus potential additional interest rates in cases 
of unlawful aid. Reimbursement of the state aid can be viewed as detrimental for banks in 
liquidity needs providing enough incentives to adhere to the EC’s state aid rules and procedure. 
This ability to require repayment relies on the suspension and recovery injunctions which are 
in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty.  
 
12 De Minimis state aid a ceiling of EUR 200,000 as the amount of de minimis aid that a single undertaking may 
receive per Member State over any period of three years. Link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/de_minimis_regulation_en.pdf (access date: 05.07.2019) 
13 The EC distinguishes between different categories of state aid. It differentiates primarily between the 
following item: Grants and tax exemptions, equity participation, soft loans and tax deferrals and guarantees. 
14 In 2011, Gazprom was raided by the EU during antitrust investigations. EU investigators raided Gazprom in 
ten different countries. This example shall highlight that the EU can and is able to run so-called “dawn raids” 
and conduct on-site monitoring; link: https://www.ft.com/content/43f9f24c-e92b-11e0-af7b-00144feab49a 




The Commission represented by the DG COMP has also the right to obtain all necessary 
information that helps it to make a decision based on the information injunction and to restore 
state aid immediately. It can also adopt interim measures that are addressed to the concerned 
member state. Interim measures may take the form of information injunctions, suspension 
injunctions but also recovery injunctions. The information injunction includes EC’s access to 
information which includes information provided by the MT.  
Lastly, to underline the legal strength of the EC in the European institutional setting, it 
should be highlighted that according to Article 24 TFEU of the Procedural Regulation, 
interested parties (including firms and individuals) 15  can easily file complaints against an 
unlawful provision of state aid if necessary.16 This may reduce the amount of misconduct, as 
firms and states are eyed by competitors and potential customers that insist on lawfully 
conducted state aid procedures. The recent case of Lufthansa showed that competitors were 
ready to refer to the EU General Court regarding the state aid approval in 2020. 
 If a member state fails to comply with a suspension injunction or a recovery injunction, 
the Commission is entitled, while carrying out the examination on the substance of the matter 
based on the information available, to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and apply for a declaration that the failure to comply constitutes a violation of the 
Treaty. The EC is aware of the risk of oversight capture at national levels and tries to apply 
rules equally to all countries as a supranational organization with imposing enough pressure to 
comply, but it also requires trustees to help to enforce and monitor its commitments, incl. “long-
term behavioural commitments” (Brueckner and Hoehn [2010], p. 73) on a case-by-case basis. 
 
2.2. Role of Monitoring Trustees 
 
According to Brueckner and Hoehn [2010], competition authorities have to ensure 
compliance with the EU commitments on a firm-level case-by-case basis. Though other 
potential monitoring mechanisms, like self-reporting, could be used, the EC has increasingly 
used MTs to monitor compliance with the commitments. Especially in merger remedies, the 
 
15 An example of how companies may come under pressure for illegal state aid occurred when Germany's local 
savings bank had to abandon state guarantees which was lobbied for by competitors that did not obtain state 
aid, link: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2000/12/07/a-change-in-the-landescape (access 
date: 08.03.2020). Also, recently Ryanair complained recently about Lufthansa’s state aid, calling it illegal and 
ready to challenge the bailout , link: https://www.irishtimes.com/business/transport-and-tourism/ryanair-to-
challenge-lufthansa-s-9bn-aid-1.4262909 (access date: 27.09.2020) 
16 Here is the link to the State Aid Complaint form https://ec.europa.eu/competition/forms/intro_en.html where 




appointment of MTs has become a common practice with almost every merger case decided by 
the EC to contain such an MT provision. This common practice, according to one of my 
interviewees, has been recently applied also to state aid cases of banks in the recent financial 
crisis to be able to enforce the commitments in a setting where the EC was faced a huge number 
of state aid cases (see figure 3) and where it needed to obtain additional expertise given the 
complexity of the financial sector. According to some anecdotal evidence, the implementation 
of MTs has proved to be a useful tool in state aid decisions.17 
The EC uses MTs as its “eyes and ears” 18, some even say the EC uses them as a “cane” 
or baton. Although the EC has no legal act that grants it the power to establish such a monitoring 
mechanism, it can be part of its conditions set when state aid is approved (Brownsword et al. 
[2017]). As depicted in figure 1, the assignment of an MT usually results in a three-sided 
relationship between the bank that has received state aid, the EC’s competition authority, and 
the MT. The MT supervises the actions by the mandated bank but also supports the banks with 
the implementation of the remedies. After the appointment of the MT, the EC will usually have 
a kick-off meeting with the MT to brief the MT on key issues of the specific case (Brueckner 
and Hoehn [2010]). The MT is usually a private consulting or auditing firm (Brownsword et al. 
[2017]), such as Mazars or Grant Thornton, because these firms have the necessary skill set to 
fulfill the required tasks. According to information from DG Comp19, there is no standard 
procedure on the process of selection of the MT. What normally occurs is that either the bank 
or the member state proposes to the EC a shortlist of candidates which are then approved by the 
DG Comp. During this phase, the EC verifies that some fundamental elements like no conflict 
of interest, independence, competencies, etc. are ensured when choosing the MT. According to 
Brueckner and Hoehn [2010], the EC has a strong influence on the selection process and is keen 
to meet with the proposed MT candidates before the MT is mandated (Brueckner and Hoehn 
[2010]).  
The MT is normally remunerated by the bank. I could not obtain any specific 
information on the salary level but, according to the EC, these are determined through market 
forces (e.g., call for bids of the proposed MTs on the shortlist) in each member state and can be 
 
17 On the 23.05.2019, I met Ulrich Puls (http://www.alcis-advisers.com/) to discuss the role of MT because his 
advisory company takes up MT roles. An informal interview with DG Comp employees on 13.01.2020 
confirmed this information. 
18 The EC itself cannot be directly involved in overseeing the implementation of the commitments, hence a 
trustee is appointed to oversee the banks’ compliance with the commitments; link: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_remedies/remedies_notice_en.pdf (access date: 
16.02.2020) 




compared to salaries based on billable hours at law firms with similar team sizes.20 The budgets 
are set only preliminary, and it is only the EC that can request work that is done by the MT, not 
the supervised bank. Unfortunately, the names of the appointed MT are not always publicly 
available. Only via few available news articles, I could identify some MTs, such as Mazars.21 
According to one interviewee, however, the market for MTs in Europe seems rather narrow and 
comprises approx. less than ten key players that apply regularly for the MT mandates. Also, 
according to my interview partners22, MTs cannot be compared to auditors because they are not 
chosen and mandated by the supervised firm. Hence, I abstain from making any further 
comparisons to auditors and links to the auditing literature. 
As part of the tasks, the MT (see Appendix D) has to file reports at pre-determined times 
(as shown in figure 1), for example, once every three or six months, and send them to the DG 
Comp. Independence of the MT is crucial (Brueckner and Hoehn [2010]) and warranted 
because the MT that gets the mandate must adhere to extremely strict rules pre and post the 
mandate. For example, the MT has a long blackout period after the mandate where it cannot 
engage in other business activities with the monitored bank worldwide. Also, the history of 
business relations of the respective bank and MT will be checked to identify any possible 
conflict of interest. Hence, the MT’s incentives are rather to please the DG Competition with 
good work to obtain follow-up referrals than to please the mandated bank 23 . In case of 
misconduct, the EC may also fire the MT in charge, blacklisted, and replace it with a new MT.24 
Objections against proposed candidates are not uncommon with reasons being the lack of 
expertise or lack of independence that is required to take up this mandate (Brueckner and Hoehn 
[2010]). The reports from the MT to the EC are generally not disclosed to the public. In case 
the MT discovers any misconduct, the MT will report this to the EC and the EC may take further 
action. The specific tasks and responsibilities of the MT are described in the MT mandate, 
which can vary across the mandate and time. The contract between the parties is not accessible 
to the public.  
 
20 This information was obtained during one of my talks with MT Ulrich Puls. 
21 According to a Reuters new article, link: https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-banks-monitors/monitors-
named-at-greek-banks- idUSL6N0ALADU20130116 (access date: 09.01.2020), KPMG monitored Pireaus 
Bank and Mazars monitored Alpha Bank. 
22 I asked Ulrich Puls during our interview whether MTs can be compared to auditors. He said not at all because 
they are not mandated by the monitored firm and they are only bound by the instructions they obtain from the 
EC. That is also why they have little incentives to please the monitored firm as they are not allowed to take up 
follow-up business according to their mandate. 
23 On the 23.05.2019, I met Ulrich Puls (http://www.alcis-advisers.com/) to discuss the role of MT because his 
advisory company takes up MT roles. 
24 In 2013, the EC sued a former MT of Microsoft (link: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/eu-




A bank disclosed that “the Monitoring Trustee's powers affect management's discretion 
by imposing further supervision on the Bank” (Alpha Bank, Form 20-F in 2014)25. Currently, 
only the publicly available state aid decisions can give an idea of the MT’s responsibilities and 
duties during the respective mandate. I have summarized these responsibilities in Appendix D 
to better understand the MT’s duties and the MT’s scope of work. Given the range of possible 
responsibilities and competencies and the fact that they may vary over the time of a mandate, I 
will quickly refer to the most important ones for the upcoming analyses. Apart from attending 
the meeting of the Managing Board, Credit Council as well as Credit Committee, the MT can 
assess projected operating results and agreed measures as well as agreed ratios. Additionally, 
the MT can assess the provisioning of non-performing loans, the recoverability of loans as well 
as the overall exposure to individual clients or credit portfolios. The MT can also propose 
corrective and improvement actions to the Board of Directors if necessary. MT may review the 
most significant loans regularly and interview all members of the relevant committees 
responsible.  
To sum up this section, it seems that MTs have far-reaching rights. The fact that illegal 
state aid must be recovered even if the recovery of aid means that recipient companies go 
bankrupt26, increases the pressure of state aid banks to comply with the MT as part of the 
commitments of the EC. Finally, it has to be highlighted that I cannot observe the potential 
varying duties on a case-by-case basis, and not all listed duties in Appendix D may apply to 
every bank in the sample which makes it difficult to formulate specific outcomes the MT may 
change. Given the potential of facing varying commitments on a case-by-case basis, it seems 
difficult for the bank to anticipate all of the MT's actions during the mandate as well as the 
chance to be assigned one MT. Here, access to the reports from the EC on an individual case 
basis would help to provide a better understanding and matching of the duties and the observed 
outcomes. 
 
2.3. Banks and state aid 
  
Many prior studies have generally focused on the differences between banks with and 
without government ownership (e.g., Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux [2001], Sapienza [2004], 
 
25 The link to the file can be found here (access date: 13.04.2021):  
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096061/000104746915004829/a2224735z20-f.htm 
26 The aid to be recovered includes interest and is payable from the date on which the unlawful aid was at the 
disposal of the beneficiary until the date of its recovery. Link: 




Micco, Panizza, and Yanez [2004], Iannotta, Nocera, and Andrea Sironi [2013], Duchin and 
Sosyura [2014]) with some older studies (e.g., Saunders, Strock, and Travlos [1990], Gorton 
and Rosen [1995], Houston and James [1995]) focusing on the effect of ownership 
concentration on risk-taking with no consensus on the sign of this economic relationship. A 
recent study by Duchin and Sosyura [2014] finds that bailed-out U.S. banks have initiated 
higher risk loans and have moved towards riskier assets. Another recent study that focuses on 
European banks (Iannotta et al. [2013]) finds that banks with a government stake have lower 
default risk, but higher operating risk compared to privately owned banks. Apart from risk-
taking, Altunbas et al. [2001] find little evidence that privately owned banks are more efficient 
than government-owned banks. Similarly, Micco et al. [2004] find no significant differences in 
the return on assets in industrial countries. 
A recent paper by Gerhardt and Vennet [2017] investigates the financial conditions of 
banks before and after they have received state aid from 2007-2013 in Europe. They find that 
saved banks hardly improve their operational performance indicators but keep their risk profiles 
and business models. Although Gerhardt and Vennet [2017] shortly mention possible 
“supervisory pressure” on page 29 of their paper, they do not explain what supervisory 
pressures they mean. Hence, they do not relate their findings to the MT and the monitoring, as 
well as to the specific institutional features of this setting. Similarly, Schaz [2019] mentions 
that by transferring control rights to the government, national politicians might have gained 
more influence without mentioning the existence of the active state aid rules and supervisory 
mechanisms, including the existence of MTs, in the EU. This study will fill this gap in the 
literature by providing a detailed analysis of the supervisory and monitoring mechanism 





2.4. Banks and enforcement 
 
Apart from the prior literature on state aid and banks, recent literature has also examined 
the role of public enforcement on the stability of the banking system that uses cross-country 
settings to examine how mainly national bank supervisors shape the stability and the financial 
reporting properties of banking systems (e.g., Bischof et al. [2020a], Bushman and Williams 
[2012]). This line of literature has provided several key takeaways: First, firms generally appear 
to differ to which extent they comply with specific disclosure requirements (e.g., Glaum and 
Street [2003]). Public enforcement of existing rules is an important determinant to explain these 
differences across countries and firms (e.g., Brown, Preiato, and Tarca [2014]). Second, related 
to the first point are the economic resources of the regulator itself that impact the possibility to 
pursue individual cases of malpractice (Jackson and Roe [2009], Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
[2016]). Third, supervisory agency’s willingness to practice forbearance may be hampered 
when the survival of the bank is largely at the supervisor’s discretion (e.g., Brown and Dinç 
[2005], Gallemore [2020]) and the supervisors may follow their own private benefits (e.g., 
potential future employment opportunities) (e.g., Costello et al. [2016]). Fourth, potential “turf 
fights” between different responsible regulators may occur leading to regulatory competition 
among supervisory bodies (Tiebout [1956], Danielsson [2013]). 
Focusing primarily on national or regional supervisors and regulators in prior literature, 
little attention has been paid to the supranational monitoring mechanisms that banks obtained 
with their state aid commitments during the financial crisis. This study aims to provide an 
understanding of these newly implemented MTs and how they may change banks reporting 
behavior and financial reporting transparency. 
 
2.5. Banks and transparency 
 
I view transparency not primarily as a state in which firms can be but merely as an 
outcome, closely defined as the availability of bank-specific, value-relevant information 
available to external stakeholders (like Guo et al. [2020]). I am also aware that the transparency 
of banks is a concept that has been difficult to measure (Nier [2005]) and that it has been 
measured differently in prior literature often trying to capture several features (e.g., disclosures, 
discretionary accruals, restatements) that are linked to the market’s ability to monitor banks and 




Regarding the MTs, I think, there are two major channels through which an MT may 
influence a bank’s financial reporting transparency. Firstly, MTs can influence the information 
generating of bank managers and the bank’s internal information processes by demanding more 
and/or better information regarding certain issues, such as loan impairments. When bank 
managers are forced to produce more and/or higher quality internal information, this 
information should manifest itself in some external reporting if we believe the proposition made 
by Verrecchia [1990] which implies that the market will exert pressure on the manager to 
disclose the higher quality piece of information.27 In principle, it appears reasonable that better 
information should improve monitoring, reduce risk, and potentially also increase profitability 
(e.g., Nier und Baumann 2006). On the contrary, one could argue that even if monitoring 
improves some dimensions of bank internal information it might not affect external reporting 
as market participants may not be aware of the MT’s activity and hence, cannot exert the 
pressure that is required to fulfill Verrecchia’s proposition. However, this concern shall be a 
minor one as shareholders can obtain the information whether the bank was assigned an MT 
either through the firm disclosures or via contacting the EC. Over-reliance on the MT’s 
presence may also lead to delegated monitoring (Diamond [1996]) and no increase in external 
reporting may be the result. 
Secondly, one can also argue that the MT’s major objective may not be to assess the 
bank’s financial reporting. However, the recent EC’s requests for more disclosures on 
foreseeable losses may go against this point. As the EC asked for more foreseeable losses to be 
disclosed, it may be using the implementation of MTs to increase market discipline and helping 
the market to monitor the banks. Prior literature, however, hints to potential forbearance 
strategies on the national level (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven [2012], Gallemore 2020]) that may 
also take place on the supranational level incl. incentives to allow banks to obtain time to “go 
dark” and recover under state aid (e.g., Agarwal et al. [2014]) during crises. Hence, one would 
not expect to see a change in the financial reporting transparency of banks. Prior findings that 
could weaken this argument suggest that the regulator’s reputation can be potentially damaged 
by forbearing on a bank and that engaging in forbearance may be suboptimal for regulators with 
a strong reputation. Morrison and White [2013]) mention related to this point the anecdotal 
evidence that the UK regulator was in “fear of falling foul of EU rules on State Aid” (p. 654) 
 
27 To allow market participants to monitor and discipline banks excessive risk-taking, the so-called process of 
market discipline in prior banking literature (e.g., Bushman and Williams [2012]) means public access to 
available timely, consistent, and reliable information on the financial performance of banks and risk exposures 




in the past and avoided engaging in secretly supporting Northern Rock during the last financial 
crises in 2007. Engaging in secret forbearance strategies can never be fully ruled out (Gallemore 
[2020]) because they are difficult to observe. The setting in the EU seem to provide, however, 
strong incentives as described above to adhere to the EU rules on State Aid (incl. retroactive 
action against illegal state aid, repayment of the state aid including interest, lawsuits against the 
bank, reputational damage, etc.) reducing the incentives to engage in forbearance strategies.  
As an alternative explanation, one could also assume that banks with MT try to raise 
capital, probably debt, to aim to get rid of these new additional supervisors and therefore 
become more transparent to attract new external capital. In the sample, nonetheless, I can only 
identify a small subsample of thirteen banks that engaged in recapitalizations (mainly fixed 
income) out of which eight had MTs. In the further analyses, due to the small sample size, this 






3. Data and Research Design 
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
I start with a sample of 122 identified banks that have received state aid during the last 
financial crisis in the EU from 2005 to 2019. I have hand-collected the data on the banks with 
state aid cases using the data on all authorized state aid which can be found on the ISEF registry 
of the European Commission.28 Since in some cases only aggregated state aid schemes are 
mentioned without referring to the specific banks, the database cannot be used to identify all 
individual banks.29 To identify all banks with state aid, banks were checked individually for the 
receipt of state aid (see more details in Appendix B), using company information and a Google 
news search. Prior research (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017], figure 2)30 and other reports, 
such as the CEPS Task Force on Bank State Aid, have been consulted to identify banks.31 Also, 
prior research (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017], Schaz [2019]) was consulted to compare the 
different sample sizes. Similar to Gerhardt and Vennet [2017], I only focused on parent 
companies because state aid is passed on the level of the parent company and it prevents double-
accounting. As many banks have benefited from several aid measures at different points in time, 
like ING (2008: capital injection, 2009: bond guarantee), the banks are defined as receiving 
government support with the first public announcement of receiving financial support (ING is 
included as a bank receiving state aid in 2008). State aid was classified into four different types, 
namely recapitalization, guarantees, asset relief measures, and liquidity assistance, as can be 
seen in table 2 panel D. Start and end dates are drawn from the state aid cases and company 
information.32 In case of unknown end dates, the state aid is assumed to continue, and it will 
take value one for the full sample period (see for further details figure 2).  
 
28 For further details see link: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_004_en.pdf (access 
date: 20.03.2019) 
29 All state aid cases that have been the object of the EC’s decision since 1st of January 2000 are obtained in that 
database. Detailed information on each of the case includes the following item displayed on the following link 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/user_guide.html (access date: 02.04.2019). 
30 In a period from 2007-2013, Gerhardt and Vennet [2017] came up with 114 state aid banks without providing 
the exact list of banks they could identify. Those banks include banks with government interventions on the 
asset and liability side like in my sample. 
31 Documents like the CEPS task force report were also used to identify banks with state aid, link: 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/bank-state-aid-financial-crisis-fragmentation-or-level-playing-field/ 
(access date: 15.08.2020). 
32 Repayment data is difficult to identify for various reasons (usually contractual reasons): the bank "repays" the 
state (i.e., for instance refunds a loan or an equity injection) because this strictly speaking might not qualify as 
"State aid repayment" from a legal perspective (the initial advantage received by the bank is not necessarily 
neutralized) but might be considered as "repayment" from an economic perspective (i.e., for the state). Missing 




All other financial data was retrieved from CapitalIQ and company filings. Here, it must 
be noted that the data from CapitalIQ comes from the original filings and not the restated 
numbers that can also be retrieved from CapitalIQ. Banks with missing gross loans and total 
assets were dropped. For exact definitions of the variables used, see Appendix A. The unit of 
observation is based on bank-year level as quarterly observations are scarce in early years and 
would have deleted many banks due to missing quarterly data. The dataset with the banks that 
obtained monitoring trustees came from the DG Comp and was obtained in 2019. The country-
specific characteristics on governance indicators comprise mainly the World Bank variables, 
such as the regulatory quality index, the rule of law index, the control of corruption index, the 
government effectiveness index, the changes in the unemployment and GDP growth rates (see 
Appendix A). These governance indicators reflect the views of many firms, citizens, and experts. 
For the subsample analyses of the listed banks and their credit risk disclosure score, I 
collected data from annual reports categorized them as described in Appendix F and G to obtain 
a credit risk disclosure score like Nier’s [2005] work where a transparency measure was created 
based on how much information was provided in its annual accounts.33 
For further subsample analyses, I also collected information on whether the banks with 
MTs disclose having them. I used public company information, such as annual reports or press 
releases, to identify in total 20 banks that disclosed having MTs.  
 
3.2. Research design 
 
Before investigating the financial reporting transparency of the banks, I explore the 
sample composition across countries and analyze in table 2 how these two groups of banks 
differ based on observable characteristics, including state aid characteristics, firm 
characteristics but also country-specific measures of governance indicators. Since the EC has 
not released any specific information regarding the criteria that can trigger the assignments of 
an MT for banks with state aid, I analyze in table 3 observable selection criteria based on 
country- and firm-specific attributes that may influence whether an MT is assigned or not to 
better understand the first stage of being assigned an MT. It is important to understand whether 
banks can anticipate the assignment of an MT because they may engage in costly avoidance 
strategies and behaviors, including changing pre-treatment outcomes. The anticipation would 
 
33 All annual reports were collected manually and saved separately. The annual reports do not show up in the 




influence the outcomes even before the actual influence of the MT starts. We can observe that 
only from 2011 onwards in most state aid cases an MT has been assigned but in 2019 the 
number of state cases as well as the percentage of MTs assigned dropped again. Also, across 
countries, the percentage of banks with MTs is varying with for example 100% in Slovenia and 
only 40% in Germany (table 1, panel B). Moreover, given the cases vary from bank to bank, it 
might be difficult for bank managers to anticipate whether they will also be assigned an MT or 
not. Additionally, the mandate itself may change over time for each bank during the time of the 
state aid case, and hence it may be difficult for bank managers to anticipate the MT’s action 
during the mandate. 
The main part of the study centers around analyzing any potential influence of the MT 
on the banks’ financial reporting transparency. Transparency is less a state in this study, but 
more an outcome which as indicated by prior research (e.g., Nier [2005]) is a concept that is 
difficult to measure and operationalize. To evaluate whether there are any potential changes in 
transparency with the introduction of the MT, I use three major perspectives. First, I analyze 
banks’ loan loss reporting behavior using panel regressions with different key ratios from banks’ 
yearly financial statements as the dependent variables. The key ratios include the loan loss 
provision ratio, the loan loss allowance ratio as well as the non-performing loans ratio (like 
Bischof et al. [2020b]). Second, I examine whether financial restatements (like in Jiang, Levine, 
and Lin [2016], Costello et al. [2016], Gallemore [2020]) change with the introduction of the 
MT. Here, I account for restatements that were classified by CapitalIQ as restatements with 
financial results that are fundamentally different from the previous numbers. Lastly, for a 
subsample of listed banks, I examine whether the credit risk disclosures increase like an 
approach by Bischof et al. [2020a] and Nier [2005] who bases a measure of transparency on 
how much information a bank provides on its risk profile in its annual accounts.  
The identification strategy relies on the fact that I can observe European banks with and 
without MTs that have received state aid (see figure 2). The research design exploits the fact 
that the banks obtained state aid at different points in time from 2005 to 2019 with some banks 
being assigned an MT and others not (with no standard procedure for the process of the selection 
of the MT as according to the DG Comp). The staggered adoption may allow for a better 
identification as it is unlikely that unrelated shocks line up in time with the MT introduction 
pattern across the respective EU countries or rule out unobserved consistent differences 
between the groups (Barrios [2021]). Also, this design allows for yearly fixed effects which 




Christensen et al. [2016]). Cofounding events would need to be correlated with these different 
dates of the MT introduction, which seems unlikely. Additionally, given the absence of a 
standard procedure for the process of the selection of the MT and the potential uncertainty and 
timing on the state aid procedure, it seems not highly likely that state aid banks can fully 
anticipate the overall commitments they have to comply with including a potential assignment 
of an MT. 
To analyze the MT impact on reporting behavior of banks, I estimate variations of the 
following ordinary least squares regression model for a panel of treatment and benchmark firms 
over the 2003 to 2018 period34: 
Loan loss reporting ratiosi,t = β0 + β1 Time,t + β2 Monitoring Trusteei,t + β3 Monitroing Trustee 
* Timei,t + Σ βi Controlsi,t + Σ βj Fixed Effectsj + εi,t  (1) 
 
As the main dependent variables in table 4, I use three different key accounting ratios: 
the loan loss provisions to total gross loans (LLP ratio), the ratio of total loan loss allowance to 
total gross loans (LLA ratio), and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans (NPL 
ratio). The coefficient associated with the Monitoring Trustee*Time interaction term captures 
the change in the dependent variable in the treated group relative to the control group. Controlsi,t 
denotes the following set of firm-level and macroeconomic control variables: Controls include 
size as the natural logarithm of total assets, the proportion of commercial and industrial loans 
(% of consumer loans), consumer loans (% of commercial loans), and real estate loans (% of 
real estate loans). I also controlled for further control for the bank-level variables that reflect 
the discretionary variations in LLP (similar to Guo et al. [2020]), such as RoA is the ratio of 
pre-provisioning income to total assets measuring of banks’ profitability, the Tier 1 ratio is the 
ratio of banks’ tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. Loss is an indicator variable capturing a 
previous negative net income and risk-weighted assets is the ratio of risk-weighted assets to 
total assets as a measure of the underlying portfolio risk. Time-varying macroeconomic 
variables that are accounted for are the change in GDP (GDP) as captured as the annual gross 
domestic product growth rate in the respective country obtained from the EU. The regulatory 
quality of the national regulator is accounted for by using time-varying data from the World 
Bank. Since the regulatory quality index is also the main variable of the observable country 
variables that remain significantly connected to the assignment of MTs in table 3, it is added as 
 
34 Similar to Balakrishnan and Ertan [2018], the whole difference-in-differences (DID) specification is mapped 
out including the fixed effects, which in some specifications will not allow to estimate the β2 Monitoring 
Trusteei,t when bank fixed effects are present. β0 would also not be estimated when fixed effects are switched 




a control variable in the main specification. For the specification, the key assumption that any 
unmeasured determinants of the outcomes are either time-invariant or group-invariant still 
holds here, (Wing, Simon, and Bello-Gomez [2018]): Year- and firm-fixed effects are included 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity on the year or bank level. This structure tries to 
subsume factors that are specific to a certain year (e.g., the sovereign debt crisis) as well as all 
time-invariant country and firm characteristics (e.g., the quality of the legal system or the 
development of capital markets). The standard errors are clustered by banks to control for time-
series correlations (Petersen [2009]). I also control for the asset relief measure program, capture 
by a binary indicator variable, to control for a potential impact on the key ratios due to potential 
changes in the loan portfolio.35In a subsample analysis, I investigate whether the 20 banks that 
are disclosing the presence of the MT drive the results. 
In the second part, I follow Jiang et al. [2016] and look at financial restatements. 
Restatements are motivated by prior literature (e.g., Rusticus and Ng [2011], Jiang et al. [2016]) 
by assuming that more restatements are associated with a higher likelihood of bank failures. 
Banks with more restatements may be more difficult to monitor and be indicative of weaker 
internal control systems (Doyle, Ge, and McVay [2007]). However, one could also argue that 
an increase in restatements in the presence of the MT may help to convey the true financial 
conditions to the market and thereby increase transparency. Due to data availability, I cannot 
look at restatements that were triggered by the regulator’s comment letter or any other 
regulators’ enforcement actions, but I take indicators of restatements from CapitalIQ where the 
financial results were fundamentally different from the original.36 Based on that data, I cannot 
say, whether the banks have restated their numbers either intentionally or unintentionally 
because any of the restatements I observe can represent a mistake or a fraudulent action. Since 
I cannot intentional and unintentional errors, I may have to refrain from stating the restatements 
reflect an attempt to manipulate the disclosed information. This goes against those who argue 
that restatements are a violation of appropriate accounting practices by managers and are, 
therefore, a measure of how management discloses information to the public. Nevertheless, 
interpreting the results may remain ambiguous because more frequent restatements could 
reduce accounting errors and indicate an increase of financial reporting transparency (e.g., 
Costello et al. [2016]) in the future, although some argue (Jiang et al. [2016]) that more frequent 
 
35 Prior findings by Gerhardt and Vennet [2017] find that rescued banks hardly improve their performance but 
maintain instead their old business models and risk profiles. 
36 According to CapitalIQ restatements were classified as fundamental net income, retained earnings and/or cash 




restatements could indicate an opaquer bank. The model specification includes varying 
dependent variables that account in columns (2) to (4) for restatements linked to the income 
statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement only. The control variables follow the 
specification of Jiang et al. [2016]) and include size, the capital ratio, the lag value of the LLP 
ratio, and the loss indicator.  
In the third part, I construct a credit risk disclosure measure following Bischof et al. 
[2020b] and Nier [2005] with hand-collected data points for the subsample of listed banks. The 
idea here is to operationalize financial reporting transparency by a measure that captures how 
much information a bank has provided on its risk profile in its annual accounts and to see 
whether banks with MTs are more compliant with credit risk disclosure. The focus on credit 
risk was chosen deliberately because of the generally accepted importance of credit risk as one 
of the key risks to be managed by banks37: weak credit risk management practices and poor 
credit quality can increase the likelihood of bank failures. Given the MTs' potential say on credit 
risk policies, I would also contend that the focus on credit risk may be the best first choice to 
investigate. One may argue that an increase in transparency is not the same as an increase in 
disclosures. However, transparency has usually been a concept that is difficult to measure (Nier 
[2005]) and many regulators, like the EC, have requested more disclosures to help market 
discipline and thereby increase transparency. Hence, I wanted to add important disclosures, too, 
in my analyses. Such a measure can only capture hard, quantifiable information and it may 
neglect all the information provided through other information channels. It is only based on an 
unweighted sum and may neglect any relative importance of the various components that build 
the score. Moreover, the biggest issue from my point of view is that the score does not capture 
any voluntary disclosure points; only compliance with mandatory disclosures is captured 
currently. Details on the construction of the credit risk disclosure score and a coding example 
can be found in Appendix F-G. 
  
 
37 An example that stressed the importance of credit risk was made earlier by a Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) best practice paper: “Experience from around the world indicates that poor credit quality 
coupled with weak credit risk management practices continues to be a dominant factor in bank failures and 
banking crises. Therefore, information on banks’ credit risk profiles, including the quality of their credit 
exposures and the adequacy of their credit risk management processes, is crucial in market participants’ and 
supervisors’ assessment of their condition, performance and ability to survive in the long run. Such information 




4. Empirical Results 
 
First, after explaining the sample construction in table 1 panel A, I investigate how the 
banks in the sample are distributed across countries. According to table 1 panel B, countries 
with the overall highest amount of state aid banks are Spain (12% of the total sample), Italy 
(11% of the total sample), Germany, and Denmark (both 8% of the total sample). The countries 
with the highest percentage of banks with monitoring trustees relative to the banks with state 
aid are Slovenia (100%), Belgium (100%), Latvia (100%), Bulgaria (100%), Spain (87%) as 
well as Portugal (83%). Germany and Denmark, although having many state aid banks, have 
covered only 40% of banks with monitoring trustees. For the remaining banks in the sample, 
the top five countries are Germany (12%), Denmark (10%) and Italy (10%), Greece (9%) and 
Austria (8%), with Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, and Romania dropping out of the sample as 
countries. The overall distribution of bank state aid cases is distributed not evenly as shown in 
figure 3, with most of the cases accumulating in the year 2008 (23 cases), 2009 (27 cases), 2011 
(15 cases), and 2012 (12 cases), which is in line with the anecdotal evidence that the EC had to 
face an unprecedented boom in state aid cases with also varying commitments across cases and 
time. 
Then, I continue my investigation by comparing on a univariate basis state aid banks 
with and without monitoring trustees in the years before the global financial crises and the first 
state aid cases. As the first state aid case was recorded in 2005, I compare the two different 
groups of banks in the pre-crisis years 2004 and 2003 which is reported in table 2 for the 
remaining 76 (out of 122 identified banks in table 1 panel A) banks. Table 2 panel A presents 
the descriptive statistics for the most important variables used in the analyses. The dependent 
variables of interest, the LLP ratio, the LLA ratio, the NPL ratio as well as the indicator for the 
overall financial restatements show no statistically significant differences in the pre-crisis years. 
Interestingly, other variables such as size, the tier 1 ratio, the return on assets, the operating 
margin, the loss indicator as well as risk-weighted assets show no significant difference for both 
treatment and control groups, too. The differences in country-level variables (changes in GDP 
and unemployment) are not statistically different from each other in both groups before the 
crisis. The only variable out of the governance indicators that seems to be statistically 
significantly different is the regulatory quality index, which captures the perceptions of the 
ability of the government to implement policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. Here, banks with MTs tend to be located in countries with a lower 




(approximately -0.11 points difference in the index). Banks with MTs are also located in 
countries with a lower rule of law index, a lower control of corruption index, and a lower 
government effectiveness index, though the differences are not statistically significant. This 
may suggest that MTs are more often requested and placed in countries with a weaker national 
regulatory environment. Additionally, the state aid banks with MTs had significantly fewer 
Big4 auditors, though this difference becomes non-significant in later years. Furthermore, the 
ratio of commercial loans to total loans was also significantly higher for banks with MTs 
(approximately 12%). For this ratio, though, it needs to be considered that CapitalIQ only 
provides the loans that are related to the working capital of commercial customers and not the 
total commercial loans provided as provided by other databases (e.g., Bankscope).  
As indicated in table 2 panel B, the differences between banks with and without MTs 
throughout 2003-2018 seem to change for some variables. Banks with monitoring trustees seem 
to become smaller in size with a mean log value of Euros 10.8 billion in total assets (like 
Gerhardt and Vennet [2017]) and have a lower disclosed tier 1 ratio with a mean value of 
approximately 9.6%. The two groups also seem to differ in their loan portfolios considering 
MT banks having more commercial loans than consumer loans. The downsizing in real estate 
loans and consumer loans may be linked to changes in the loan portfolio linked triggered by the 
commitments related to the state aid, which is support by findings in panel D, where banks with 
MTs are more likely to also face asset relief measures that may change the underlying loan 
portfolio of the bank. With regards to the return of assets and the risk-weighted assets, the 
differences between MT banks and non-MT banks are not significantly different. State aid 
banks with MT are also not more like to be loss-making, which is in line with findings by 
Gerhardt and Vennet [2017] who claim that state aid banks hardly have improved their 
performance but have maintained instead their old business models. Banks with MTs also have 
a higher LLP ratio and a significantly higher LLA ratio but a lower disclosed NPL ratio and 
lower charge-off ratio in the univariate comparison. Comparing the results to other findings in 
prior literature must be done with caution as different variable definitions (Gerhardt and Vennet 
[2017]) and different filings choices (not disclosed whether restated or original filings are used) 
(e.g., in Bischof et al. [2020a]) make comparisons of results rather difficult if not impossible. 
Concerning the country level measures, MT banks remain more likely to be based in 
countries that have a significantly lower regulatory quality index, lower rule of law index, lower 
control of corruption index, and a lower government effectiveness index as shown in table 3 




duration of state aid (on average 7.5 years) and usually more recapitalizations, guarantees, and 
asset relief measures. They are also more likely to still have ongoing state aid commitments. 
These observations may imply that banks with MTs face generally more commitments and/or 
more complicated state aid cases of longer periods. The EC may consider that these 
commitments are too complex and not easy to monitor directly by the EC. 
Table 3 aims to further analyze what observable criteria based on country-specific and 
firm-specific attributes are linked to obtaining or not obtaining an MT. After controlling for 
country and year fixed effects, the only country-specific attribute that still matters is the 
regulatory quality index, which is in line with the findings in table 2 panel b and panel c. 
Regarding the firm-specific attributes, the state aid-specific attributes, like the asset relief 
measure, the guarantees, and the recapitalization seem to matter after controlling for year and 
bank-specific fixed effects, which is in line with findings in table 2 suggesting that banks with 
MT may face more complicated commitments, including asset relief measures. 
Table 4 summarizes the main results on the loan loss reporting behavior of banks for 
the three key dependent variables. The estimation results are based on ordinary least squares 
regression specification in a staggered difference in differences design for a panel of MT banks 
and non-MT banks firms over the 2003 to 2018 period and 1,049 bank years. The impact may 
vary with the difference in the presence of the MTs that enter the bank as additional supervisors. 
Note also that it is assumed that the MT is immediately implemented after the state aid decision 
is made and (as described in figure 2) it is assumed that the MT does not switch back to zero 
once the state aid stops for the baseline analyses shown in table 3 (MT remains in the bank).38 
These are strong assumptions as the implementation may take longer and the MT may not have 
any impact on the banks reporting behavior after the mandate ends. Furthermore, a strong 
underlying assumption for a causal interpretation of the results provided in table 4 (but also 
table 5) requires that the banks cannot anticipate the assignment of an MT. Any anticipation 
effects will bias the results39. From the information provided on the setting, it is difficult to say 
whether a bank can foresee the assignment of an MT. On one hand, having a more complicated 
case or being in a low regulatory quality country may make the assignment of an MT more 
likely. On the other hand, given the possibility of changes during the mandate, one may argue 
that banks may have difficulty forecasting the MT’s behavior during the mandate. 
 
38 According to Brueckner and Hoehn [2010], MT are implemented in merger cases approximately two weeks 
after the commitment is installed. 




The MT’s presence in a bank seems to be linked to the bank’s loan loss reporting by 
increasing the LLA ratio when the original filings are considered. However, no link to the other 
two key variables is observable when the original filings are used. After using data based on 
the original filings, there is no increase in the LLP observable, which would be indicative of 
timelier loan loss provisioning. On average, the baseline effect for the loan loss provisions and 
the non-performing loans remains insignificant after accounting for determinants for 
discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss reporting items as in Bischof et al. [2020] and 
after accounting for bank and year fixed effects. Only the coefficients for the loan loss 
allowance ratio are statistically significant and economically meaningful with a 2.0 percentage 
points increase compared to the estimated effect sizes by Bischof et al. [2020b] where loan loss 
allowances decrease by 0.2 percentage points upon the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
adoption.40 This result even holds after controlling for the asset relief measure programs which 
should account for a change in the underlying loan portfolio of the bank that may be induced 
by the MT. Under various specifications, the evidence on loan loss reporting seems to indicate 
that these banks adapted to the newly introduced monitoring with an increase in disclosed loan 
loss allowances.41  
Concerning the restatements of financial statements, banks with an MT seem, on 
average, not more likely to engage in restatements as reported in table 5 column (1). However, 
once the dependent variable is split into different restatements, like restatements in income 
statements, balance sheets, or cash flow statements, one observes that restatements regarding 
the income statement and cash flow statement can become more likely for banks with an MT 
which is in line with the described MT’s “powers [to] affect management’s discretion by 
imposing further supervision on the Bank” 42 . As in Jiang et al. [2016], more frequent 
restatements would indicate a negative signal about the disclosure quality of the firm but higher 
restatements, as discussed by Costello et al. [2016], may also reduce accounting errors in the 
future that impair financial accounting transparency and potentially the likelihood of future 
restatements, which may improve the reporting quality.  
 
40 Comparing results to Bischof et al. [2020b] is difficult and has to be done with caution because it is not clear 
whether the researchers have used original filings or restated numbers from CapitalIQ. 
41 I am aware of recent discussions on the potential biases in staggered DiD design and the role of heterogeneous 
treatment affects when using as two-way fixed effect regression; but due to a limited sample size I have not 
adjusted for it via a stacked regression design (Barrios [2021]). 
42 This quote comes from Alpha Bank, Form 20-F, p.24, link: 





For the subsample of listed banks in table 6, MT banks do not have significantly more 
compulsory fulfillment of credit risk disclosures than the banks without MTs in a univariate 
comparison. However, it needs to be considered that in the setting the separate the effect of the 
MT is difficult to identify because compliance with the new IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 disclosures 
occurred at the same time as most of the listed banks received MTs in the analyzed subsample. 
Also, any differences in voluntary disclosures are not captured by the score. Interestingly, the 
listed banks that disclose the presence of the MT in their annual reports, have significantly 
lower credit risk disclosure scores than the banks with MT that do not disclose it.43  
Additionally, I conduct another subsample analysis based on the 20 disclosing MT 
banks (public and private) to investigate which group of MT banks might drive the results in 
table 4 and table 5: First, I compare banks with MTs in a univariate comparison (not tabulated) 
who disclose having MTs and banks not disclosing having MTs. When looking at the key 
outcome variables, the loan loss allowance ratio is significantly larger for disclosing banks. In 
Appendix H, I redo the analysis in table 4 and table 5, to see which group of MT banks might 










This paper is the first one to examine what duties the newly implemented supranational 
monitoring trustees have in their assigned banks, and whether they may have an impact on the 
financial reporting transparency, more particularly on the loan loss reporting behavior, the 
financial restatements, and the credit risk disclosures of banks. I exploit a setting where these 
monitors are implemented at some state aid banks at varying points in time across banks in the 
EU to provide additional supervision. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to 
explore these supervisors in banks in detail and that investigates the relationship between the 
monitoring trustees and the banks’ financial transparency, as prior literature has mainly focused 
on the impact of national regulators and supervisors (e.g., Bushman and Williams [2012], 
Costello et al. [2019]). Moreover, some academics (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017], Schaz 
[2019]) have been silent about the role of supranational regulators and monitors when studying 
state aid in the European setting. My findings suggest that the MTs’ presence is be connected 
to changes in loan loss reporting and other reporting behavior, such as restatements, through 
their power to curtail management’s discretion.  
Concluding, my findings present the first empirical insights into these new supranational 
monitors. In the aftermath of the last financial crisis, external stakeholders have been seeking 
additional governance mechanisms to encourage bank managers to establish adequate reserves 
and provide better disclosures, thus leading to a more stable and healthier banking system. To 
what extent these new supernational supervisors also lead to a more transparent and stable 
banking system, remains to be seen, as I am not capturing transparency as a state but rather as 
a reporting outcome. Nevertheless, these the findings should be of interest to regulators, 
researchers, and, most importantly, the policymakers at the EC, as my findings contribute to 
the lively debate on the extent to which additional strong monitoring mechanisms should be 
implemented to foster financial stability. Interestingly, a recent paper (Rixi [2015]) has also 
asked to learn more about the EC’s experiences made with the assignment of MTs. I also call 
for future research to examine more closely the detailed effects of MTs on banks’ financial 
reporting decisions and other operating outcomes, and changes related to the MT’s presence 
across other industries, too. Here, access to the EC’s proprietary information would be of great 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition and Source 
Firm-level variables  
Monitoring Trustee Binary treatment indicator variable that takes on the value of one 
whether the bank received a monitoring trustee (MT) during its 
state aid commitments and zero otherwise. It is assumed in the base 
case that the MT is implemented immediately with the 
announcement of the state aid decision. In the baseline analyses, it 
is assumed that the Monitoring Trustee does not switch back to 
zero, i.e., leaves the bank. For more details on the data collection 
see Appendix B; data source: European Commission (provided a 
list of Monitoring Trustees) 
Time Binary treatment indicator variable that takes on the value of one 
beginning in the first year that the bank becomes subject to the 
state aid whether the bank has received it and zero otherwise; data 
source: European Commission 
LLP ratio Loan loss provisions (IQ_LL) / total gross loans 
(IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ based on original 
filings or Company Data 
NPL ratio Non-performing loans (IQ_NON_PERFORMING_LOANS) / total 
gross loans (IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ based 
on original filings or Company Data 
LLA ratio Loan loss allowance (IQ_ALLOW_LL) / total gross loans 
(IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ based on original 
filings or Company Data 
Restatement Indicator variable that represents the incidence of financial 
restatement (balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow 
statement (IQ_Restatement_BS, IQ_Restatement_IS, 
IQ_Restatement_CF)  
which equals one if the restatement code equals “RS” which 
indicate fundamentally different results from original in year t and 
zero otherwise; data source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or 
Company Data 
Size Ln (total assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS)); data source: CapitalIQ 
based on original filings or Company Data 
Charge-off ratio Gross charge-offs represent the total of gross loans charged-off by 
the bank during the year when management determines that it is 
probable that the repayment of the principal amount of a loan will 
not be made in accordance with the terms of the loan; charge-off 
ratio (IQ_CHARGE_OFFS_GROSS / total gross loans 
(IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ based on original 




Consumer loans ratio 
 
Consumer loans (IQ_CONSUMER_LOANS_TOTAL_LOANS) / 
total gross loans (IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ or 
Company Data 
Commercial loans ratio Commercial loans 
(IQ_COMMERCIAL_LOANS_TOTAL_LOANS) / total gross 
loans (IQ_GROSS_LOANS); include commercial enterprises, or 
joint venture, usually short-term, as a source of working capital not 
backed by a mortgage security divided by the amount of total 
loans; data source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or 
Company Data 
Real estate loan ratio Real estate loans (IQ_TOTAL_RE_LOANS_TOTAL_LOANS)/ 
total gross loans (IQ_GROSS_LOANS); data source: CapitalIQ 
based on original filings or Company Data 
Tier 1 ratio Tier 1 capital ratio % represents Tier 1 capital as a percentage of 
total risk-weighted assets of the bank (IQ_TIER_ONE_RATIO); 
data source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or Company Data 
RoA (EBIT) / ((total assets (t) + total assets (t-1)) / 2) via 
IQ_RETURN_ASSETS; 
data source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or Company Data 
Loss Binary indicator variable that equals one if net income (IQ_NI) is 
negative, and zero otherwise; data source: CapitalIQ based on 
original filings or Company Data 
Risk-weighted assets  Risk-weighted assets (IQ_RISK_ADJ_BANK_ASSETS) / total 
assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS); data source: CapitalIQ based on 
original filings or Company Data 
Big4  Binary indicator variable of one if the Big4 Auditor (PWC, E&Y, 
Deloitte or KPMG) audits the company and zero otherwise, 
identified via IQ_AUDITOR_NAME; data source: CapitalIQ 
based on original filings or Company Data 
Capital ratio  
 
Book value of equity over total assets; data source: CapitalIQ 
based on original filings or Company Data 
Asset growth  
 
The yearly growth rate of total assets (IQ_TOTAL_ASSETS); data 
source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or Company Data 
Analysts  
 
Analyst coverage estimated via (IQ_EST_NUM_NO_OPINION); 
data source: CapitalIQ based on original filings or Company Data 
Disclosure score Credit risk disclosure score, see Appendix F-G for details; data 
source: Company Data 
  
State aid characteristics  
On-going state aid Indicator variable of one whether the state aid is ongoing and zero 
otherwise. I searched (via company webpage and a google search) 
for each bank with state aid whether they announced the end of the 
state aid or not; words used were “state aid” and “repay”, “end”, 





Recapitalization Indicator variable of one whether the state aid included a 
recapitalization and zero otherwise; data source: European 
Commission and company information 
Guarantees Indicator variable of one whether the state aid included guarantees 
and zero otherwise; data source: European Commission and 
company information 
Asset relief measure Indicator variable of one whether the state aid included an asset 
relief measure and zero otherwise; data source: European 
Commission and company information 
Liquidity assistance Indicator variable of one whether the state aid included liquidity 
assistance and zero otherwise; data source: European Commission 
and company information 
Duration Years of state aid of a bank calculated as the difference of the year 
the first state aid package per bank get announced and the 
announced repayment or the difference between the first year and 
2018; data source: European Commission and company 
information 
  
Country-level variables  
Regulatory quality index 
 
Annual changing estimate of the perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development; a 
value of -2.5 is considered weak and a value of 2.5 as strong; defined 
as RQ.EST; data source: World Bank's worldwide governance 
indicators 
Rule of law index 
 
Annual changing estimate of perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. Estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate 
indicator, in units of standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from 
approximately -2.5 to 2.5; defined as RL.EST; data source: World 
Bank's worldwide governance indicators 
Control of corruption index 
 
Annual changing estimate of perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. Estimate gives the country's score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of standard normal distribution, i.e., 
ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5; defined as CC.EST; data 




Annual changing estimate of perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. Estimate gives the 
country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of standard 




defined as GE.EST; data source: World Bank's worldwide 
governance indicators 
Unemployment rate Annual change of the unemployment rate defined as a percentage of 
the labor force (the total number of people employed plus 
unemployed); defined as SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS; data source: World 
Bank's worldwide governance indicator 
GDP growth rate The annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 
on constant local currency; defined as NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG; 






Appendix B: Guide on How to Identify Banks with State Aid 
 
This snapshot depicts the database that is relevant for screening the banks with state aid. First, I selected the policy 
area under “state aid” as shown. Second, via the economic sector selection, I chose “K - Financial and insurance 
activities” to obtain the publicly available list of state aid decisions made. Although the EC must publish its 
decisions or a summary notice in the Official Journal at least, the Member States may ask for the non-disclosure 
of information covered by the obligation to keep professional secrecy which complicated the data collection 
process. The link to the database with the cases is: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1&policy_area_id=3 (accessed throughout 2018-
2020, last time: 03.04.2021) 
To capture all banks with state aid, including all forms of public assistance, using taxpayer-funded resources, I 
also screened a list of all public and private banks in the EU via a google search “state aid” / “bail-out” and the 
name of the bank. The list of banks was obtained via CapitalIQ and the industry code SIC code: 60-62. Secondary 
sources such as CEPS task for reports on bank state aid and past literature (e.g., Gerhardt and Vennet [2017]), 
were also consulted to identify state aid banks. 
 






Appendix C: Overview of EU State Aid Rules in the Financial Crisis 
 
The Commission’s approach concerning state aid for banks is explained via means of so-called 
Communications of which five major Communications have been released for the financial sector and that have 
had importance during the financial crisis.44 The EC normally issues specific Communications to lay down 
guidelines on specific criteria, for example, criteria for assessing the compatibility of state aid in the banking 
sector. Generally, a Communication belongs to a standard procedure when the EC faces a new policy challenge, 
and it is a policy paper to inform the EU lawmakers of the situation. A consultation process with different 
stakeholders precedes the publication of the Communication. The Communication functions like a 
memorandum that explains the Commission’s views on an issue. 
 
Communication Key Features 
First Banking Communication 
of 13 October 2008 
• Gives guidance on the application of state aid rules to 
public support schemes as well as individual assistance 
for financial institutions 
• Points out essential elements for authorizing state aid are 
non-discrimination, limited in time and scope of aid, 
appropriately remunerated 
• Requires that state aid receiving banks should abstain 
from abusing state aid to aggressively expand 
• Emphasizes the need for structural measures for the 
whole financial sector  
Recapitalisation Communication  
of 5 December 2008 
• Provides more detailed remuneration criteria 
• Safeguards were built in to ensure that public capital is 
used to sustain lending to the real economy 
• Aims to avoid fostering aggressive commercial conduct 
to detriment of competitors who have managed without 
state aid 
Impaired Asset Communication  
of 25 February 2009 
• Aims to tackle impaired assets on balance sheets by 
providing guidance for aid linked to relieving banks 
from these assets 
• Foreseeable losses should be disclosed and properly 
handled by banks  
• Provides methodologies for valuation of impaired assets 
and necessary remuneration of state for asset relief 
Restructuring Communication  
of 19 August 2009 
• Offers more details on conditions as to when banks need 
to submit a restructuring plan and what measures should 
be included  
• Requires having strategies to remedy unsustainable 
business models  
• Aims to achieve long term viability without state support 
under adverse economic conditions 
Fifth Communication  
of 10 July 2013 
• Voices importance of a sound plan for restructuring or 
orderly winding down before banks can benefit from 
recapitalizations or asset protection measures 
 
44 Information has directly been sourced from http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/temporary.html and 




• Strengthened burden-sharing requirements obliging 
shareholders and junior creditors to contribute first 
before banks can ask for public funding 
• State-aided banks were asked to introduce strict 
executive remuneration policies and give management 
proper incentives to implement restructuring plan and 
repay aid 
Additional Communication  
Additional Communication on the 
return to viability and the 
assessment of restructuring 
measures 
of 23 July 2009 
• Explains how the EC will examine aid for the 
restructuring of banks  
• Will be applied for the assessment of restructuring aid 
notified to the Commission on or before 31 December 
2010 
Additional Communication on 
state aid rules to support 
measures in favor of banks in the 
context of the financial crisis 
of 01 December 2010 
• Describes steps of the EC to set out a gradual phasing 
out regards to a recapitalization and impaired asset 
measures 







Appendix D: Monitoring Trustee’s Characteristics and Duties 
 
This table summarizes the characteristics and duties of monitoring trustees (MT) to give readers an idea of the 
monitoring trustee’s duties and assigned work. As the responsibilities may vary across different banks and even 
for a single mandate as the scope of the mandate may change over time, this overview should not be regarded as 
being all-encompassing. Normally, all duties of an MT are specified in the commitment catalog to which I have 
(to this date) no access because these files are not publicly available and not all data is publicly available, also 
due to the obligation to keep professional secrecy. 
 
Panel A:   
Characteristics Exemplary Sources 
Legal person: The MT is one or more 
natural or legal person(s). 
Brussels, 30.05.2012 C (2012) 3540; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C (2015) 9349 final; 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final 
Presence: The MT can be physically 
present in the bank. 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final;  
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final;  
Brussels, 23.07.2014 C (2014) 5201 final; 21.11.2012 
Official Journal of the European Union C 359/45 
Appointment: The MT is appointed by 
the concerned bank with the approval 
of the Commission; the appointment 
takes place after the Commission’s 
endorsement; the Commission may 
object to appointments if it, for 
example, has doubts with regards to the 
conflict of interest. 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 9087 final; 
Brussels, 14.12.2009 C (2009)10112 final; 
Brussels, 30.06.2010 C (2010) 4487 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brüssel, 04.10.2012 C (2012) 7047 final; 
Brussels, 11.05.2012 C (2012) 3150 final; 
Brussels, 16.11.2012 C (2012) 8238 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 27.7.2012 C (2012) 5390 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9886 final; 
Brüssel, 05.02.2013 C(2013) 507 final; 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final;  
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final; 
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 23.07.2014, C (2014) 5201 final; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C (2015) 9349 final; 
Brussels, 21.11.2016 C(2016) 7526 final 
Conflict of interest: The MT needs to 
be independent (of the country and the 
concerned bank) to avoid any conflict 
of interest; the Commission can require 
its replacement in a case of conflict of 
interest. 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 9087 final; 
Brussels, 30.06.2010 C (2010) 4487 final; 
Brussels, 30.05.2012 C (2012) 3540; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final;  
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final;  
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 2.7.2015 C (2015) 4635 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C (2015) 9349 final 
Remuneration: The MT is remunerated 
by the bank in a way that does not 
impede the independent and effective 
fulfillment of its mandate. 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 9087 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final; 




15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C (2015) 9349 final 
Qualification: The MT must possess, 
as an investment bank, consultant, or 
auditor, the knowledge, expertise, and 
workforce that is required to carry out 
its mandate. 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
Brussels, 30.06.2010 C (2010) 4487 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 24.7.2013 C (2013) 4801 final; 
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.04.2014;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final 
Additional advisors: The MT may 
appoint additional advisors (e.g., for 
corporate finance and legal advice); 
only the MT or the Commission can 
instruct the advisors. 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final 
 
End of activities: The MT can cease its 
activities only after the Commission 
has discharged the MT from its duties 
and can reappoint the MT if it finds 
that some relevant commitments have 
not been properly implemented as 
agreed in the prior commitments. 
Brussels, 30.03.2012 C (2012) 2227 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final;  
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final 
  
Panel B:  
Duties Exemplary Sources 
The MT must monitor and correct 
compliance with all points set out in 
the commitment agreement (which 
may differ across banks). 
Brussels, 14.12.2009 C (2009)10112 final; 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 20.12.2011 C (2011) 9755 final; 
Brussels, 30.05.2012 C (2012) 3540; 
Brussels, 25.7.2012 C (2012) 5063 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8764 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final;  
Brussels, 24.7.2013 C (2013) 4802 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2013 C (2013) 9592 final; 
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final; 
Brussels, 13.08.2014 C (2014) 5857 final; 
Brussels, 23.07.2014 C (2014) 5201 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final;  
Brussels, 11.10.2017 C (2017) 6896 final; 
Brussels, 31.08.2018 C (2018) 5749 final 
The MT must follow orders or 
instructions from the Commission and 
the MT is not entitled to follow 
instructions obtained from the 
concerned bank. 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27;  
Brussels, 20.12.2011 C (2011) 9755 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final,  
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final 
The MT must file reports frequently 
(e.g., half-yearly; quarterly, yearly) to 
be sent to the Commission and the 
respective country; the bank may also 
obtain the reports but only a non-
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 9000 final corr.; 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
Brussels, 14.12.2009 C (2009)10112 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 30.06.2010 C (2010) 4487 final; 




confidential version of the report. MT 
must also submit a final report. 
Brussels, 11.05.2012 C (2012) 3150 final; 
Brussels, 30.05.2012 C (2012) 3540; 
Brussels, 16.11.2012 C (2012) 8238 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 25.7.2012 C (2012) 5063 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2013 C (2013) 9592 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final;  
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final; 
Brussels, 23.07.2014 C (2014) 5201 final; 
Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014; 25.11.2014; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 24.02.2014 C (2014) 1202 final; 
Brussels, 13.08.2014 C (2014) 5857 final; 
Brussels, 9.4.2015 C (2015) 2353 final; 
Brussels, 22.11.2015 C (2015) 8374 final; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C (2015) 9349 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final;  
Brussels, 25.6.2017 C (2017) 4501 final; 
Brüssel, 17.3.2017 C (2017)1695 final; 
Brussels, 11.10.2017 C (2017) 6896 final; 
Brussels, 31.08.2018 C (2018) 5749 final; 110/40 Official 
The MT must monitor the 
implementation on corporate 
governance; MT is allowed and should 
attend, as an observer, the meetings of 
the Managing Board, Credit Council, 
Credit Committee as well as the 
meetings of the Audit Committee 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final; 
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final; Brussels, 
25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final;  
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final;  
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 
Brussels, 13.08.2014 C (2014) 5857 final; 
Brussels, 24.7.2013 C (2013) 4801 final; 
Brussels, 23.05. 2011C (2011) 3589 final 
The MT must monitor the 
implementation on commercial 
operations and assessment of projected 
operational results (e.g., 
implementation of a litigation policy to 
maximize recoveries, monitor pricing 
policies, limit the risk of prioritizing 
volume growth; review Know-Your-
Client (KYC) and Anti-Money-
Laundering (AML) procedures; 
monitor agreed measures to reach cost-
to-income ratio, restrictions on 
commercial advertising and acquisition 
bans or dividend bans). 
Brussels, 14.12.2009 C (2009)10112 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 20.12.2011 C (2011) 9755 final; 
Brussels, 25.7.2012 C(2012) 5063 final; 
Brussels, 11.05.2012 C (2012) 3150 final; 
Brussels, 16.11.2012 C (2012) 8238 final; 
21.11.2012 Official Journal of the European Union C 
359/45; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 24.7.2013 C (2013) 4801 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 24.7.2013 C (2013) 4802 final 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final;  
Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final;  
Brussels, 23.07.2014 C (2014) 5201 final; 
Brussels, 24.02.2014 C (2014) 1202 final; 
Brussels, 13.08.2014 C (2014) 5857 final; 
Brussels, 16.12.2015 C(2015) 9349 final; 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final;  
Brussels, 11.10.2017 C (2017) 6896 final; 
Brussels, 31.08.2018 C (2018) 5749 final; 110/40 Official 
The MT must monitor commitments 
given on the restructuring of activities 
in the home country and abroad. 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 8980 final; 
Brussels, 14.12.2009 C (2009)10112 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 




Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9886 final 
Brussels, 25.7.2012 C (2012) 5063 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 13.05.2013 C (2013) 2793 final; 
Commission Decision of 3 September 2013 — State aid 
SA.32554 (09/C); 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brüssel, 05.02.2013 C (2013) 507 final; 
Brussels, 24.02.2014 C (2014) 1202 final; 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final 
The MT must engage in risk 
monitoring: loans exceeding a certain 
predefined exposure must be reported 
to the MT. The MT must receive 
access to the information regarding 
credit risk management and the set of 
alerts and reports, which help the risk 
management department to identify 
loan impairments, to assess the 
provisioning of non-performing loans, 
to assess the recoverability of loans and 
early signs of loan impairments and the 
overall exposure to individual clients 
or credit portfolios. MT might also 
assess the request for a revision of 
Value at Risk (VaR), stop loss limit on 
proprietary trading, and provide a 
report to the Commission for its 
endorsement; the MT can also propose 
corrective and improvement actions to 
the Board of Directors if necessary. 
MT may review the most significant 
loans regularly and interview all 
members of the relevant committees 
responsible. Supervising the reduction 
of the balance sheet and risk-weighted 
assets (RWA) may also be required by 
the MT. 
Brussels, 30.06.2010 C (2010) 4487 final; 
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 
Brussels, 16.11.2012 C (2012) 8238 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9830 final 
Brussels, 13.05.2013 C (2013) 2793 final; 
Commission Decision of 3 September 2013 — State aid 
SA.32554 (09/C); 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 24.02.2014 C (2014) 1202 final; 
Brussels, 29.04.2014 C (2014) 2933 final;  
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 23.07.2014 C (2014) 5201 final; 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final;  
Brussels, 11.10.2017 C (2017) 6896 final;  
Brussels, 31.08.2018 C (2018) 5749 final 
 
 
The MT can postpone the granting of 
credit lines or loans if conditions do 
not appear to be met or the MT has 
received insufficient information. 
Brussels, 09.07.2014 C (2014) 4662 final 
The MT must agree if assets and 
liabilities shall be transferred between 
units. 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final 
The MT must analyze and report any 
remedial actions proposed by the bank 
to the Commission if the bank is failing 
to meet any commitments set out in the 
prior commitment catalogue. 
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9840 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final  
The MT has unrestricted access to all 
information needed to monitor the 
agree implementations; this includes 
any books, records, documents, 
Brussels, 18.11.2009 C (2009) 9087 final; 
15.4.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 95/27; 
Brussels, 31.3.2011 C (2011) 2262 final; 
Brussels, 28.11.2012 C (2012) 8759 final; 




management or other personnel, 
facilities, sites and technical 
information of the bank or of the 
business to be sold that are necessary 
to fulfil the MT’s duties under its 
mandate. 
Brussels, 20.12.2012 C (2012) 9886 final 
Brussels, 13.05.2013 C (2013) 2793 final; 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final;  
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final; 
Brussels, 25.11.2014 C (2014) 8959 final; 
Brussels, 24.02.2014 C (2014) 1202 final; 
Brussels, 13.08.2014 C (2014) 5857 final; 
110/40 Official Journal of the European Union 12.4.2014;  
Brussels, 22.11.2015 C (2015) 8374 final; 
Brussels, 19.12.2015 C (2015) 9762 final; 
Brussels, 04.07.2017 C (2017) 4690 final 
The MT must report immediately to 
the Commission if it has reasons to 
assume that the respective bank is 
failing to comply with the agreed 
commitments. 
Brussels, 30.08.2013 C (2013) 5669 final; 
Brussels, 18.12.2013 C (2013) 9632 final 
 
The MT is required to monitor any 
divestment of business sub-units as 
agreed in the commitment catalogue. 
Brussels, 20.12.2011 C (2011) 9755 final 
 
On confidential basis, a relevant 
competitor shall provide the MT with 
information regarding the market 
share, if needed. 







Appendix E: Example of EC’s Decision and Monitoring Trustees’ Responsibilities 
  
This excerpt shows an example of a publicly available EC’s decision concerning the state aid of Catalunya Banc 
S.A., State aid n° SA. 33735 (2012/N). As the responsibilities may vary across different banks and even for a 
single mandate as the scope of the mandate may change over time, this overview should not be regarded as being 
all-encompassing. Normally, all duties of a Monitoring Trustee are specified in the commitment catalog to which 



























Appendix F: Credit Risk Disclosure Score Construction 
 
This table outlines the items accounted for in the credit risk disclosure score. The best practice recommendations 
follow the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000): Basel Committee Publications - Best Practices for 







IAS / IFRS 
Best Practice 
Recommendation 
Definition past due/impaired Qualitative 4a IFRS 7.33b 7 
Description of approaches for specific and 
general allowances 
Qualitative 4a IFRS 7.33b 7 
Total gross credit exposure Quantitative 4b 
IFRS 7.36 (a), 
IG21 
19 
Inclusion of off-balance sheet 
commitments to the credit exposure 
Qualitative 4b 
IFRS 7.36 (a), 
IG21, B10 
 - 
Distribution of credit exposure by major 
geographic areas 
Quantitative 4c 
IFRS 7.36 (a), 
34 (c) 
12 
Amount of credit exposure by geographic 
region 
Quantitative 4c 
IFRS 7.37 (a), 
20(e), IG29 
12 
Distribution of credit exposure by 
counterparty or industry 
Quantitative 4d 
IFRS 7.36 (a), 
34 (c) 
19 
Amount of credit exposure by industry Quantitative 4f 
IFRS 7.37 (a), 
20(e), IG29 
19 
Amount of credit risk exposure by 
counterparty 
Quantitative 4f 
IFRS 7.36 (a), 
34 (c) 
19 
Amount of credit risk exposure by segment 
(business line) 
Quantitative 4f IAS 14.9 10 
Residual maturity breakdown of the whole 
portfolio 
Quantitative 4e IFRS 7.39 9 
Amount of specific and general allowances 





Allowances broken down by specific and 
general 
Quantitative 4f IFRS 7.37(b) 20 
Reconciliation of changes in the 
allowances for loan impairment 
Quantitative 4h 
IFRS 7.16, IAS 
37.84 
21 
Explanation of internal rating 
process/description of external ratings used 
Qualitative 5a/6a-c 
IFRS 7.36(c), 
IG 24, IG 25 
8 
Breakdown of credit risk exposure by 









IG 22, 15 
14 












Total amount of counterparty credit risk Quantitative 8a IFRS 7.36(a) 11 
Total amount of restructured loans Quantitative 8b  - 23 
Description of significant concentrations 
of credit risk 
Qualitative 8a IFRS 7.34 13 
Description of techniques used to 
mitigate/reallocate credit risk (derivatives, 
guarantees) 
Qualitative 8a -  14 










Appendix G: Example of AIB – Annual Report 2009 
 
This table outlines the coding for AIB’s annual report in 2009 and the items used to set up the credit risk 
disclosure score in 2009.  
(Link: https://aib.ie/content/dam/aib/investorrelations/docs/Annual%20General%20Meeting/2010/annual-
financial-report-2009.pdf; access date: 15.08.2020). The maximum score is 25 and AIB scored 24 out of 25 in 
2009. 
 




“Impaired: a loan is impaired if there is objective evidence of impairment as a result of one 
or more events that occurred after the initial recognition of the assets (a ‘loss event’) and 
that loss event (or events) has an impact such that the present value of future cash flows is 
less than the current carrying value of the financial asset or group of assets i.e., requires a 
provision to be raised through the profit and loss.” 
Description of 
approaches for 





“Specific provisions arise when the recovery of a specific loan or group of loans is 
significantly in doubt. The amount of the specific provision will reflect the financial 
position of the borrower and the net realizable value of any security held for the loan or 
group of loans. In practice, the specific provision is the difference between the present value 
of expected future cash flows for the impaired loan(s) and the carrying value. When raising 
specific provisions, AIB divides its impaired portfolio into two categories, namely 
individually significant and individually insignificant.” 
“The increase in provisions (as a percentage of total loans, including loans and receivables 
held for sale to NAMA) from 1.74% to 5.50% reflects the increased provisioning across all 
divisions, particularly in specific provision in the period. Specific allowances are allocated 
to individual impaired loans. Impaired loans increased from €2,991 million in 2008 to 
€17,453 million at December 2009. Specific provisions as a percentage of total loans 
increased from 0.87% to 4.46% (the geographic splits by sector of specific provisions for 
non-NAMA and NAMA are set out on pages 85 and 90 respectively). 
Total gross credit 
exposure 
1 71 “Maximum exposure to credit risk” 
Inclusion of off-
balance sheet 
commitments to the 
credit exposure 
1 71 
“The table below sets out the maximum exposure to credit risk that arises within the Group 
and distinguishes between those assets that are carried in the statement of financial position 
at amortised cost and those carried at fair value. The most significant credit risks arise from 
lending activities to customers and banks, trading portfolio, available for sale, held for sale 
and held to maturity financial investments, derivatives and ‘off-balance sheet’ guarantees 
and commitments. The credit risks arising from balances at central banks, treasury bills and 
items in course of collection are deemed to be negligible based on their maturity and 
counterparty status.” 
Distribution of credit 
exposure by major 
geographic areas 
1 91 
Cross-border outstanding with counties United Kingdom, United States, Germany, France, 
Spain, Italy, Australia etc. 
Amount of credit 
exposure by 
geographic region 
1 78 Table with Ireland, UK, USA, Poland and Rest of World 





Table with Agriculture, Energy, Manufacturing, Construction and property, Distribution, 
Transport, Financial, Services, Personal and Lease financing 
Amount of credit 
exposure by industry 
1 78 
Table with amounts regarding the following industries: Agriculture, Energy, 
Manufacturing, Construction and property, Distribution, Transport, Financial, Services, 
Personal and Lease financing 




Table with amount of credit exposure including loans and receivables to banks and loans 




Amount of credit risk 
exposure by segment 
(business line) 
1 197 Table with AIB Bank Ireland, AIB Bank UK and Capital Markets  
Residual maturity 
breakdown of the 
whole portfolio 
1 258 Table with financial assets and financial liabilities by contractual residual maturity 





1 80 Table with amounts include Loans and receivables to banks and to customers. 
Allowances broken 
down by specific and 
general 
1 80 Table with provisions at end of period, specific and IBNR (collective) 
Reconciliation of 
changes in the 
allowances for loan 
impairment 









“The Group’s rating systems consist of a number of individual rating tools designed to 
assess the risk within particular portfolios. These ratings tools are calibrated to meet the 
needs of individual business units in managing their portfolios. All rating tools are built to 
a Group standard and independently validated by Group.” 
“Perhaps the most significant amendment is the ability of banks to use the outputs of their 
own internal rating systems to calculate capital requirements for credit risk. This is known 
as the internal ratings-based approach (“IRBA”).” 
 
Breakdown of credit 




Table with external ratings profiles of loans and receivables to banks, trading portfolio 
financial assets (excluding equity securities), financial investments available for sale 
(excluding equity shares) and financial investments held to maturity are as follows 
Description of 
collateral received for 
financial assets 
1 74 
“In relation to individual exposures, while the perceived strength of the borrower’s 
repayment capacity is the primary factor in granting the loan, AIB uses various approaches 
to help mitigate risks in individual credits including transaction structure, security, and 
guarantees. These items of collateral or guarantees are required as a secondary source of 
repayment in the event of the borrower’s default. Guidelines covering the acceptability of 
different forms of security and how it should be valued are outlined in the various 
Divisional policy papers. The main types of collateral for loans and receivables to 
customers are as follows:…” 
Amount of total 
credit exposure 
covered by collateral 
1 195 
“Under reverse repurchase agreements, the Group has accepted collateral that it is permitted 
to sell or repledge in the absence of default by the owner of the collateral. The fair value of 
collateral received amounted to o 679 million…” 




1 241 Table with guarantees and assets pledged as collateral security 
Total amount of 
counterparty credit 
risk 
0 - - 
Total amount of 
restructured loans 
1 199 
“Loans and receivables renegotiated are those facilities at the current reporting date that, 
during the financial year, have had their terms renegotiated resulting in an upgrade from 
91+ days past due or impaired status to performing status such that if they were not 
renegotiated, they would be otherwise past due or impaired. Renegotiated loans and 










AIB’s Group Large Exposure Policy sets out maximum exposure limits to, or on behalf of, 
a customer or a group of connected customers. At 31 December 2009, the Group’s top 50 
exposures amounted to d 20.0 billion, and accounted for 15.4% of the Group’s on balance 
sheet gross loans and receivables to customers including those held for sale to NAMA (d 
19.0 billion and 14.4% at 31 December 2008). Of this amount 11.2 billion relate to loans 
held for sale to NAMA. No single customer exposure exceeds regulatory guidelines. See 
also Risk Management - Credit risk management and mitigation. 
Description of 






“In relation to individual exposures, while the perceived strength of the borrower’s 
repayment capacity is the primary factor in granting the loan, AIB uses various approaches 
to help mitigate risks in individual credits including transaction structure, security, and 
guarantees.” 
Total amount of 
credit derivatives 
1 190 Table with credit derivatives contracts total 











Appendix H: Disclosing versus Not Disclosing the MT’s Presence in a Bank 
 
This table reports ordinary least squares regression coefficient estimates examining the impact of the 
Monitoring Trustees (MT) on the LLA ratio and financial restatements for the income statement only (as shown 
in tables 4 and 5). I include year and bank fixed effects in the regressions. Columns (1) and (3) exclude all 
banks that have not disclosed having an MT. Columns (2) and (4) exclude all banks that have disclosed having 
an MT. Disclosing banks (20) include listed and non-listed banks. The table reports ordinary least squares 
coefficient estimates and p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by bank in (1)-(4). The specific 
description of variables used in this table can be found in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  
Monitoring Trustee – Disclosing versus Non-Disclosing MTs 
















Test Variables:     
Monitoring Trustee - - - - 
Post 0.004 0.001 -0.012 -0.023 
Monitoring Trustee * Post 0.033** 0.005 0.171** 0.062 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (bank-years) 888 935 888 935 
R2 0.750 0.674 0.259 0.251 




Appendix I: Excerpt of the Interviews 
 
The interviews were not recorded and only contain the personal views of the people interviewed and not the view 
and opinions of the EC. The purpose of the interviews was to obtain key insights from experts regarding the role 
of monitoring trustees in the European Union. Some questions were also answered by email by the DG 
Competition which are not disclosed here. Approval was obtained from the interviewee to publish the interview 










Figure 2: Identification Strategy 
 
This figure illustrates the identification strategy. I employ a difference-in-differences design based on the staggered 
adoption of state aid decisions with and without monitoring trustees. It was assumed that the state aid was active 
until the end of the period of analyses if no corporate press releases were found that explicitly stated a repayment 
of the state aid. For my baseline analyses, I assume as shown in panel B, that the Monitoring Trustee does not 












Figure 3: Distribution of Monitoring Trustees across the Whole Sample 
 
This figure shows the distribution of banks with state aids with and without monitoring trustees over time, starting 
from 2005 to 2019, including all 122 identified cases as described in Table 1. 2008-2012 have been the years with 







Figure 4: Geographical Distribution of Monitoring Trustees 
 
This figure shows the geographical distribution of MTs across the different EU member states based on the starting 
sample of 122 banks with state aid. The percentage shows how many state aid bank cases were assigned with MTs. 
Like Gerhardt and Vennet [2017], several countries did not rescue banks because the banking sector is primarily 










Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
Panel A: Basic sample composition 
 
This table shows the sample construction for the state aid banks with and without Monitoring Trustees (MTs) in 
the European Union from 2005 to 2018. The initial sample includes all banks with state aid that could have been 
identified. After considering missing financials (missing total assets and total gross loans) in the pre-crisis year 
2004 and excluding Banco Espírito Santo S.A. due to an extremely high RoA value, 76 banks remain in the sample. 
The sample is partitioned according to the MT indicator variable, which is one for banks with MT and zeroes 
otherwise. Appendix B further describes the process of how MTs were identified. Other papers that cover EU state 
aid banks identified 114 over 2007-2013 (Gerhardt and Vennet [2017]) and 66 over 2000-2015 (Schaz [2019]) 
with naming the banks. 
 




Starting sample of banks 122 
Private and public banks in the European Union with 
state aid 
with MT (treated banks) 66 54% 
without MT (control banks) 56 46% 
Remaining banks 76 
Available financial data of total assets and gross 
loans in pre-crises year 2004 and following years 
with MT (treated banks) 41 54% 







Panel B: Sample composition across countries  
 
This table shows the distribution of banks across countries, the number of Monitoring Trustees (MTs) and the first 
year of state aid paid to a bank and the last year in which state aid was paid to a bank in the respective country. 
 
Country 
# of Banks 
with State 
Aid 




Year of First 
State Aid 





% of Total 
Austria 9 5 56% 4th Qtr. 2005 1st Qtr. 2017 6 8% 
Belgium 3 3 100% 4th Qtr. 2008 4th Qtr. 2008 2 3% 
Bulgaria 1 1 100% 2nd Qtr. 2014 2nd Qtr. 2014 1 1% 
Cyprus 3 1 33% 2nd Qtr. 2012 2nd Qtr. 2014 2 3% 
Denmark 10 4 40% 2nd Qtr. 2007 1st Qtr. 2012 8 11% 
Finland 1 0 0% 3rd Qtr. 2008 3rd Qtr. 2008 1 1% 
France 7 1 14% 3rd Qtr. 2008 4th Qtr. 2017 5 7% 
Germany 10 4 40% 3rd Qtr. 2007 2nd Qtr. 2009 9 12% 
Greece 8 5 63% 2nd Qtr. 2009 4th Qtr. 2016 7 9% 
Hungary 2 1 50% 1st Qtr. 2009 2nd Qtr. 2015 2 3% 
Ireland 6 2 33% 1st Qtr. 2009 3rd Qtr. 2011 5 7% 
Italy 13 8 62% 1st Qtr. 2009 1st Qtr. 2019 7 9% 
Latvia 2 2 100% 4th Qtr. 2009 2nd Qtr. 2015 0 0% 
Lithuania 2 1 50% 1st Qtr. 2012 1st Qtr. 2013 1 1% 
Luxembourg 2 0 0% 2nd Qtr. 2009 4th Qtr. 2009 0 0% 
Malta 1 0 0% 4th Qtr. 2014 4th Qtr. 2014 0 0% 
Netherlands 4 3 75% 4th Qtr. 2008 4th Qtr. 2008 1 1% 
Poland 2 0 0% 3rd Qtr. 2010 3rd Qtr. 2012 1 1% 
Portugal 6 5 83% 4th Qtr. 2008 4th Qtr. 2015 4 5% 
Romania 1 0 0% 1st Qtr. 2019 1st Qtr. 2019 0 0% 
Slovenia 5 5 100% 1st Qtr. 2011 4th Qtr. 2013 4 5% 
Spain 15 13 87% 4th Qtr. 2008 1st Qtr. 2014 5 7% 
Sweden 3 0 0% 1st Qtr. 2006 2nd Qtr. 2009 1 1% 
United Kingdom 6 2 33% 3rd Qtr. 2007 4th Qtr. 2011 4 5% 
  122 66 




Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Comparison of state aid banks with and without monitoring trustees in the pre-crisis years 2004-2003  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the 76 state aid banks with (41) and without monitoring trustees (35) in the pre-crisis years 2004-2003 with 79 
bank-years for MT banks and 68 bank-year for Non-MT banks. I provide detailed variable definitions in Appendix A together with sample construction steps in 
table 1 panel A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
  
Summary statistics                   
 MT banks  Non-MT banks    
Variables of interest Mean Med. SD  Mean Med. SD  
Difference in 
Means 
LLP ratio 0.007 0.006 0.008  0.005 0.005 0.005  0.002 
NPL ratio 0.015 0.003 0.022  0.721 0.009 4.046  -0.706 
LLA ratio 0.021 0.016 0.021  0.016 0.009 0.020  0.005 
Restatements 0.506 1.000 0.503  0.618 1.000 0.490  -0.111 
Size 10.340 10.210 1.986  10.603 10.520 2.176  -0.263 
Charge-off ratio -0.001 0.000 0.002  -0.003 0.000 0.004  0.001 
Consumer loans ratio 0.056 0.002 0.082  0.097 0.000 0.182  -0.041 
Commercial loans ratio 0.314 0.223 0.321  0.194 0.136 0.208  0.120*** 
Real estate loans ratio 0.001 0.000 0.001  0.006 0.000 0.019  -0.005** 
Tier 1 ratio 0.070 0.074 0.042  0.061 0.074 0.048  0.009 
RoA 0.008 0.007 0.012  0.006 0.006 0.006  0.001 
Loss 0.025 0.000 0.158  0.059 0.000 0.237  -0.034 
Risk-weighted assets 0.390 0.411 0.356  0.319 0.347 0.294  0.071 
Big4 Auditor 0.873 1.000 0.335  0.971 1.000 0.170  -0.097** 
Regulatory quality index 1.303 1.314 0.309  1.416 1.502 0.280  -0.113** 
Rule of law index 1.304 1.310 0.456  1.417 1.529 0.461  -0.113 
Control of corruption index 1.338 1.357 0.674  1.493 1.459 0.688  -0.156 
Government effectiveness index 1.400 1.353 0.540  1.506 1.540 0.510  -0.106 
GDP growth rate 0.008 -0.001 0.030  0.010 0.002 0.026  -0.002 




Panel B: Comparison of state aid banks with and without monitoring trustees  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of state aid banks with and without monitoring trustees in the period from 2003-2018 for the sample of 76 banks and 
N=1,049 bank-years. I provide detailed variable definitions in Appendix A together with sample construction steps in table 1 panel A. ***, **, and * denote 







Summary statistics                           
 Bank-
years 
MT Banks  Non-MT Banks  
Difference 
in Means 
Variables of interest  Mean Min. Med. Max. SD  Mean Min. Med. Max. SD  
LLP ratio 1,049 0.014 -0.092 0.007 0.366 0.029  0.010 -0.025 0.005 0.702 0.035 0.004 
NPL ratio 1,049 0.086 0.000 0.037 0.982 0.142  0.393 0.000 0.029 43.195 3.202 -0.307** 
LLA ratio 1,049 0.051 0.000 0.027 0.461 0.065  0.032 0.000 0.022 0.300 0.040 0.019*** 
Restatements 1,049 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500  0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 -0.012 
Size 1,049 10.795 4.948 10.872 15.145 1.926  11.273 5.069 10.952 14.911 2.098 -0.478*** 
Charge-off ratio 1,049 -0.008 -0.205 -0.003 0.001 0.018  -0.005 -0.202 -0.002 0.000 0.012 -0.003*** 
Consumer loans ratio 1,049 0.081 0.000 0.031 0.544 0.109  0.109 0.000 0.004 0.882 0.187 -0.028*** 
Commercial loans ratio 1,049 0.347 0.000 0.298 0.944 0.295  0.216 0.000 0.171 0.997 0.225 0.130*** 
Real estate loans ratio 1,049 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.001  0.004 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.011 -0.003*** 
Tier 1 ratio 1,049 0.096 -0.067 0.093 0.403 0.058  0.117 0.000 0.090 3.041 0.220 -0.021** 
RoA 1,049 -0.001 -0.279 0.003 0.100 0.024  0.001 -0.179 0.003 0.092 0.017 -0.002 
Loss 1,049 0.263 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.441  0.228 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.420 0.035 
Risk-weighted assets 1,049 0.370 0.000 0.387 1.184 0.305  0.339 0.000 0.316 1.188 0.284 0.032 




Panel C: Comparison of country variables of state aid banks with and without monitoring trustees  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the country-level variables as described by the World Bank with N = 1,049. I provide detailed variable definitions together 










Summary statistics                         
 MT Banks  Non-MT Banks  
Difference 
in Means 
Variables of interest Mean Min. Med. Max. SD  Mean Min. Med. Max. SD  
Regulatory quality index 1.187 0.148 1.191 2.047 0.438  1.401 0.148 1.522 1.925 0.366 -0.214*** 
Rule of law index 1.213 -0.113 1.189 2.096 0.569  1.420 0.084 1.622 2.096 0.504 -0.207*** 
Control of corruption index 1.142 -0.267 1.144 2.470 0.751  1.420 -0.189 1.593 2.470 0.696 -0.278*** 
Government effectiveness index 1.199 -0.057 1.188 2.354 0.565  1.403 0.198 1.532 2.354 0.509 -0.204*** 
GDP growth rate -0.011 -1.721 -0.002 0.249 0.146  -0.006 -1.721 -0.001 0.249 0.117 -0.005 




Panel D: Sample of state aid banks with and without monitoring trustees  
This table presents the descriptive statistics about the state aid characteristics of the sample for the 
76 banks (N=1,049). Apart from the duration of the state aid which accounts for the years a bank 
obtained state aid, all other variables are indicator variables if the state aid characteristic is met and 
zero otherwise. The specific description of variables used in this tables can be found in Appendix 
A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 
Summary statistics             
 MT Banks   Non-MT Banks  
Difference in 
Means 
State aid characteristics Mean  Med.   Mean  Med.   
On-going state aid 0.697 1.000  0.537 1.000 0.161*** 
Recapitalization 0.802 1.000  0.688 1.000 0.114*** 
Guarantees 0.550 1.000  0.425 0.000 0.126*** 
Asset relief measure 0.133 0.000  0.022 0.000 0.112*** 
Liquidity assistance 0.145 0.000  0.205 0.000 -0.059** 






Table 3: Selection Criteria based on Observable Country- and Firm-Specific Attributes 
 
Panel A: Selection based on country-specific attributes  
 
This table provides the ordinary least square regression specification including year and country fixed effects with 
robust clustered standard errors being based years in (2) and country and years in (3) to identify statistically 
significant country-specific attributes for the assignment of Monitoring Trustees. The regressions are conducted 
in a stepwise manner, with the independent dummy variable being the bank with a monitoring trustee and zero 
otherwise. The complete list of the variable definitions is provided in Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, 




    OLS   
Dependent variable Monitoring Trustee 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Regulatory quality index -0.495*** -0.347*** -0.261* 
Rule of law index 0.460*** 0.253*** -0.054 
Control of corruption index -0.055 -0.051 -0.083 
Government effectiveness index -0.083 0.044 -0.042 
GDP growth rate -0.089 0.040 0.011 
Unemployment rate -20.355*** -8.979 -6.467 
Country FE No No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
N 1,049 1,049 1,049 
R2 0.066 0.220 0.312 




Panel B: Selection based on firm-specific attributes  
This table provides the ordinary least square regression specification including year- and bank-fixed 
effects with robust clustered standard errors being based years in (2) and bank and years in (3) to identify 
statistically significant bank-specific attributes for the assignment of MTs. The regressions are conducted 
in a stepwise manner, with the independent dummy variable being the bank with a monitoring trustee 
and zero otherwise. The complete list of the variable definitions is provided in Appendix A for variable 









    OLS   
Dependent variable Monitoring Trustee 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
LLP ratio -0.181 0.430 0.058 
NPL ratio -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
LLA ratio 2.275*** 1.323*** 0.511** 
Restatements 0.021 0.042* 0.004 
Size 0.003 -0.010 0.031 
Charge-off ratio -3.417*** -2.107*** -0.116 
Consumer loans ratio 0.185*** 0.194*** -0.020 
Commercial loans ratio -0.146* -0.163** 0.096 
Real estate loans ratio -2.856* -3.623** -0.016 
Tier 1 ratio 0.122 -0.096 0.024 
RoA -0.753 0.055 -0.174 
Loss 0.015 -0.028 -0.003 
Risk-weighted assets -0.079** -0.047 -0.012 
Big4 Auditor 0.041 0.026 -0.008 
Recapitalization 0.139*** 0.141*** 0.655*** 
Guarantees 0.124*** 0.113*** 0.512*** 
Asset relief measure 0.264*** 0.247*** 0.324*** 
Liquidity assistance 0.043 0.047 0.163 
Bank FE No No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
N 1,049 1,049 1,049 
R2 0.229 0.308 0.957 




Table 4: Monitoring Trustees and Loan Loss Reporting 
 
This table reports ordinary least squares regression coefficient estimates examining the impact of the Monitoring Trustees (MT) on banks loan loss provisions, loan loss 
allowance, and non-performing loans in an unbalanced panel. I include year and bank fixed effects in the regressions. All control variables except asset relief measure and 
regulatory quality index are lagged. N shows the firm-year observations based on the 76 banks. All bank control variables apart from the regulatory quality index are lagged. 
The table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by banks. The constant is not reported. Given the sample 
size, variables are not winsorized. The specific description of variables can be found in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Monitoring Trustee and Loan Loss Reporting 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable: LLP Ratiot LLP Ratiot LLA Ratiot LLA Ratiot NPL Ratiot NPL Ratiot 
Test Variables:       
Monitoring Trustee 0.002 - -0.004 - 0.309** - 
Post 0.006 0.009 0.011* 0.002 0.323** 0.072 
Monitoring Trustee * Post -0.001 -0.004 0.019*** 0.019* -0.070 -0.355 
       
Control Variables:       
Size -0.002*** -0.001 -0.007*** -0.024 0.008 -0.007 
Tier 1 ratio -0.007*** -0.003 -0.037*** -0.045* -0.082 -0.040 
Loss -0.005 -0.006 0.023*** 0.015*** 0.166 0.031 
RoA -1.216*** -1.205*** -0.394* -0.375*** -0.301 -2.063 
Risk weighted assets 0.002 -0.002 0.007** -0.008 0.806** 0.318 
GDP growth rate 0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.017** 0.261 0.818 
Consumer loans ratio -0.003* -0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.532* 0.066 
Commercial loans ratio 0.015*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.007 -0.083 0.022 
Real estate loans ratio 0.038 0.178 -0.578** 0.233 1.063 0.721 
Asset relief measure 0.000 -0.002 -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.331 0.390 
Regulatory quality index -0.003 -0.006* -0.036*** -0.098*** -0.429** -0.038 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N  1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 
R2 0.626 0.700 0.501 0.694 0.039 0.328 




Table 5: Monitoring Trustees and Financial Restatements 
 
This table reports ordinary least squares regression coefficient estimates examining the impact of the 
Monitoring Trustees (MT) on financial restatements in an unbalanced panel. I include year and bank fixed 
effects in the regressions. The table reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates and p-values based on 
robust standard errors clustered by bank in (1)-(4). The specification followed the paper Jiang et al. [2016] in 
Table 5 which controls for size, capital, the lag value of the LLP, and the loss binary indicator variable. The 
specific description of variables used in this table can be found in Appendix A. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (two-tailed), respectively. 
  
Monitoring Trustee and Financial 
Restatements 
      














    
Monitoring Trustee - - - - 
Time 0.164** -0.019 0.135* 0.114 
Monitoring Trustee * Time 0.027 0.108** -0.021 0.131* 
 
    
Control Variables:     
Size 0.101** 0.033 0.044 0.162*** 
Loss 0.058 0.061 0.009 0.067 
LLP ratio -0.863* -0.414 -1.159*** -0.521 
Capital ratio 0.753* 0.512** 0.613 0.454 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  1,049 1,049 1,049 1,049 
R2 0.193 0.238 0.222 0.167 









Table 6: Subsample Analysis on Credit Risk Disclosures for Listed Banks 
 
The table compares descriptive statistics of listed banks with (N=16) and without MTs (N=14) where the banks’ 
annual reports’ credit risk disclosures were analyzed over the period 2006-2016 to capture compliance with the 
demanded credit risk disclosures. N in the table shows bank-years for the subsample. A risk disclosure index score 
was constructed to capture compliance with IFRS 7 and Pillar 3 credit risk disclosures (like Bischof et al.2020a). 
IFRS 7 relates to the fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2007. The effective dates of Pillar 3 primarily 
fell in the 2007 to 2008 period with initial disclosures in the years 2008 and 2009. During 2008 and 2009, as can 
be seen in Figure 3, state aid cases accumulated and most banks in this subsample received state aid in 2008 or 
2009. Of the 16 listed banks 8 disclose MTs in their annual reports, the average disclosure score of those banks is 
15.98 vs. 18.39 of banks that do not disclose the MT in their annual report. 
 
Panel A: Disclosures on credit risk for listed banks – 2006-2016 




Variables N Mean  Med.  SD 
 N Mean  Med.  SD   
Size 165 12.06 12.42 1.64  154 12.04 12.30 2.50  0.03 
Analysts 165 1.82 2.30 1.25  154 2.03 2.77 1.34  -0.21 
Capital ratio 165 12.38 13.00 5.77  154 12.66 13.10 7.16  -0.28 
RoA 163 -8.04 3.70 83.91  154 3.44 6.69 18.50  -11.48 
Asset growth 165 0.02 -0.01 0.20  154 0.02 0.02 0.11  0.00 
Regulatory 
quality 
165 1.30 1.34 0.49  154 1.51 1.58 0.31       -0.22*** 
Disclosure score 164 17.58 19.00 5.97  149 18.68 21.00 5.85  -1.10 
 
Panel B: Disclosures on credit risk for listed banks – 2006-2016 
 MT Banks  
with MT Disclosed 
 MT Banks  





Variables N Mean Med. SD 
 N Mean Med. SD   
Size 55 11.52 11.20 1.46  110 12.33 12.70 1.67  -0.81** 
Analysts 55 1.51 1.95 1.33  110 1.97 2.48 1.18  -0.46* 
Capital ratio 55 11.98 12.50 5.01  110 12.58 13.50 6.13  -0.60 
RoA 54 -17.69 5.88 138.74  109 -3.26 3.36 32.34  -14.42 
Asset growth 55 0.03 -0.01 0.15  110 0.02 0.00 0.23  0.02 
Regulatory quality 55 1.09 0.86 0.57  110 1.40 1.46 1.67   -0.31*** 











This dissertation comprises three essays on the role of information and monitoring 
intermediaries in capital markets. The first essay investigates whether different short sellers 
vary in their selection of target firms using observable firm characteristics. Results show that 
hedge funds and investment managers on average prefer larger and younger firms, whereas 
banks focus on firms with fewer restatements and a higher leverage. The second essay provides 
descriptive evidence on how firms respond to activist short seller reports and how these 
responses are associated with outcomes for the targeted firms. It finds that the response rate 
increases substantially when the report is accompanied by significantly negative abnormal 
returns and when the short sellers provide new evidence which is consistent with the idea of 
short sellers acting as information intermediaries. Not responding is associated with a less 
negative stock price response when the report is released and fewer adverse outcomes. The 
third essay shifts the attention to Monitoring Trustees who assist in the supervision of banks 
that have received state aid in the European Union during the last financial crisis. It explores 
in a hand-collected sample the characteristics and duties of these newly implemented monitors 
and it studies the role of these supranational monitors and the banks’ reporting behavior. 
Results suggest that these additional supervisors can influence the banks financial reporting 
transparency and reporting behavior when mainly loan loss reporting and restatements are 
accounted for. 
 
The second essay has been published in the Journal of Accounting Research 
(https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12356). 
 




Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Aufsätze über die Rolle von Informationsintermediären und 
Intermediäre mit Aufsichtsfunktionen in Kapitalmärkten. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht, ob sich 
verschiedene Leerverkäufer bei ihrer Auswahl von Zielunternehmen anhand von sichtbaren 
Merkmalen unterscheiden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Hedgefonds und Investmentmanager 
im Durchschnitt größere und jüngere Unternehmen bevorzugen, während sich Banken auf 




Verschuldungsgrad konzentrieren. Der zweite Aufsatz beschreibt, wie Unternehmen auf 
aktivistische Leerverkäuferberichte reagieren. Es wird festgestellt, dass die Antwortrate 
erheblich steigt, wenn der Bericht von deutlich negativen abnormalen Renditen begleitet wird 
und wenn die Leerverkäufer neue Beweise vorlegen. Dies stimmt mit der Vorstellung überein, 
dass Leerverkäufer als Informationsintermediäre fungieren können. Eine Nichtbeantwortung 
ist außerdem ist mit einer weniger negativen Aktienkursreaktion bei Veröffentlichung und mit 
weniger nachteiligen Ergebnissen verbunden. Die dritte Aufsatz fokusiert sich auf so-genannte 
Monitoring Trustees. Sie sind bei der Überwachung von Banken behilflich, die in der 
Europäischen Union während der letzten Finanzkrise staatliche Beihilfen erhalten haben. In 
einer von Hand gesammelten Stichprobe werden die Merkmale und Aufgaben dieser neu 
implementierten Aufseher und ihre Rolle im Zusammenhang mit dem Berichtsverhalten der 
Banken untersucht. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass diese zusätzlichen Aufseher die 
Transparenz und das Berichtsverhalten der Banken bei der Finanzberichterstattung 
beeinflussen können, insbesondere wenn die Berichterstattung über Kreditverluste und 
Anpassungen der Geschäftsberichte berücksichtigt werden. 
 
Der zweite Aufsatz wurde im Journal of Accounting Research (https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-
679X.12356) publiziert. 
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